Conjuring Up Prehistory

Landscape and the Archaic in Japanese Nationalism

Mark J. Hudson

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Barley ripening at Kanzaki, Saga, Japan. In the distance is Yoshinogari, a large Yayoi-period town with reconstructed watchtowers and other defensive features. (Photo by M. Hudson). Inset: A Yayoi warrior incised on a ceramic bell-shaped object from Kawayori-yoshihara, Kanzaki. (Drawn by J. Uchiyama).

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This book is dedicated to the memory of my parents
Jean Mary Hudson (1938-2004) and William James Hudson (1933-2019).

Contents

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Conventions

Modified Hepburn is used for Japanese. Macrons are omitted for words now common in English. McCune-Reischauer is used for Korean. For Chinese, pinyin is used except for words commonly found in English in Wade-Giles (for example, Taoism) and for people and places in Taiwan. Japanese personal names are given in the European order with family name last. 'Nature' is capitalised to make it seem less natural. Footnotes give the short form of references, which can be found in full at the end of the volume. An English translation of Japanese titles is included in the final reference list. All Japanese books are published in Tokyo unless otherwise noted.

Introduction. Modernity, the archaic and Japanese Nature

> Our notions of place are retroactive fantasy constructs
> determined precisely by the corrosive effects of modernity.
> Timothy Morton, *Ecology Without Nature*.

Walter Benjamin observed that it is 'precisely the modern which always conjures up prehistory.'[1] Building on this insight, the present book looks at how Japanese nationalist writings have used landscape and cultures of the archaic as 'firewalls' against the Anthropocene, emphatic rejections of the queer mess which, since at least Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, has replaced what used to be known as Nature. While various definitions of the Anthropocene exist, the Japanese writings discussed here have attempted to build firewalls around them all. Aside from the emperor, long-selling firewall programmes in Japanese thought have included Shinto, animism, the 'ecotopia' of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, and even 'civilisation'—a Victorian concept resuscitated for its ability to divide and rule human history. Japanese eco-nationalist firewalls have not been built as conscious critiques of the Anthropocene, a concept which assumes a shared, global position vis-à-vis climate catastrophe. Instead, they serve as reflex reactions to the disturbing turning points of human history such as the Neolithic, agriculture, urbanisation, the nation-state, industrialisation and globalisation in its various forms.[2]

What I mean by 'Japanese eco-nationalism' is explained below and contextualised in the first chapter. My use of the term 'firewall' is suggested by Timothy Morton's concept of a 'Neolithic firewall' which, he argues, developed when agriculture led to hierarchical religions that attempted to police inclusion and exclusion. Neolithic elites liked strict boundaries between 'my field and yours, Heaven and Earth, God and Man, human and nonhuman (otherwise known as Nature), king and peasant'.[3] The term 'firewall' seems appropriate because the policing of difference in Japanese nationalist writings is invariably conducted in a highly conscious and often obsessive manner, beginning at least from Moto'ori Norinaga (1730-1801) who attempted to wipe away the 'dust' or 'veil' of the 'Chinese spirit' from the 'clear mirror' of Japaneseness.[4] The writings explored here have proposed an inventive range of firewalls whereby Japan is reified and separated from the Other, an approach which is continually upgraded from the flash memory of Japanese culture. As a literary device, this approach draws on Western works such as *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*—Patient X of this genre in the post war era—yet it goes much further in its increasingly desperate dyadic comparisons. Morton's ideas of agrilogistics and Neolithic firewalls help us to expose a deep irony at the centre of Japanese nationalist writings: in developing their critiques of Western civilisation as a destructive force that damages Nature, these writings use the exact same logic to imagine their own binary structures of inside and outside. The claim that 'my god is bigger and better than your god' is a basic symptom of agrilogistics.[5] In arguing that European monotheistic/ meat-eating civilisation is 'bad', Japanese eco-nationalism simply retweets the same Neolithic logic with its proposal that the polytheistic/rice-and-fish-eating Japanese hard disc is 'good'.

Several of the writers discussed in this book, including philosopher Takeshi Umehara (1925-2019) and archaeologist Yoshinori Yasuda (b. 1946), have launched a frenzied series of ever-excessive claims to

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1 Benjamin, 'Paris', p. 170.
2 For these transitions, see Uekoetter, *The Turning Points of Environmental History*.
3 Morton, *Being Ecological*, pp. 107, 147.
4 Matsumoto, *Motoori Norinaga*, p. 80.
5 Timothy Morton, interview with Verso books (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AEy2KmHwh0), published 27 September, 2017.

a Real Japanese Nature, imagined not through actual content but through symbolic *oppositions* to what they perceive as non-Japanese Nature. These oppositions include 'civilisations which make enemies' *versus* 'civilisations which make harmony', 'civilisations which protect forests' *versus* 'civilisations which dominate forests', 'dragon civilisations' *versus* 'sun civilisations', and even 'civilisations which drink milk' *versus* those which do not.[6] As we shall see, Japanese eco-nationalism spends a great deal of time writing about the landscape of the Other, especially the desert and the pastures whose forests have been destroyed by Christianity and its sheep and goats. But—like Žižek's Big Other—the actual natural environment found in the Japanese archipelago is missing. Except for some superficial and often historically inaccurate platitudes about trees and rice paddies, Japan's natural environment is rarely discussed. However, the symbolic significance of Nature is clear to readers of these works; there is no need to complicate things by mentioning that, for example, over 40 per cent of forests in Japan are artificial plantations begun in the 1950s but never harvested because it has been cheaper to import timber from overseas. Real Japanese Nature is an idea best left imagined.[7]

Japanese Eco-Nationalism: Some Orientations

A number of labels have been applied to the thought and writings of Japanese nationalism since the eighteenth century, including National Learning (*Kokugaku*), nativism, exceptionalism, and *Nihonjinron*. Japanese nationalism attained its peak social and political impact in the 1930s through a totalitarian Shinto ideology which emphasised Japan as an ethnic nation begun by the Sun Goddess Amaterasu and characterised by a total fusion between emperor and nation. Writers of the time debated how certain 'negative' cultural impacts such as Buddhism and Confucianism had affected the unique natural form of the national polity.[8] After the Second World War, these ideas were continued through the incorporation of concepts from the human and social sciences, most notably archaeology and physical anthropology. A key group in this respect has been scholars associated with the so-called 'New Kyoto school'. In the 1980s and '90s, a number of New Kyoto School figures worked at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (known colloquially in Japanese as the *Nichibunken*) and I have coined the term 'Alt-Nichibunken' for a core group of especially reactionary figures.[9] Notwithstanding the different names for these nationalisms, an essential continuity is often assumed with respect to the tendency to engage in highly polemical critiques of non-Japanese cultures and to insist that the 'uniqueness' of Japanese culture makes it superior. Many of these writings are founded on three assumptions or 'analytical motivations'.[10] The first is that 'the Japanese constitute a culturally and socially homogenous racial entity, whose essence is virtually unchanged from prehistorical times down to the present day.' The second is that 'the Japanese differ radically from all other known peoples.' Finally, the writings are 'consciously nationalistic, displaying a conceptual and procedural hostility to any mode of analysis which might be seen to derive from external, non-Japanese sources.'

Despite its roots in the National Learning movement of the Tokugawa period (1600-1868), nationalist discourse underwent a major operating system upgrade in the late nineteenth century in the context of Japanese responses to industrial capitalism. The writers discussed in this book begin with figures who attempted to respond to the first wave of capitalism and the cultures of modernity, notably folklorist

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[6] Umehara, *Nihon bunkaron*; Kawakatsu and Yasuda, *Teki o tsukuru bunmei*; Yasuda, *Mori o mamoru bunmei*, *Tatsu no bunmei* and *Miruku o nomanai bunmei*.

[7] Yasuda is nevertheless keen to emphasise the history of secondary forest plantations *outside* Japan, claiming (without any citations) that since 90 per cent of forests in Switzerland had been 'destroyed' by the seventeenth century, 'if you go to Switzerland today you can see rich forests but those trees have all been planted by human hands since the eighteenth century': Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 441.

[8] The best introduction to the ideas of this period is Skya, *Japan's Holy War*.

[9] See Hudson, 'Review of Yoneyama, *Animism in Contemporary Japan*'.

[10] These three characteristics are taken from the unpaginated introduction of Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*. See also McCormack, 'Kokusaika'.

Kunio Yanagita (1875-1962) and philosopher/cultural historian Tetsurō Watsuji (1889-1960). Post war exponents of the genre include religious studies scholar Tetsuo Yamaori (b. 1931) and economic historian-turned-politician Heita Kawakatsu (b. 1948), as well as the previously mentioned Umehara and Yasuda. Beginning with Yanagita, all of these writers have 'attempted to overcome the problems caused by the direct importation of European ideas into Japan by focusing upon the unique features of Japanese life.'[11] Yanagita questioned and critiqued modernity through an emphasis on heritage and tradition, and aimed for 'the realization of a harmonious co-existence between man and nature and the banishment of alienation by communal rebirth.'[12] This approach was instrumentalised by Watsuji through a focus on landscape and his influential concept of *fūdo*, variously translated as 'climate and culture', 'human environments' or *milieu*.[13]

Watsuji's explicitly anti-Marxist and anti-Christian thinking followed the standard nationalistic perspective of the time, yet has been adopted and expanded by post war writers, notably Umehara and Yasuda.[14] Both Christianity and Marxism are what sociologist Michael Mann calls *transcendent* sources of social power and were in clear conflict with the immanent *morale* of State Shinto.[15] Together with Buddhism and Confucianism, such ideologies 'postulated the individual as a moral being with a raison d'être outside the völkisch state.' For ultranationalist State Shinto, the 'existence of a private morality provided to the individual by a universal religion or any system of thought that had at its core universal principles as opposed to ethnic religion constituted a rebellion against the state.'[16] In premodern times, it was argued, Japan had managed to neutralise the influences of Buddhism and Confucianism through the continuing vitality of native 'Shinto' beliefs. As discussed later in this book, Umehara continued this argument with his claims of an integrated synthesis between native and outside aspects of Japanese culture.

After 1945, eco-nationalist writers also developed critiques of Christianity and Marxism based on environmental determinism. Yasuda, for instance, explains Marxism in the following way:

> Karl Marx was someone who was born and raised in the landscape [*fūdo*] of Europe, which bases its economy on dry field farming and pastoralism. His view of history is smeared with the landscape of dry farming and pastoralism. Moreover, Marx's 'historical view of class struggle' was born from the landscape in which, beginning with the 'Hundred Years' War', endless conflicts were repeated by ethnic peoples who washed their blood in the blood of others.[17]

Japan, by contrast, is for Yasuda a place where—because of the monsoon landscape—conflict and violence cannot explain historical change, meaning that Marxism has no relevance there. This interpretation replaces but mirrors the pre-1945 belief that, since the Japanese nation was composed of the same ethnic group, there was no ethnic conflict in Japanese history. In a similar censorious vein, Yasuda uses the Book of Genesis to emphasise what he sees as the discriminatory concept of clean and unclean animals, insisting that 'the basic philosophy of original sin can be said to continue to exist in contemporary Christianity through the discrimination of living things between clean and unclean, as seen, for example, in the apartheid of South Africa, the recent Neo-Nazi movement in Europe and

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11 Kawada, *The Origin of Ethnography in Japan*, p. 1.

12 Kawada, *The Origin of Ethnography in Japan*, p. 2.

13 The translation 'human environments' is from Berque, 'From Watsuji's concept of "human" to beyond', p. 139.

14 For this aspect of Watsuji's work, see Befu, 'Watsuji Tetsurō's ecological approach', p. 113. One of Yasuda's many critiques of Christianity can be found in his *Hebi to jūjika*.

15 Cf. Mann, *Sources of Social Power*, Vol. 1, pp. 23-24.

16 Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, pp. 74, 73.

17 Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei no seiki e*, p. 65.

the discrimination against blacks and people of colour in America.'[18] Needless to say, Judaic dietary restrictions were not followed in *Christian* Europe where 'the designation of animals as unclean (especially the pig) in Judaism was actively rejected by early Christians, and would feature prominently in medieval anti-Semitism.'[19] A further problem here is Yasuda's assumption that similar ideas about Nature did not exist in the Japanese tradition. Of course, Japanese religions did not regard animals as unclean in exactly the same way as Judaism, yet the concept of pollution (*kegare*) resulting from death, childbirth or menstruation was central to the Japanese social and religious experience. Premodern Japan had very strong discriminatory beliefs about animals and the people who handled them, the latter sometimes being termed *hinin* or 'non-humans'.[20] Julian Thomas argues that animals became members of human societies with the Neolithic and with domestication.[21] In that sense, Umehara and Yasuda's explanations for animal use in premodern Japan are very Neolithic. Over the medieval period, earlier barriers between humans and animals in European thought began to break down.[22] In Japan, the opposite was true as discrimination became more entrenched in social roles.

From the 1980s, this type of polemic about Japanese culture, national identity, landscape and the archaic was expounded by a group of scholars working under Takeshi Umehara, the first director of the Nichibunken. Umehara also served as an advisor to the 1982-87 prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone with whom he wrote two books. In a speech given in 1985, Nakasone claimed that, 'Forty years after the war and sixty years into the reign of his majesty the [Shōwa] emperor, it is time to reconsider Japanese identity. While various ideas have so far intruded from foreign countries, the time has come for us to clear away all those ideas and to form our own conclusions.' Nakasone's dream of studying Japanese identity without 'intrusive' ideas from foreign countries was realised with the establishment of the Nichibunken in 1987.[23] In response to critiques of his centre, Umehara at first played down or denied the influence of Nakasone. In one of his final publications, however, he made no attempt to hide the central role that Nakasone had played in the establishment of the Nichibunken.[24]

In his thirties, while working as a university lecturer, Umehara became disillusioned with Western philosophy and began to study Japanese thought and letters, a move which he claims moved him even further from mainstream academia.[25] Reinventing himself as a representative of Japan's colonised bourgeoisie, he attracted a large following with his popular writings. Umehara started to write about archaeology from the 1970s and began to argue that in order to understand the 'basal culture' (*kiso bunka*) of Japan, one needs to study the pre-agricultural Jōmon period. The terms 'basic' or 'deep' culture were frequently used by Umehara from the 1980s onwards to refer to this Jōmon heritage, which he used to Photoshop the archaic onto modern Japan. Umehara denied the role of agrilogistical Neolithic ideology and blamed *pastoralism* for the world's ecological woes. Specifically, it was the nomadic pastoralism of the Jews and the piracy of ancient Greece which led directly to the anthropocentrism of modern scientific civilisation.[26] Umehara argued that, as a result, we have to return to the culture of hunter-gatherers who lived in harmony with Nature—a common enough dream in Romantic thought, yet here possessing a peculiar twist. In Japan, Umehara informs us, 'Agricultural civilisation was established on top of hunter-gatherer civilisation. The rice cultivating culture that flourished in Japan continued the culture

[18] Yasuda, *Hebi to jūjika*, pp. 115-116.
[19] Pluskowski, 'The zooarchaeology of medieval "Christendom"', pp. 208-209.
[20] On pollution in general, see Namihara, *Kegare no kōzō*, Miyake, *Shūkyō minzokugaku* and Amino, *Rethinking Japanese History*. For animals, see Matsui, 'The use of livestock carcasses in Japanese history' and Hankins, *Working Skin*.
[21] Thomas, 'Commentary: what do we mean by "Neolithic societies"?'.
[22] Gilhus, *Animals, Gods and Humans*; Ruhmann and Brieske, *Dying Gods*; Salisbury, *The Beast Within*.
[23] See Nakasone and Umehara, *Seiji to tetsugaku* and *Riidaa no rikiryō*.
[24] Umehara and Kawakatsu, *Nihon shisō no kosō*, pp. 78-87.
[25] Umehara, *Nihon bōken (jō)*, p. 24.
[26] Umehara and Kawakatsu, *Nihon shisō*, p. 74.

of the Jōmon [hunter-gatherers]. That Jōmon culture has penetrated deeply into Japanese Shinto and Buddhism. If we don't return to that philosophy, then ... the survival of humanity and the development of civilisation will be impossible.'[27] These quite astonishing claims will be discussed further below, but the initial point is Umehara's belief that previously scorned 'traditional' or even 'primitive' elements of Japanese history—what Marxists used to call 'feudal hangovers'—are, in fact, of great relevance for *global* futures. 'Today', Umehara insisted, 'Japan's goal should be to create another amalgamation [of old and new]—a new civilization—that blends the industrial civilization introduced from Europe with the Japanese native culture of the forest.'[28]

These claims draw on earlier nationalist understandings that, while outside cultures introduced into Japan in antiquity had been successfully contained with the frame of the 'national polity' (*kokutai*) centred on the emperor, 'modern' or 'Western' ideas based on individualism were fundamentally incompatible with that polity.[29] After 1945, the idea that 'traditional' Japanese culture has the power to save the world is found in the writings of several scholars and critics. Philosopher Shunpei Ueyama (1921-2012) argued that, 'modern industrial civilization, based on the principles of "science" and "freedom", has produced great benefits for humanity, but has also produced negative social and spiritual consequences: "poisons" to which it is necessary to seek an antidote.'[30] Ueyama's term 'poison' is still used to refer to European influences on Japanese thought by writers who assume that, due to its close 'harmony' with Nature, Japanese civilisation has the potential—and indeed the *obligation*—to provide an 'antidote' to the poison of the West and modern industrial culture.[31] The comparative historian Shuntarō Itō (b. 1930) provides a further example of this world-saviour ideology with his proposal that 'it is we Japanese who must assume the responsibility of pioneering the sixth revolution in civilization.' After the human, agricultural, urban, spiritual and scientific revolutions, Itō's sixth stage is a 'new human revolution' or a 'bio-world revolution'.[32]

Umehara's ideas about ecology and the archaic have been enormously influential and continue to impact environmental understandings and policy in Japan.[33] However, such eco-nationalism is sometimes played down for foreign audiences. One example is the English translation of politician Ichirō Ozawa's book *Blueprint for a New Japan*.[34] Most controversy over this book centred on its call for Japan to change the pacifist Article 9 of its Constitution. The claim in the original version that an 'eastern' ecological value system was most evident in Jōmon Japan and that Jōmon values should now replace Western exploitation was probably one of the least controversial parts of the book for Japanese readers. Nevertheless, in the English translation the discussion of the Jōmon is strangely omitted.[35] This may have been a decision by the 'editor' of the translation designed to increase 'readability', but given that the book represents a carefully crafted political statement it is possible that the omission of the Jōmon was directed by the

[27] Umehara and Kawakatsu, *Nihon shisō*, p. 76.

[28] Umehara 'The civilization of the forest', p. 47.

[29] This point was argued in the *Kokutai no hongi*, a propaganda text issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937. See Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, pp. 275-277.

[30] Cited in Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, p. 144.

[31] Kawakatsu and Yasuda, *Teki o tsukuru bunmei*, p. 114.

[32] See Morris-Suzuki, 'Rewriting history'.

[33] While a number of studies have investigated aspects of this issue, there has not been a full analysis of the impact on policy. See Knight, 'The discourse of "encultured nature" in Japan'; Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history'; and Rots, *Shinto, Nature and Ideology*.

[34] Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan*. The dust jacket of this book claims that it was first translated by the CIA. According to Chalmers Johnson, the first translation was by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Service: see Johnson's review of *Blueprint* in *Monumenta Nipponica* 49 (1994): 379-381.

[35] See Hudson, 'Archaeology as Japanology'.

author.[36] Ivan Hall has noted how 'many Japanese intellectuals and spokesmen for Japan manipulate their dialogue with the outside world to "deflect scrutiny, put down criticism, and raise false hopes of intellectual decartelization."'[37]

Within the Alt-Nichibunken group, three of Umehara's ideas remain especially influential. The first is that although Japan's rise to modernity owed a great deal to the West, Western modernity 'seems to have exhausted itself in nihilism, the obsessive pursuit of pleasure through economic growth and the destruction of nature.'[38] This is pure Nietzsche but Umehara uses this to propose a second idea that, in order to overcome the crisis of modernity, Japan should re-examine its traditional cultures and religious beliefs—including those of prehistoric hunter-gatherers—which, he argues, were characterised by a 'harmonious' relationship with Nature. A third point, which Umehara takes from Arnold Toynbee, is an understanding of world history as the rise and fall of different civilisations. Again following Toynbee, Umehara argues that religion lies at the centre of a civilisation and proposes that three principles inherent in 'European civilisation'—individualism, the conquest of Nature and the denial of life after death—are largely responsible for the current global crisis. Umehara's conclusion is that the 'forest civilisation' of Japan, based on a suite of religious ideas derived from animism, Shinto and Buddhism, should be considered as an alternative to 'European civilisation'. Yasuda uncritically adopts this framework from Umehara yet goes further in expressing these ideas through landscape history and Watsuji's concept of *fūdo*.

The first chapter of this book will attempt to define Japanese eco-nationalism and provide some historical context for what remains an influential way of looking at the world in contemporary Japan. I argue that, despite its superficial concern with Nature, this approach is profoundly *non*-ecological because it attempts to deny the connectivity of living things. Japanese eco-nationalism is, however, clearly nationalistic, and I suggest that it possesses many features of Umberto Eco's definition of *Ur-fascism*. Chapter 2 looks at landscape and Watsuji's role in generating a determinist approach to the relationship between climate and culture. I explore the influence of Watsuji's work in a Gothic genre of nationalist landscape writing in post war Japan, exemplified in texts by Yamaori and Yasuda. In Chapter 3, I examine Watsuji's concept of *jūsōsei* or 'stratigraphic layering', an approach which continues to influence how Japanese archaeologists and anthropologists understand the relationship between Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures in the archipelago. Chapter 4 argues that the eco-nationalist project in modern Japan has been mirrored and encouraged by the influence of broader Romantic ideas in Japanese archaeology. This argument is illustrated through a close reading of a recent book on the Jōmon by Tatsuo Kobayashi titled *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai o hiraku* or 'Jōmon culture opens up the future of the Japanese'. A concluding chapter summarises the main arguments of the present volume.

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[36] The 1994 English version was translated by Louisia Rubinfien and edited by Eric Gower. Chalmers Johnson's review explains that, according to the Japanese press, *Blueprint* was a result of around one hundred meetings by bureaucrats and scholars. Ozawa is said to have attended only eighty of those meetings, nevertheless implying that the work reflects a broader political consensus in the early 1990s.

[37] Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, p. 28, citing Hall, *Cartels of the Mind*, p. 150.

[38] Umehara 'The civilization of the forest', p. 41

Chapter 1. Huddle together, warm bodies pressing: the community of Japanese eco-nationalism

The writings considered in this book form a particular genre within contemporary Japanese nationalism. All of them are written with an explicit awareness of content and style which makes the whole greater than the parts. The genre includes the following features: an interest in Nature, the archaic and landscape; frequent use of a limited and conventional range of topoi such as desert, monsoon, mono/polytheism, rice, fishing, meat, milk, and the emperor; a tone toward the reader that is moralising yet assumes itself to be communitarian; sharply critical, even racist attitudes towards the 'West', Han China and Christianity; and a strong intertextuality. Writings within this genre assume that: (1) Japan forms a *sui generis* culture or 'civilisation'; (2) factors proposed as promoting sustainability were shared across *all* periods of Japanese history, at least until industrial capitalism was imported from the West; (3) those same factors are assumed to be shared across the whole archipelago, a space defined a-historically as the territory of modern Japan; and (4) cultural elements in Japan can be contrasted with the West and China in a binary approach that ignores all historical and geographical diversity.

Some writings in the genre can be classified as 'histories of climate and society' and share many of the standard drawbacks of that scholarship.[1] Many contributions, however, go much further, bringing an environmental twist to cultural nationalism in their insistence on an 'ecotopia' in the Japanese Islands from prehistory until at least the 1950s.[2] While sometimes adopting a scientific veneer, these texts contain narrative gaps which would hardly be possible in scientific writings: they are best approached as literary works, as eco-poetics. The genre has been called 'reactionary ecology' by historian Richard Reitan. Reitan argues that 'reactionary ecology in Japan reflects a desire for ethnic community' and can be understood as 'a fascist desire to create or rely upon a nationalistic narrative of Japanese cultural uniqueness that conceals the excesses of capitalism and operates to sustain the socio-economic order that is today generating ecological catastrophe.'[3] Japanese reactionary ecology is a type of climate denial syndrome, except that it does not deny that environmental destruction has taken place—just that we (Japanese) are responsible. When talking about the environment, Japanese eco-nationalists do not shy away from the we-word. Heita Kawakatsu even begins a book with this word, writing that 'We use various opportunities to plant trees'; by the next sentence, it becomes clear that this refers only to 'we Japanese', even if it manages to include Japanese migrants to Brazil.[4] As Matthew Johnson has asked, 'What is the imagined community behind the tiny, commonsensical, but utterly pernicious word "we"?'[5]

What Reitan calls 'Japanese reactionary ecology' is certainly reactionary but is it ecological? It frequently presents itself as ecological, without necessarily using that term. Yasuda writes, 'It is none other than the Japanese who possess the sensitive feeling that they want to connect to the will of the earth and to the chain of life, and who have developed a civilisation which brings that feeling into their own lifestyle.'[6] However, a closer look shows certain differences with more standard environmentalist thinking and discourse. For a start, Japanese eco-nationalism does not 'dump facts' on us about the end of the world; exhortations to turn off lights or to do something—*anything*—about the ecological crisis are rare.[7] There are no demands to change driving or shopping habits, little sense that the problem is too big, that we

1 Cf. Degroot *et al*., 'Towards a rigorous understanding of societal responses to climate change'.
2 This cut-off date is proposed by Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei no seiki e*, p. 13.
3 Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history'.
4 Kawakatsu, *Bi no kuni*, p. 9.
5 Johnson, *Ideas of Landscape*, p. 178.
6 Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei no seiki*, p. 12.
7 On the common tendency of ecological thinking to present an 'information dump', see Morton, *Being Ecological*, pp. 9-13.

are powerless to act. As one practical measure, Yasuda encourages people to save the world by buying more of his books.[8] The genre consistently emphasises the destruction of Nature by the 'Anglo-Saxons' and the Han Chinese, yet the (Japanese) reader is spared feelings of guilt for the demise of civilisation. Using vignettes from his own family history, Yasuda absolves himself and his readers from the sins of capitalism and of consuming meat or milk:

> ... I have to admit that meat, bread and milk are among my favourite foods. It is not [my] intention ... to condemn bread or drinking milk. My grandfather on my mother's side was a well-to-do businessman who owned a dairy farm with over 300 milk cows. Having lost my father at a young age, our family relied on my mother's family for economic support. For that reason, I still feel a deep gratitude to my grandfather and I love the milk cows, milk and meat which provided him with his wealth. I consider myself lucky to have been brought up drinking milk and eating meat.[9]

The eco-nationalist genre frequently uses such normalising stories to narrow the distance between narrator and reader. The responsibility for unsustainable lifestyles is placed firmly on the shoulders of 'Western civilisation'; the many Japanese who eat and enjoy meat and dairy products have simply been duped by the 'Anglo-Saxons'. In fact, all that is required, the broader genre claims, is for 'we Japanese' to return to the deep heritage of *being Japanese*.

Sacrifice is often linked to the Japanese ethos of Nature worship through the idea that while Japanese life has been inherently simple and frugal, people nevertheless found happiness just through looking at 'surroundings agreeable to the eye.'[10] The themes of guilt and sacrifice are developed more explicitly in Yasuda's 2007 essay 'Gyoshoku no bunmei, nikushoku no bunmei' ('Piscatorial civilisations, carnivorous civilisations') published in *Nihon Kenkyū*, the Japanese language journal of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies. In the first section of this essay, titled 'The landscapes (*fūdo*) born from monotheism and polytheism', the author quickly checks the main boxes of his approach to the world: civilisation, fish, meat, monotheism, polytheism and landscape. However, the sub-title of section 1 then shifts key to state that 'Humans have to eat in order to live' before expounding a dialectical *Bildungsroman* of the antithetical viewpoints of Jesus and Kūkai, a Japanese Buddhist monk who lived from AD 774-835. Jesus, Yasuda tells us, placed great importance on eating as a way of spreading his message of love. But Kūkai is said to have fasted before his death. According to Yasuda, this 'speaks to the clear difference between the world of the Occidental dry farming pastoral people who, even in the face of death hold a Last Supper and attempt to explain the importance of love through food, and the world of the Oriental rice farming/fishing people who, when they realise they are dying, move to avoid unwanted life by fasting.'[11] Thus the Japanese can feel less guilty than the meat-eating/milk-drinking foreigners who are really to blame for all the world's ecological troubles. This is not just because (some) Japanese thoughtfully kill themselves when the time is nigh, but also because the Japanese have been eating sustainably for the last ten thousand years and need only to purge the pollution (*osen*) of foreign food and return to that traditional lifestyle.[12]

All of Yasuda's writings follow what Morton calls the preaching *religious style* of ecological thought. Despite his hatred of ovicaprids (see below), Yasuda follows the classical genre of a 'shepherd-type'

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[8] Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', p. 86. Yasuda proposes that readers 'read any of the books I have cited here' but of the 17 references listed, 14 are by Yasuda himself.

[9] Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', p. 77.

[10] Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334*, p. 7.

[11] Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', p. 491.

[12] Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', p. 494.

person climbing a hill 'to look down on the awful corrupt things happening in the town below'.[13] In the religious style, 'Evil isn't part of me, it's something lodged in me that I can dispose of.'[14] As Morton explains, this type of thinking is common in environmental writing and, in that sense, Reitan's term 'Japanese reactionary ecology' may not be a misnomer. In my view, however, 'Japanese reactionary ecology' is profoundly *un*-ecological because it claims that *some* Nature (Japan's forests) is separated from and *better than* others (desert, meadow, city). From there it is a small step to say some humans are better than others and it is no coincidence that this group of writers frequently invokes the 'dangers' of immigration. If Japanese culture is a shrink-wrapped, sanitised experience, the same is true of Japanese Nature. Furthermore, Japanese eco-nationalism lacks any sense of irony, argued by Morton to be a key aspect of ecological immersion and awareness.[15] There is no sense of tragedy or irony that 'we Japanese' are *also* destroying the world, just the psychological comfort of an imagined tradition of innocence. The central contradiction of Japanese eco-nationalism is thus that it attempts to describe a space *outside* environmental catastrophe, but can only do that by setting up super firewall installations between Japan and the outside. For this reason, I argue that the term 'ecological' is not appropriate to the writings discussed here. 'Japanese reactionary ecology' is a profoundly *non*-ecological way of thinking about the world because it totally denies the complex and uncanny interactions across the web of life.

Japanese Eco-Nationalism as Ur-Fascism

Reitan's other classification of these writings as reactionary or fascist is, however, on point. To begin with, these texts all assume that the conditions of human life are inherent in Nature (or landscape—Watsuji's *fūdo*) rather than in the historical, and therefore changeable, conditions of society and economy. The eco-nationalist writers considered here follow many of the features of *Ur-* or Eternal Fascism as outlined by Umberto Eco.[16] Eco's first feature of Ur-fascism is the *cult of tradition*. Although it might be assumed that, by definition, 'tradition' is something which has been around for a long time and which is normatively shared within a particular culture or nation, Eco argues that it is nevertheless important that tradition be newly *revealed* by the prophets of fascism. Writings about the Japanese Nation have been particularly adept at such revelations. When the bureaucrat and folklorist Kunio Yanagita attended the enthronement ceremony for the Taishō emperor in 1915, he saw a few traces of white smoke ascending into the sky from the mountains around Kyoto. Yanagita claimed he was the only person who understood the significance of this smoke. It was, he said, an acknowledgement of the imperial transition by the *sanka* or 'mountain people' who had 'preserved Japanese culture in its pristine form'.[17] The Grand Master of Revelation was Takeshi Umehara who founded his own school of Japanology, unashamedly termed *Umehara Nihongaku* or 'Umehara's Japanology'. Umehara's writings on 'Japanese civilisation' contain nothing that is original in terms of basic structure or approach. He simply follows pre-war nationalists in their valorisation of the ethnic-nation in its struggles against pernicious outside influences. Umehara's only novelty is to mis-use archaeology rather than mythology. One supposed achievement of 'Umehara's Japanology' was the 'discovery' of a prehistoric 'Jōmon civilisation'.[18] Umehara also emphasised that the Indigenous Ainu, long ignored in Japanese letters, were central to the cultural history of the nation.[19] Moving beyond Japan, Yasuda has further claimed that it was he and Umehara who discovered the ancient civilisation of the Yangtze river basin 'in the

[13] Morton, *Being Ecological*, p. 203.
[14] Morton, *Being Ecological*, pp. 203-204.
[15] Morton, *Ecology Without Nature*, p. 27.
[16] Eco, 'Ur-Fascism'.
[17] Hashimoto, 'Chihō', p. 136. The Taishō emperor had ascended the throne in 1912 but his enthronement ceremony was not held until 1915.
[18] Umehara and Yasuda, *Jōmon bunmei no hakken*. For a discussion of Umehara's ideas on the Jōmon site of Sannai Maruyama, see Habu and Fawcett, 'Science or narratives?'.
[19] Umehara and Hanihara, *Ainu wa gen-Nihonjin ka*.

winter of 1993'.[20] As Eco points out, fascism's cults of tradition are also syncretic and again Japanese eco-nationalism fits this definition with its careful recipe blending the prehistoric Jōmon and Yayoi cultures, the ethnographic Ainu and Okinawans, and the ancient rice growing cultures of southern China and Southeast Asia.

The second feature proposed by Eco is the *rejection of modernism*. Japanese thought has a long history of anti-modernism. This literature has been extensively discussed in English and will not be rehearsed here.[21] Later chapters will discuss in some detail how the rejection of modernism has been employed in Japanese eco-nationalism and archaeology. Numerous placeholders for the anti-modern are found in the writings examined in this volume. For Watsuji, it was 'monsoon', for Umehara, 'forest'; for some archaeologists, 'Jōmon' serves the same purpose.

Eco's third feature of Ur-fascism, *action for action's sake*, is not directly appropriate to an essentially intellectual movement like Japanese eco-nationalism, a key characteristic of which is *lack* of any action or policy regarding the environment. Yet fascism's natural distrust of intellectuals impacts the Japanese writings discussed here since they can, in essence, be seen as a type of pseudo-intellectualism, more interested in rhetoric than in science. This last point connects to Eco's fourth feature, which is *lack of analytical criticism*. Several of the writers in the eco-nationalist genre were trained as philosophers, yet none have developed critical philosophical analyses of the issues they write about. Archaeologists such as Kōji Mizoguchi have provided much more sophisticated philosophical discussions of archaic Japan than Umehara. Archaeology has been used by many Japanese eco-nationalist writers, but the lack of engagement with archaeological theory is striking. For example, the dominant intellectual paradigm dealing with landscape change in archaeology over the past three decades—historical ecology—has been totally ignored.

The fifth feature for Eco is *fear of difference*. Heita Kawakatsu and Yoshinori Yasuda have both argued that isolation and restrictions on migration have been good for Japan's development. Kawakatsu suggests that, 'in the interests of social harmony, Japan should limit the entry of foreign workers and instead promote overseas investment, assisting people to live and develop in their own natural habitats, and so promoting a harmonious order of "ethnic coexistence".'[22] Here, Kawakatsu draws on the ideas of Kinji Imanishi (1902-1992), a biologist who developed the concept of *sumi-wake* or 'habitat segregation', to argue that Japan should limit the entry of foreign migrants as happened under the Tokugawa 'closed country'.[23] The belief that the separate co-existence of ethnic groups promotes sustainability has been taken up by Yasuda who warns that 'it is ethnic migrations that have debased civilisations and led to their eventual downfall', noting with relief that 'I feel deeply thankful for the Japanese archipelago which is surrounded by water on all four sides.'[24] With apparent glee, Yasuda writes that the 'one million' refugees who escaped Syria in 2016 means that 'The movement of peoples and the "decline of the West" has finally started.'[25] Since the number of migrants actually accepted into contemporary

[20] Yasuda, 'Discovery of the Yangtze river civilization', p. 9. In fact, the advanced Neolithic cultures of the Yangtze had been recognised by Chinese archaeologists since the late 1950s: see Sun, 'The Liangzhu culture'.

[21] Key texts are Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*; Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing*; McNally, *Like No Other*; and Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*.

[22] Morris-Suzuki, 'Rewriting history', p. 536, citing Kawakatsu, *Nihon bunmei to kindai seiyō*, p. 250.

[23] Morris-Suzuki, 'Rewriting history', p. 536. Kawakatsu was a translator of Imanishi's 1941 *Seibutsu no sekai*, which appeared as *A Japanese View of Nature: The World of Living Things by Kinji Imanishi* (RoutledgeCurzon, 2002). This is not the place for a detailed critique of Imanishi's ideas but the concept of *sumi-wake* goes against mainstream ecology since the 1970s when Holling demonstrated that environments such as forests are not stable habitats but undergo adaptive cycles of change over the long-term: see Holling, 'Resilience and stability of ecological systems'.

[24] Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', pp. 85, 84.

[25] Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 466. Yasuda expresses no sympathy for the refugees from the civil war in Syria.

Japan remains extremely low, this fear is irrational and provocative.[26] Nevertheless, explaining cultural decline by invasions of outside 'barbarians' is hardly an original idea; the 'tragedy' of the fall of Rome due to the *Völkerwanderung* is still mis-used by far-right politicians in Europe.[27]

The sixth feature of *appeal to a frustrated middle class* was largely absent in the early days of Japanese eco-nationalism. Watsuji in particular resisted any sort of petit bourgeois collusion and was strongly opposed to the new mass culture influenced by vulgar Americanism. Watsuji's 'unwavering solution' to the crisis of modernity was a 'predictable appeal to the "pathos" of aristocratic distance associated with older archaic values and culture heroes.'[28] From the 1980s, the writings and public lectures of Umehara and Yasuda attempted an appeal to a wider audience. Yasuda's frequent vignettes of daily life—such as his milk-drinking cited above—tried to shift eco-nationalism closer to middle class aspirations. Both Umehara and Yasuda would, however, dispute this characterisation, preferring to see (modern) Japan as a largely classless society. The pretence that Japan lacked social classes since it was naturally united by the emperor was a key belief in Japanese ultranationalistic thought in the early twentieth century.[29] Umehara used the work of economist Tsuneo Iida (1932-2003) to claim that Japan is 'an egalitarian society where Marx's ideal has been almost completely realized.' Umehara added his own inventive observations: 'That Japan is an egalitarian society can be determined from the faces of her prime ministers. Many prime ministers have come from impoverished families. In Japan it is rumoured that if you have an aristocratic face and are too intellectual you will never become prime minister!'[30] The egalitarianism of Japanese society can, according to Umehara, be traced back to the Jōmon period and has been maintained throughout Japanese history. These fanciful claims demonstrate that Umehara and other eco-nationalist writers have remained essentially elitist. Despite the popularity of their writings, they have shown little interest in the real struggles and precariousness of everyday life.[31]

Eco's seventh feature is *obsession with a plot*, a condition which leads to a feeling of being besieged in a permanent life-or-death struggle. The writings of Japanese eco-nationalists are emotional and seductive, preying on feelings of insecurity by a general public anxious over the changes of modernity and globalisation. These writings may provide psychological comfort for some readers, yet they offer no hint of how Japan's 'forest civilisation' might be used to build contemporary sustainability—except through an atavistic return to the past. In a typical example of plot obsession, Yasuda takes the narrative struggle back to the seventh century Battle of Paekchon River in Korea, when the kingdom of Silla, in alliance with Tang China, beat Paekche and its ally Japan, then ruled by the emperor Tenji (r. 661-671). In Yasuda's re-telling, following his defeat Tenji was frightened of an invasion by the 'dry-field farming pastoral people' of Tang China and built forts in Kyushu and the Seto Inland Sea and moved his capital away from the coast to Ōtsu near Lake Biwa. Furthermore, the emperor Tenmu then issued a proclamation against meat eating in order to prevent the 'pollution (*osen*) of the civilisation of the dry-field farming pastoral people who ate the meat of sheep and goats'. This was the time 'The Japanese as a rice-growing fishing people first realised the awfulness of the dry-field farming pastoral people.'[32] Yasuda ignores the inconvenient fact of the Battle of Paekchon River being a result of the 'awfulness' of Japanese attacks on the Korean peninsula. Historians do not doubt that the defeat of ancient Japan's

[26] In the year that Yasuda's essay was published (2016), Japan accepted only 18 refugees out 10,901 applications: https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00449/japan-accepts-far-fewer-refugees-than-g7-peers.html, accessed November 27, 2020.

[27] For some examples see Brown, *The Rise of Western Christendom*, p. xxii.

[28] Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 250.

[29] Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, p. 24.

[30] Umehara, 'Nihon to wa nan na no ka?'. In reality, political dynasties have dominated post war Japanese politics: see Smith, *Dynasties and Democracy*.

[31] For an excellent introduction to Japan's contemporary situation, see Allison, *Precarious Japan*.

[32] Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', pp. 493-494.

military expeditions on the Korean peninsula were one stimulus to various political changes at home.[33] However, Yasuda's account of these events is so inaccurate as to consist of little more than propaganda designed to make readers feel besieged by a long history of outside 'threats'. In order to understand why plot so often displaces history in these writings, it is worth briefly unpicking Yasuda's claims about the seventh century.

The first problem is one of basic chronology. Yasuda writes that 'in 634' the emperor Tenji was forced into various measures to protect his kingdom after the defeat at Paekchon River. In fact, the battle occurred in 663. The move to the Ōtsu palace (*Ōmi Ōtsu no miya*) did not happen until 667. Yasuda's portrays Tenmu's proclamation against meat eating as part of the process of reaction to the threat from China, but that proclamation was made in 675, more than a decade after the Paekchon River defeat. Tenmu ordered 'let no one eat the flesh of kine [cattle], horses, dogs, monkeys, or barn-door fowls. This prohibition does not extend to other kinds of meat.'[34] There is no mention of sheep and goats. More broadly, Yasuda provides no analysis of the complex historical context of the mid-seventh century Japanese attack on Korea and the domestic response to its disastrous aftermath. His account reads as if all Japan's problems derived from the outside and that the emperors Tenji and Tenmu were saviours of the Japanese people. Reading these events against the background of power politics within Japan provides a different perspective. Before he became emperor, Tenji—then known as Prince Naka no Ōe—had been involved with the assassination of his rival, Soga no Iruka, in 645. This coup is thought to have been a major stimulus to the expansion of state power.[35] Historian Shō Ishimoda argued in 1971 that the Taika coup was an attempt to concentrate power in response to foreign threats, but Bruce Batten notes that there is little evidence of such threats in the 640s.[36] Yasuda implies that the Japanese people should be grateful for the far-sighted policies of their ancient emperors. However, even the state archives show that appreciation was not shared at the time. The *Nihon shoki* acknowledges that when the capital was moved to Ōtsu in 667, 'the common people of the Empire did not desire the removal of the capital. Many made satirical remonstrance, and there were also many popular songs. Every day and every night there were numerous conflagrations.'[37] A further period of political transformation in Japan, including Tenmu's proclamation against meat eating, came after the civil unrest known as the Jinshin War (672) during which the Ōtsu capital was destroyed.

Eco's feature number eight is that followers of fascism must feel *humiliated by the ostentatious wealth and force of their enemies*. Yasuda's writings frequently allude to this humiliation. He complains that 'We have been taught "history" from the perspective of the victors of modern European civilisation that propped up the spiritual supports for Christianity.'[38] This means that 'We Japanese have been taught that our rice-cultivating fishing society was a backward one dominated by harsh labour and feudalism, and that its mud-covered, shit-stinking [*unkokusai*] people could never have possessed a civilisation.'[39] In such formulations, Japan is always a victim, never an aggressor.

Feature number nine talks of *life as a permanent struggle*. This links to previous features such as obsession with plot. The Japanese eco-nationalist writings discussed here have not contained explicit calls to violence as part of their struggle. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Samuel Huntingdon argued that the 'problem for Islam' is 'the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power

[33] Ishimoda, *Nihon no kodai kokka*; Batten, 'Foreign threat and domestic reform'.
[34] Aston, *Nihongi*, Vol. II, p. 329.
[35] Hall, *Government and Local Power*.
[36] Ishimoda, *Nihon no kodai kokka*, pp. 48-71; Batten, 'Foreign threat and domestic reform', p. 218.
[37] Aston, *Nihongi*, Vol. II, p. 286.
[38] Yasuda, 'Introduction: Tales of the forest'.
[39] Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', pp. 81-82.

imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world.'[40] While Walter Skya has noted that this *problématique* fits some contours of Japanese ultranationalism, Japan's military struggle ended in 1945.[41] Yet, the eco-nationalist writings discussed here invariably portray Japanese life within modernity as a constant fight against its enemies. If the genre is short on practical policies, that is because such remedies would remove the very struggle which provides its *raison d'être*.

Ten is a *popular elitism* which implies contempt for the weak. Japanese eco-nationalism represents a highly self-conscious attempt to adopt the position of 'the weakest subjects on earth', understood as the forests and the 'minority indigenous peoples and animals that dwell within them.'[42] While this position may indeed have great validity, it is expressed through exhaustive critiques and dismissals of the non-Japanese. Yasuda, for example, has been a vociferous critic of domesticated animals, reserving particular vitriol for sheep and goats. A photo in one of Yasuda's essays is captioned 'Forests were consumed by sheep and goats, Sultansazul Göl in Turkey'.[43] The photo shows a small flock of goats moving across a dry, treeless landscape. The caption leads the reader to believe that the landscape was once covered in trees which were later destroyed by ovicaprid grazing. There is, however, no discussion of the history of the landscape shown in the photo. The reasonable assumption for anyone familiar with the ecological history of the Mediterranean would be that an arid environment unsuitable for other types of land use was employed for grazing. Japanese eco-nationalism instead encourages the reader to overread a masterplot of environmental catastrophe caused by domesticated animals and by the monotheism of the desert.

Yasuda's antipathy against ovicaprids seems strangely irrational but must be read as a total rejection of the history of landscape. In a well-known sentence in *Das Kapital*, Marx wrote 'First the labourers are driven from the land, and then the sheep arrive.'[44] The precedence given to sheep in Yasuda's work gives away his environmental determinism and lack of interest in human stories. Sheep and trees may have an ecological relationship but that needs to be analysed though human history. A truly ecological view avoids giving precedence to certain species. In 1992, farmers in northern Cyprus were forced to sell all goats then grazing in the mountains to the state, which slaughtered them. German historian Joachim Radkau writes that 'one hesitates to pronounce apodictic condemnations if one hikes through the mountains of Cyprus and sees on the one side the monotony of ailing pine forests, and on the other side the merry eyes and liveliness of the goats. Why should one be opposed to goats on principle? Why can't they embody nature, why must it always be trees, and only trees?'[45] Yet Japanese eco-nationalists invariably take the view from the trees: 'From the forest's perspective, a bleating little lamb that looks so cute is really a devil in disguise and white sheep innocently feeding on grass in green pastures ... are like lice, sucking the energy out of the land' is an oft-repeated mantra.[46]

Eco's feature number eleven is *education* to become a hero for the cause. Following a long European tradition, including Rousseau and the Romantic poets, Umehara's Jōmon 'forest civilisation' conflates childhood and the primitive. Over a century ago, the literary critic Irving Babbitt noted the Romantic obsession with 'the savage, the peasant and above all the child.'[47] Yasuhiro Nakasone, the conservative prime minister who established the Nichibunken, wrote that 'our ancestors, the ancient Japanese ...

40 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 217-218.
41 Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, p. 3.
42 Yasuda, 'Tales of the forest', p. 9.
43 Yasuda, 'Comparative study of the myths and history of a cedar forest', Fig. 22, p. 35.
44 Marx, *Capital*, p. 556.
45 Radkau, *Nature and Power*, p. 23.
46 Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', 2016, p. 80 and *Yama wa ichiba genri shugi*, p. 183.
47 Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*, cited in Perry, 'Literary criticism and theory'.

were, it seems, placid natural children.'[48] Yasuda, in particular, frequently writes about childhood. In the dairy vignette cited above, after the loss of his father the milk from his grandfather's cows becomes his childhood sustenance. As a literary device, this draws on aristocratic narratives of 'milk kinship' in premodern Japan.[49] The ecological utopia imagined by Yasuda is one where children are important within strict limits: there is, for instance, no mention of play.

Eco's twelfth feature is *machismo*. While this may seem a less relevant category for an academic movement like Japanese eco-nationalism, several points can be made in this respect. Tessa Morris-Suzuki has noted how post war nationalist writings in Japan have emphasised a shallow view of 'Japan as male'.[50] Masculine ideals appear in Japanese eco-nationalism in several ways. For Umehara in particular, masculinity was linked with primitivism, an association also found in the writings of many of his contemporaries including the novelist Yukio Mishima, born the same year as Umehara. Roy Starrs writes of Mishima's 'Nietzschean vitalism which celebrates, often with homosexual overtones, the raw energy of a primitive, pre-rational masculinity and laments its suppression in modern industrial society.'[51] More broadly, the idea of the state as a family structure based on blood has been emphasised by fascist writers in Japan and, in turn, criticised by anti-fascist intellectuals such as Masuo Maruyama (1914-1996). Maruyama wrote in 1947 that the insistence on the family system may therefore be termed a distinctive characteristic of fascist ideology in Japan.[52] This background is necessary to understand the outrageous claim made frequently by Yasuda that, because the Jōmon has the world's oldest pottery, the first human families also developed in Japan as a result of sitting together around a pot to eat. By contrast, 'meals where you tear off pieces of bread or meat with your hands and drink milk' mean that people can sit where they want and don't have to come together to eat. It was for this reason that Jesus emphasised the importance of people eating together. 'In that sense', writes Yasuda, 'the Jōmon people who invented the oldest pottery might have been the first humans to establish communication between each other.'[53] In Europe, because people continued to eat by 'tearing off bits of meat and bread' with their hands until the fifteenth century, the first true family life with proper table manners did not develop until that time.[54]

Amongst eco-nationalist writers, Yasuda frequently attempts to emphasise the role of women in Japanese history, but his claims in this respect are shallow or even discriminatory. In arguing that the Neolithic Jōmon was uniquely peaceful in world history, Yasuda writes that the importance of life over death was reflected in the power of women in Jōmon society. The only 'evidence' in support of this claim is a terse announcement that 'Ninety-nine per cent of [Jōmon] clay figurines were pregnant women.'[55] Many archaeologists have indeed linked Jōmon figurines with female fertility. One specialist imagines that 'When women became adults they would make figurines to wish for a safe birth. Making representations of breasts on the clay, it can be thought that the women prayed to produce mother's milk.'[56] Nevertheless, if one thing is clear about Jōmon figurines, it is the tremendous *variation* in face and body representations. A few do appear to represent pregnancy but many figurines combine human, animal and even plant features and it is not possible to classify them all in the simple category of

48 Cited in Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 345.

49 See Schmidt-Hori, 'The erotic family'.

50 Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, p. 127.

51 Starrs, *Deadly Dialectics*, p. 15.

52 Maruyama, 'The ideology and dynamics of Japanese fascism', p. 37. Other commentators have, however, noted that by the 1930s some Japanese writers had come to emphasise the emperor as the only true father figure, thus replacing Confucian ideas of filial piety with loyalty to the emperor: see Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, pp. 183, 268-269.

53 Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei*, p. 71 and 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', p. 511.

54 Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', p. 522. In support of this conclusion, Yasuda cites the essay 'Nihon bunmei wa sekai heiwa' by the economic historian Sakae Tsunoyama (1921-2014). I have not been able to consult this latter work.

55 Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', p. 85.

56 Okamura, *Jōmonjin kara no dengon*, p. 115.

'pregnant women'.[57] For Yasuda, the Heian (794-1185) and Tokugawa were periods like the Jōmon when Japan had little contact with the outside and were therefore peaceful, meaning that 'At the same time, these were periods when women who gave birth to life shone brightly.'[58] The Heian is known for several female aristocratic writers including Murasaki Shikibu who wrote the *Tale of Genji* in the early eleventh century but, needless to say, it is hardly possible to generalise that women 'shone brightly' in either the Heian or the Tokugawa—life for most women would have been hard in the extreme.

Yasuda's comments about gender roles in prehistory are by no means unusual in Japanese archaeology. While claiming to have a special interest in gender archaeology, Jōmon specialist Michio Okamura (b. 1948) makes very similar remarks, insisting that in the Jōmon period—and presumably today— 'A woman's greatest wish is to safely deliver a child'.[59] Okamura goes on to imagine the daily routine of a Jōmon woman:

> As the day breaks, the mother gets up and, while also helping the children, she must have also prepared a meal on the hearth inside the house. Even if we look at ethnographic examples, since time immemorial raising children and cooking have been women's work.
>
> If we look at the role of women in hunter-gatherer societies around the world, aside from raising children and cooking, they worked hard carrying water and other things, collecting nuts and mountain plants, digging tubers, collecting shells and seaweed, making pottery, baskets, textiles and clothes, and sewing and washing clothes.[60]

Many of these activities are documented in the ethnographic record. But Okamura provides no details or indeed appreciation of female labour and displays absolutely no interest in discussing the abundant ethnographic and historic evidence suggesting that gender roles were never as fixed as he imagines. Yasuda writes that 'The one thing Jōmon figurines can tell us about the twenty-first century is the importance of building a society where women can be independent.'[61] Ultimately, however, both Okamura and Yasuda want to use the Jōmon to reproduce the subordinate position of women in modern Japan.

Finally, machismo can be linked with the photographic representation of the main practitioners of Japanese eco-nationalism. In his introduction to the Penguin edition of the works of Walter Benjamin, Amit Chaudhuri builds upon Susan Sontag to discuss links between modernity, the subaltern and photography.[62] A photo of a young Tetsurō Watsuji taken before his trip to Europe shows a neatly-dressed man in a suit and tie, the triangle of a folded white handkerchief in his breast pocket. Through round-framed spectacles his pensive gaze is fixed away from the camera, apparently caught in a moment of reflection.[63] In a way reminiscent of the photograph of a young Walter Benjamin explored by Chaudhuri, Watsuji shows his ambivalence, even angularity to the mainstream of modernity. Fast forward half a century and Umehara's collected works were published with highly self-conscious photos taken by the well-known photographer Takao Inoue (1940-2016). In these photos, Umehara appears confident, frequently smiling broadly at the camera, and looking incongruously well-groomed even while conducting fieldwork. Such images go beyond vanity to suggest a cult of personality surrounding

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57 See Hudson and Aoyama, 'Waist-to-hip ratios of Jomon figurines'; Naumann, *Japanese Prehistory*; and Bailey *et al*., *Unearthed*.

58 Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', p. 85. The Japanese here does not necessarily mean that only women who gave birth 'shone brightly' (*kagayaita*) but most readers would interpret the sentence in that way.

59 Okamura, *Jōmonjin kara no dengon*, p. 115.

60 Okamura, *Jōmonjin kara no dengon*, p. 125.

61 Yasuda, 'Bunmei no Jōmon-ka, bunmei no herenizumu-ka'.

62 Chaudhuri, 'Introduction'.

63 The photo can be viewed at: http://www.asahi.com/houryuji/story/13.html

Umehara. Yasuda attempts something similar in his own books, frequently including photographs of himself standing in front of—or sitting on—famous archaeological sites such as Angkor Wat or the *moai* of Rapa Nui (Easter Island). Like Umehara, his gaze is certain and proprietary, almost colonial in its confidence.

Eco's feature number thirteen is *selective popularism* wherein the leader carries out the will of the people. The lack of even the possibility of debate over the views espoused by Japanese eco-nationalists demonstrates its attempted replacement of science and democracy.

Eco's fourteenth and final feature is that Ur-fascism speaks *Newspeak*. Japanese eco-nationalism's Newspeak involves two strategies. One is the radical juxtaposition of words which attempt to reclaim Japan using the ideas of the West. 'Jōmon civilisation' is a typical example. The other approach is the use of obscure texts which are positioned as central to the Japanese experience. An example is a saying associated with the Tendai Buddhist sect that, 'mountains, rivers, plants and trees all achieve buddhahood.' According to Umehara, this idea was shared across *all* medieval Buddhist sects in Japan.[64] No evidence is provided for this claim and the Tendai aphorism concerned has probably received its greatest attention through the works of Umehara. The use of language in eco-nationalist writings in Japan is discussed further below.

Eco-Nationalism and the *Volk* Community

Critics of Japanese eco-nationalism have argued that it represents an essentially racist or *völkisch* philosophy.[65] Such claims were rejected by Umehara who wrote, 'I have never advocated blood purity nor racial superiority of Japanese people [sic].'[66] Yasuda makes an even more explicit rejection of blood in favour of soil as a condition of Japaneseness: 'The Japanese nation [*minzoku* or *Volk*] is not a nation bound by blood like the Jewish nation.' Instead, he writes, 'it is bound together by this beautiful Japanese archipelago, by the national territory [*kokudo*] of Japan, and by the Japanese language.'[67] In the twenty-first century, any definition of a people or nation which begins by declaring a fundamental dissimilarity from the Jews sounds, to say the least, out of place and out of time. Several other aspects of Yasuda's definition require extensive critical comment. Let us begin, however, with the 'Jewish question'. Why does a definition of the Japanese nation written in 2010 require mooring in issues of Jewish race and blood? The answer, I suggest, is that while ostensibly rejecting racism, Yasuda's explication has to be read as insisting on the importance of ethnic attachment to a specific place—in other words, Ratzel's *Raumverbundenheit*, a concept which was frequently linked with anti-Semitism through the claim that the Jews lacked any such attachment.[68] Already in the 1930s, many Japanese intellectuals had worried about the dangers of a rootless American culture overdetermining Japan's modernity.[69] Yasuda takes this idea but re-orients it back to a classic anti-Semitic trope. Yet at the same time, there is also a strange, despondent longing in Yasuda's work which has parallels to the Jewish tradition of the 'dream of ethnic redemption from present wretchedness'.[70]

64 Umehara, 'The Japanese view of the "other world"', p. 176; Umehara and Kawakatsu, *Nihon shisō no kosō*, p. 38.
65 Buruma, 'The right argument' and 'Umehara Takeshi shi wa yahari Yamatoisuto'.
66 Umehara 'The civilization of the forest', p. 47. See also Umehara, 'Watashi wa yamatoisuto de wa nai'.
67 Yasuda, 'Jōmon ga ichimannen', p. 169.
68 Michel, 'Anti-semitism in early 20th century German geography'.
69 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 56.
70 Cf. Cook, *Muhammad*, p. 88.

In the same text, Yasuda goes on to ask,

> So how do we define the Japanese Nation? In short, as this beautiful Japanese archipelago and territory and the Japanese language and Japanese food. If anyone lives for ten years in this beautiful Japanese archipelago, speaks Japanese and eats Japanese food, then that person can become Japanese. It doesn't matter if the colour of your skin is white or black or yellow. If you speak Japanese, eat Japanese food, love Japanese culture, and continue living in this beautiful Japanese archipelago then anyone can become Japanese.

The assumption that someone—presumably the state—should manage or control Japaneseness is an idea which would have seemed natural in both Japan and Germany in the 1930s. Yasuda encourages young Japanese towards international marriages wherein they can transfer Japanese values to their children and grandchildren. This follows the logic of colonial coercion of Japanese customs and culture under Japan's empire when writers such as Ukichi Taguchi (1855-1905) supported 'mixed residence' as a means by which Japan 'as time goes by, will without a doubt accept, digest and assimilate these foreigners, who will eventually become our brethren.'[71] For Yasuda the natural community of Japan is a plant-based utopia like that found in the *Peach Blossom Spring*, a Taoist tale written by Tao Yuanming (365-427).[72] In this allegory, the people are happy because 'It is their individual labour and cooperative organisation that render their society a more desirable one than the oppressive feudal regimes with high taxes and tyrannical rulers that dominated in contemporary China.'[73] What Yasuda calls his 'Shangri La' philosophy uses the past to imagine a traditional oneness with Nature, generating a warm anti-modernist sanctuary in ethnic communitarianism. As in Naomi Shibab Nye's poem *300 Goats*, the Japanese Nation is led 'naturally' to 'huddle together, warm bodies pressing'.

We Are All Greeks: The Language of Japanese Eco-Nationalism

Japanese eco-nationalists, and the 'Alt-Nichibunken' group in particular, have used an unusual language of discourse, the roots of which are a complex mixture of late European Romanticism, the anti-modernist cultural pessimism of Nietzsche and Spengler, the Leipzig school of historical geography, and the idealist history of Arnold Toynbee. The Alt-Nichibunken scholars were educated in early post war Japan in a system that retained a heavy emphasis on pre-war European scholarship. Yasuda relates how he was still reading Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie* in the original German in a graduate seminar in the 1970s.[74] The political geography of Friedrich Ratzel plays an important role in the emphasis given to links between *Volk* and Land and in Yasuda's anti-urbanism.[75] Although the scarcity of citations in their writings makes it difficult to reconstruct exact influences, many of the specific ideas and even terminology of the Alt-Nichibunken group seem to have been borrowed directly from nineteenth and early twentieth century European scholarship. Words like civilisation, monotheism, Renaissance and Hellenism are thrown around with little definition or nuance. Many of these terms are filtered through the lens of European Romanticism. Yasuda's promotion of Hellenism, for instance, recalls the philhellenism of Goethe, Schiller and other Romantics 'who came to believe that becoming Hellenized was the only possible path for someone seeking personal development (*Bildung*).'[76] Shelley's battle cry

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[71] Yasuda, *Yama wa ichiba genri shugi to tatakatte iru* and 'Proposed solution'. The Taguchi quote is cited from Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 28. According to Kawada, *Origin of Ethnography*, p. 83, the idea that Japan has a mission to civilise 'the coloured races' goes back to Kunio Yanagita. By contrast, Matthew Johnson reminds us that 'Many people do not belong to a particular place; they are, nevertheless, just as much part of the national community as the most rotund, bewhiskered "English" gentleman.' Johnson, *Ideas of Landscape*, p. 178.

[72] Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', citing Kurihara, *Tōyō no kome, seiyō no komugi*.

[73] Dutton, '"Non-western" utopian traditions', p. 243.

[74] Yasuda, 'Jōmon ga ichimannen ijō', pp. 164-165.

[75] For a discussion of these ideas in German geography, see Michel, 'Anti-semitism in early 20th century German geography'.

[76] Dietler, *Archaeologies of Colonialism*, p. 29.

'We are all Greeks' finds a strange echo in Yasuda almost two centuries later. Yasuda's endorsement of 'Hellenism' against 'Hebraism' bears a striking resemblance to Matthew Arnold's 1869 *Culture and Anarchy*, as well as to the claims of an English classicist of the 1950s who continued to propose that the 'hellenization of a barbarous world' was the 'best hope' of the post war generation.[77]

Ratzel was a proponent of diffusionism, arguing for a limited number of primordial *Urkulturen*.[78] Influenced by Ratzel and the Leipzig historical geographers, Tadao Umesao's 1957 essay *Bunmei no seitai shikan* ('Civilisation from the perspective of ecological history') provided one point of departure for later eco-nationalist writings in its use of 'civilisation' as a unit of analysis and its assumption that Japan has absorbed more of the West than other Asian countries but still remained 'unique'.[79] Whereas wartime scholarship had focused on Japan's relations with Asia, Umesao moved the goalposts to encompass a broader geographical framework. Though displaying similarities with Watsuji's pre-war writings, Umesao brought a sharper focus on the comparative history and anthropology of Eurasian peoples. Umehara and Yasuda continue the interest in civilisation begun by Watsuji and Umesao, yet follow Toynbee in reversing German understandings of the difference between culture and civilisation. In the German tradition, *Kultur* was the permanent, spiritual and organic heritage of a *Volk*, whereas *Zivilisation* represented the materialistic and superficial layers which perverted the authentic *Kultur*. Toynbee, in contrast, saw culture as superficial and civilisation as representing true 'self-determination'.[80] The idea that civilisations have a 'vitalist' or organic life force (*Lebenskraft*)[81] recalls Nietzsche and Gobineau before him.

When I began writing this book, I spent a great deal of time investigating sources for the very particular language and discourse used by Japanese eco-nationalism. I found many parallels which are unlikely to be totally coincidental but for which I was unable to identify appropriate intermediate texts. The contrast between 'activity' and 'passivity' recalls Nietzsche as well as Gustav Klemm's *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit*, published from 1843 to 1852.[82] The imprecise yet calculated use of the term 'Anglo-Saxon' mimics and parodies the Aryan theses of Max Müller and others, resonating also with the writings of pre-war German intellectuals who feared British and American imperialism.[83] Richard Evans notes that, 'Pan-German racism was expressed in the linguistic usage through which they reduced every nation to a simple, uniformly acting racial entity—"Germandom", "Slavdom", "Anglo-Saxondom" or "Jewdom"'.[84] Yasuda's use of 'an eye for an eye' recalls the frequent use of this phrase by Adolf Hitler who called it 'the true old Jewish law'.[85] The anti-urban proclamations of Umehara and Yasuda recall Oswald Spengler for whom 'All great peoples begin as villagers, fitting their collective fates to the contours of the land, in recognition of their close affinity with Mother Nature'.[86] Yasuda's emphasis on eating as sacrifice brings to mind Hegel's comment that, 'to eat means to sacrifice and to sacrifice means to eat oneself'.[87] In these and many similar cases, it is mostly unclear to what extent the Japanese writers were consciously

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77 Shelley, *Hellas*; Murray, *Hellenism and the Modern World*, p. 7. Arnold's contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism is discussed at length in Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions*, pp. 147-149.

78 Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie 1*.

79 Umesao, *Chūō Kōron*, February 1957, 32-49. A translation of this essay was published as 'Introduction to an ecological view of civilization'. For a longer account of Umesao's ideas, see his *An Ecological View of History*.

80 Herman, *The Idea of Decline in Western History*, pp. 196-197, 277.

81 Cf. Yasuda, 'Jōmon ga ichimannen', pp. 168-169

82 Yasuda, 'Passivity and activity of Japanese studies'.

83 After reading Spengler's *Decline of the West* in 1919, for instance, novelist Thomas Mann wrote that, 'What's coming now is Anglo-Saxon dominance of the world, that is perfected Zivilisation' (cited in Herman, *The Idea of Decline*, p. 244).

84 Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, p. 48.

85 See Evans, *The Third Reich at War*, p. 267.

86 Herman, *The Idea of Decline*, p. 238; see also Michel, 'Anti-semitism in early 20th century German geography'.

87 'Essen heißt Opfern und Opfern heißt Selbstessen': Hegel, *Vorlesungen* 2:81, translated by Mack, *German Idealism and the Jew*, p. 48.

intending to cite these European authors. Japanese eco-nationalism leaves little doubt that it draws heavily on the European tradition but at the same time its main *raison d'être* is to reject that tradition. With no hint of irony, the discourse of European philosophy and history is used as a key method in that rejection.

Chapter 2. I had not seen this kind of mountain or forest before: *fūdo* as Gothic landscape

If 'place' can be defined as 'a framed space that is meaningful to a person or group over time', then Japan is a country which is highly *emplaced*.[1] When space is framed, it is assigned meanings by individuals and cultures. Such meanings are not fixed or unchanging, neither are they determined by climate or topography. Social space is a stage or strategic context used by actors who may have very different objectives.[2] This, in turn, requires a historical perspective on ways of seeing place, and Japan provides constant examples to show that 'Nature is an idea as much as it is a physical reality'.[3] When the courtier and poet known today as Sei Shōnagon (ca. 966-1017/1025) ventured out into the countryside to write about the cuckoo, she and her companions burst out laughing when encountering farm women threshing rice. As historian Brett Walker notes, neither 'understood the other, making it difficult ... to isolate a particular "Japanese" attitude towards the natural world in this encounter.'[4] Today, however, Nature in Japan has become constrained by an aesthetic gaze which plays little attention to the habitation of the land by real people over history. The view of Nature held by the aristocratic poet Sei Shōnagon has almost become the norm in modern Japan.

The tendency for Nature to compress 'diverse and complex phenomena into such a flat, colorless cartoon that it erases most of the things scholars wish to understand' was understood by twentieth-century Japanese intellectuals such as political scientist Masao Maruyama.[5] Maruyama criticised the reliance of political authority on Nature, under which 'the autonomous political subject could never hope to develop, and, without the development of autonomous individuals, state power could never be challenged'.[6] To the extent that state power in Japan was identified with Nature, it became 'an ideology guaranteeing the permanence of the existing order' and was thus 'by definition anti-modern, deadeningly traditional, and opposed to liberty'.[7] An early expression of this thinking was found in Shigetaka Shiga's influential 1894 work *Nihon fūkeiron* ('A theory of Japanese landscape'). According to Masako Gavin, Shiga was influenced in this respect by a Christian missionary, S.A. Bernett, who had written that,

> It is helpless to save the poor in India, and the poor have been debased in China. Efforts to save the poor in the United States where bureaucrats are corrupt and therefore hated by the poor have been in vain. Only in Japan, do the poor hold a hope. ... Working hard in their land ... a nation as one loves beauty of mountains and fields. ... Being one with nature, they would come to even forget their poverty.[8]

As state ideology, this idea of a nation being at one with Nature reached its peak in the *Kokutai no hongi* ('Fundamentals of Our National Polity'), a text published by the Ministry of Education in 1937, but the link between Japanese Nature and Japanese identity continues to be a common nationalist trope. In fact, remarkably similar views have been widely shared within the project of modernity, giving Nature

1 The definition is from Thornton, *Being and Place Among the Tlingit*, p. 10.
2 Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.
3 della Dora, *Landscape, Nature and the Sacred*, p. xiii.
4 Walker, *A Concise History of Japan*, p. 41.
5 Cronon, 'Introduction: In search of nature', p. 35.
6 Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*, p. 16.
7 Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*, p. 20.
8 Gavin, *Shiga Shigetaka*, p. 36.

'unnatural qualities' including '(but not limited to), hierarchy, authority, harmony, purity, neutrality, and mystery.'[9]

The incantation that the Japanese are 'close to Nature' has been deconstructed in depth by numerous scholars. The 'wrapping' of Nature or landscape means that highly cultivated gardens, officially famous scenery (*meisho*) or miniaturised plants (*bonsai*) are appreciated despite their artificiality.[10] Raw Nature or 'wilderness' is looked down upon because it lacks cultivation. This means that even a can of drink from a vending machine can become an icon of Nature exactly because it is 'cultivated' and 'wrapped' (Figure 1).[11] Anthropologist Dolores Martinez comments, 'It could be argued that the elite practice of bringing the natural under the control of esthetic ideals is precisely what makes it possible, in some part, for many Japanese to ignore the destruction of their and others' environments.'[12]

Figure 1. *A vending machine in Shizuoka, Japan attempts to sell highly processed beverages by appealing to images of green Nature. Photo by the author.*

The performance—as opposed to the gaze—of Japanese Nature has a darker side than that typically imagined for the Great Outdoors of the United States, where such performances are 'sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and "healthy"'.[13] Practitioners of *shugendō*—often explained as 'mountain asceticism'—undergo harsh training which can include climbing high mountains and standing under icy waterfalls. The aim of these austerities is to 'enter into the very process of being *that is nature itself*.'[14] Yet humankind is no more part of Nature standing under an icy waterfall at the base of Mount Fuji than under a hot shower in a Tokyo apartment. Standing under an icy waterfall could be considered as a critique of capitalism; unlike hot water in Tokyo, waterfalls are not commodities and are considered as 'externalities' to economic exchange. But Nature itself doesn't worry too much about this distinction. The Japanese prefer Nature removed from what Kalland and Asquith call the 'chaotic veil of profusion', but a true ecological perspective makes no attempt to judge or exclude profusion.[15]

Landscape

Given the highly aesthetic view of Nature common in Japan, it is no surprise that *landscape* has been key to framing the environment. Landscape is a way of seeing but also a way of working and dwelling. For this reason, landscape can be a means by which people are distanced or separated from the places where they spend their lives. A landscape painting of a field, for example, may include the lord and lady who own the land but not the workers who toil there.

[9] Morton, *The Ecological Thought*, p. x.
[10] Hendry, 'Nature tamed'.
[11] Ashkenazi, 'The can-onization of nature'.
[12] Martinez, 'On the "nature" of Japanese culture', p. 196.
[13] Morton, *The Ecological Thought*, p. 16.
[14] Shaner, 'The Japanese experience of nature', p. 167, emphasis added.
[15] Kalland and Asquith, 'Japanese perceptions of nature', p. 18.

Any discussion of landscape in modern Japanese scholarship must begin with philosopher and cultural historian Tetsurō Watsuji. Like W.G. Hoskins in Britain or Carl Sauer in the United States, Watsuji began the Japanese tradition of landscape studies. Just as it is possible to talk about an 'English landscape tradition' spanning archaeology, geography, history and literature, so Watsuji was the father of a 'Japanese landscape tradition' which remains vibrant across several fields.[16] Despite this role, academic research on Watsuji has focused largely on his philosophical contributions and, with the notable exception of French geographer Augustin Berque, his work has received less attention from landscape studies.

Watsuji's enormously influential book *Fūdo* was translated into English in 1961 under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of Education as *Climate and Culture*. This translation was based on the 1943 edition in which Watsuji had revised the section on China in Chapter 3, admitting that chapter had been first 'written in 1928, when leftist thinking was very prevalent. I have eliminated traces of leftist theory and now present this chapter as a pure study of climate.'[17] Based on his experiences travelling in Europe, the Middle East, India and China, Watsuji's study of climate is anything but 'pure' in the sense of an objective description; the observations he makes are highly individualistic and subjective. Landscape is, for Watsuji, akin to cold, a phenomenon which he argues is always encountered as a subjective experience. *Climate and Culture* is, in one sense, a work of landscape phenomenology, albeit one that lacks any sensation of inhabitation or embodiment in non-Japanese landscapes. It would be hard, in fact, to imagine a more detached spectator of non-Japanese landscapes than Watsuji. The landscapes of Japan itself, in contrast, are portrayed with a love and attention to some aspects of the vernacular which almost anticipates the work of J.B. Jackson.[18]

The heart of *Climate and Culture*, and its most influential argument, is Watsuji's theory of three types of climate: monsoon, desert and meadow. With some literary flourish, Watsuji explores the psychological effects of these types of climate. It is not long, however, before the reader is presented with observations such as, 'This factor helps us to understand why the people of the South Seas have never made any appreciable cultural progress'; in turn, the 'generosity' of Nature in the South Seas explains why the people living there 'became easy prey for and ready lackeys of the Europeans after the Renaissance'.[19] India, we are told, suffers even more from psychological passivity due to climate and Watsuji is not ashamed to conclude that, 'Because of his receptivity and resignation, or, ... because of his lack of an aggressive and masterful nature, the Indian, in fact, prompts in us and draws out from us all our own aggressive and masterful characteristics'.[20] While there are similarities in approach and tone to Huntington's 1915 *Civilization and Climate*, Watsuji makes the new argument that any 'aggressive and masterful characteristics' of the Japanese are justified by the 'resignation' of the Indians and other Asians.

In philosophy, Watsuji's *Climate and Culture* has received attention for its early focus on space over time. Watsuji's spatial turn was, however, centred around a geography of difference. Watsuji's argument that the environment consists of subjective experience has also been widely discussed. As mentioned, cold is explained as the thing we experience as cold. This means, in essence, that Watsuji experiences all landscapes outside Japan with a frisson of horror and rejection; as discussed below, this horror is often expressed through the literary trope of Gothic Romanticism. Furthermore, Watsuji's subjective landscape is not an individual experience but is linked to community *as integrated by the state*. For this reason, 'Watsuji's ecological perspective brings in and legitimates the existence of the state. This

16 For the English tradition, see Johnson, *Ideas of Landscape*.
17 Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. vii.
18 Jackson, *Discovering the Vernacular Landscape*. Watsuji's 'vernacular' is nevertheless highly elitist.
19 Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, pp. 22-23.
20 Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 38.

position allows Watsuji to incorporate in his ethical theory the Emperor as the pivotal state institution, and create his version of cultural nationalism.'[21]

Writing about the poetry of Ted Hughes, Jonathan Bate mentions the claim that, 'harmonious dwelling with the earth is a matter of *staying put* and *listening in*, whereas the rapacious drive of "progress" is towards *travelling out* and *making claims*—the claims of knowledge, of conquest and of possession.'[22] There is a sense in which all life is about travelling and exhortations to stay in our place can easily be linked to political control. Yet within Japanese environmental writing, there is a stark contrast between, on the one hand, authors such as Watsuji, Umehara, Yamaori and Yasuda who travel out to seek and occasionally find new civilisations only to recoil in horror at non-Japanese landscapes and, on the other hand, place-based figures who lament the penetration of industrial Japan into the local scene. A wonderful example of the latter is Michiko Ishimure (1927-2018) whose moving account of the town of Minamata and its mercury poisoning by the Chisso chemical company is structured around listening to people in the community.[23] Watsuji, by contrast, listens to no-one and his landscape gaze is always removed from life, high up on the deck of a steamship, or looking at a sea with no boats. Unlike Wordsworth, Watsuji did not have to walk miles to place himself in a landscape; his gaze was essentially fixed before he left home.

Watsuji's racism needs to be placed in the context of a period when the Japanese were widely subjected to discrimination. A few years before Watsuji visited Europe, Kunio Yanagita had been sent to Geneva as a League of Nations committee member. Geneva was, Yanagita wrote, a place where 'Britain and France odiously lorded it over everyone else'.[24] Like Watsuji, Yanagita's negative experiences in Europe seem to have profoundly influenced his later scholarship. Watsuji's critique of Europe in *Climate and Culture* is sometimes expressed through musings which serve as amusing antidotes to the more triumphalist of Eurocentric writings. For example, we are told that, 'It is no mere chance that Hades as pictured in the *Odyssey* bears a strong resemblance to the English winter'.[25] The fact that the more overt racism of Watsuji evident in the passages cited above is linked with *guilt*, and with the idea that peoples such as the Indians and Jews could *invite* their own persecution, suggests a link with the psychology of colonial oppression.[26] In order to escape a fate similar to other colonised peoples, Japan had to struggle to maintain its superiority: 'in the whole world, it is only Japan which can resist' Euro-American colonialism.[27] Such comments do not necessarily mean that Watsuji was a wholesale supporter of Japanese imperialism and Harootunian has argued that Watsuji misunderstood the violence of Japan's own colonial oppressions.[28]

Why it is worth going back to the rambling writings of a Japanese tourist of nearly a century ago who was almost unremittingly negative about the places he visited? The main reason is that Watsuji remains extremely influential in Japanese academia. Watsuji's fame in Japanese letters brought environmental determinism into the mainstream. Yasuda frequently claims he is not an environmental determinist but writes:

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21 Befu, 'Watsuji Tetsurō's ecological approach', p. 112.
22 Bate, *Song of the Earth*, p. 29.
23 Ishimure, *Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow*.
24 Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 182.
25 Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 75.
26 Cf. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*.
27 Cited in Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 267.
28 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, pp. 259-260. According to Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 278, Watsuji supported the emperor but opposed ultra-nationalism.

> I believe that the volcanic eruptions and earthquakes of the Pacific Ring of Fire, as well as the tsunami and typhoons of the same region, make a landscape [*fūdo*] with frequent natural disasters which built the sense of ethics and morality of the peoples living around the Pacific and gave those same peoples a sense of strength. This sense of ethics and morality gave birth to unique civilisational principles ranging from the 'civilisation of beauty and compassion' to the concept of 'Japanese business management'.[29]

This environmental determinism mirrors a long tradition of such ideas in European thought. As Jonathan Bate has noted, Jane Austen's vision of 'English verdure, English culture, English comfort, seen under a sun bright, without being oppressive' derives from the association of a 'temperate climate with a liberal society and excessive heat with oriental despotism.'[30] Watsuji makes similar links in *Climate and Culture*.

Another of Watsuji's arguments that remains influential is the supposedly peace-loving nature of the Japanese Nation. This idea goes back to the eighteenth century and Moto'ori Norinaga's claim that Japan lacks social conflict because it is a 'natural community' under the emperor.[31] Watsuji further developed this conclusion using the writings of Kenji Kiyono and other anthropologists who proposed that, since the Japanese ethnic nation had existed from the time of the first human occupation of the archipelago, the Japanese had not conducted wars of conquest against non-Japanese peoples such as the Ainu.[32] The fact that the regulation of landscapes by the state involves structures of violence is ignored by Watsuji and his later followers.[33]

Watsuji has also influenced Japanese eco-nationalism's basic mode of writing, which is what Morton calls the *religious style*.[34] A shepherd's eye view of the world laments the decline and corruption of civilisation. Such writing follows the *pastoral* tradition in describing Nature or the countryside with a 'celebratory attitude' which contains 'an implicit or explicit contrast to the urban'.[35] The Japanese eco-nationalist pastoral is *pejorative*, meaning that its 'pastoral vision is too simplified and thus an idealisation of the reality of life in the country.'[36]

Desert: Dark and Revolting as Death

It may seem strange to begin a discussion of landscapes and Japan in the desert. A common definition of a desert is a place receiving less than 250 mm of rain per year, but average annual precipitation in Japan ranges from a low of 788 mm in Obihiro to a high of 4477 mm on Yakushima Island.[37] Despite this, deserts have held an enormously important place in the Japanese eco-nationalist imagination. The first page of Heita Kawakatsu's book *Making the 'Beautiful Nation' Japan* notes 'It is said that "After civilisation only deserts remain"'.[38] This unsourced quotation derives from George-Louis Leclerc (the Comte de Buffon) via Rousseau. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) saw desertification as a universal feature of the human story, writing that 'history tells us about the huge forests all over the earth which had to be cut down as it became populated and civilized.'[39] Rousseau acknowledged this ecological perspective derived from

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[29] Yasuda, *Miruku o nomanai bunmei*, p. 4. This passage cites the following sources for the 'civilisation of beauty and compassion' and 'Japanese business management', respectively: Kawakatsu and Yasuda, *Teki o tsukuru bunmei* and Inamori, *Ikikata*.

[30] Bate, *The Song of the Earth*, p. 6. The Austen quote is from *Emma* (1816).

[31] See Nishimura, 'The way of the gods'.

[32] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, pp. 278-279.

[33] On violence and landscape, see Mitchell, 'The devil's arm'.

[34] Morton, *Being Ecological*, pp. 202-205.

[35] Gifford, *Pastoral*, p. 2.

[36] Gifford, *Pastoral*, p. 2.

[37] Data from https://www.currentresults.com/Weather/Japan/precipitation-annual-average.php

[38] Kawakatsu, *Bi no kuni*, p. 1.

[39] Cited in Bate, *Song of the Earth*, p. 43.

Leclerc (1707-1788) who had written that because 'men consume enormous quantities of timber and plants for fires and other uses, it follows that in an inhabited country the layer of vegetative soil must always diminish and eventually become like the soil of Arabia Petraea, and so many other provinces of the Orient, which is in fact the area of most ancient habitation, where today we find only salt and sand'.[40] The link between desertification and civilisation is important to Japanese eco-nationalist writers because it enables them to claim that Japan does not fit normal historical narratives. Japan and Japanese 'civilisation' become the exception which proves the rule that forests 'must always diminish'. Pierre Bourdieu explained commonplaces as 'those places in discourse in which an entire group meets and recognizes itself'.[41] Deserts serve as such places in Japanese nationalism, not because the Japanese group sees itself in the desert, but because it recognises there the natural *opposite* of Japaneseness. The use of the desert as a literary topos also enables Japanese writers to expound links between climate and race/culture, a mainstay of nineteenth-century geography adopted without critical reflection.[42]

This discursive significance of deserts perhaps explains why they have generated some of the best literary accounts of landscape within the Japanese eco-nationalist genre. Japanese literary fascination with the desert begins with Watsuji, for whom the desert was a skeleton-like non-place of 'dread revulsion', 'dark and revolting as death'.[43] The dead climate of the desert makes its inhabitants submissive yet aggressive: here man 'sees his own ugliness in an ugly mountain.'[44] According to Watsuji, this desert psychology was carried by the Jews into Europe where their national character was maintained over time: 'Persecution by the Europeans has forced this on them—but it was the Jews themselves, who invited such persecution.'[45] Watsuji's conclusion that the Jews deserved their own persecution mirrors the exact logic of Adolf Hitler who in February 1942 told Goebbels that, 'The Jews have deserved the catastrophe they are experiencing today.' Goebbels himself commented, 'The Jews are being punished barbarically, to be sure, but they have fully deserved it.'[46] This logic of persecution made 'natural' in the harsh landscape of the desert continues into more recent Japanese eco-nationalist writings, especially those by Yoshinori Yasuda. Just as the Nazis blamed the Jews for all of Germany's ills, so Yasuda blames the pastoral, wheat-growing, milk-drinking people for all of Japan's woes.

Watsuji's trope of desert lifelessness is expanded into a broader motif for the arid areas of southern Europe centred on the Mediterranean, which was 'truly a sea of the dead':

> ... it is a sea with little life in it, a sea where marine plants do not flourish. I do not remember on a single occasion seeing boats putting out to fish in this sea. ... There was an air of desolation about this scene.
>
> (...)
>
> It was no mere chance that the Mediterranean gave me this impression of desolation; you might call it a sea-desert, for the harvest of the sea here is indeed meagre. So it is natural in the extreme that there has been no development of either a fishing industry or of fish eating habits.[47]

[40] Bate, *Song of the Earth*, p. 43.
[41] Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, p. 168.
[42] For a historical overview of such ideas in Europe, see Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition*.
[43] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, pp. 44, 46. In the 20 pages of this book devoted to the desert, the word 'death' and related compounds appear 14 times.
[44] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 43.
[45] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 52.
[46] Evans, *Third Reich at War*, p. 268.
[47] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, pp. 64-65.

It is, of course, quite inaccurate to say that there has been no fishing industry or fish eating in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean basin is characterised by oligotrophic (low nutrient) conditions leading to diverse fish communities, rich in species but with low levels of dominance.[48] Migratory fish such as tuna enter from the Atlantic and even today the Mediterranean is certainly not lifeless enough for fish not to find their way to the Japanese market.[49] Fish have been a key element of many Mediterranean cuisines.

Death becomes a less frequent theme as Watsuji travelled north, but as with the desert it is the *lack* of living things that stands out.[50] The lack or rarity of weeds and insect pests in Europe supposedly made farming there an easy endeavour. 'Italians', for instance, 'are said to be lazy idlers; one of the reasons for this is the lightness of their farming tasks.'[51] Even when he is physically *in* Nature, Watsuji leeches out the life that is actually present. He complains that, 'to one who knows an insect-ridden country like Japan, there is even a certain loneliness to the Mediterranean coastline, so few insects are there.' In Italy, visiting the river Po swollen by melting snow in March, Watsuji could see only 'a tranquillity and a leisureliness about the flow which made it difficult to believe even that there was any movement.' As a result, 'it all struck me as a great joke and I could not help bursting into laughter.'[52]

Watsuji gave later Japanese eco-nationalist writers a particular vocabulary ('monsoon', 'death', 'Anglo-Saxon') which continues to influence and constrain their thought. Yasuda's description of night time in the desert closely mirrors a similar passage in *Climate and Climate* complete with its explicit motif of death.[53] Writings by Tetsuo Yamaori also follow Watsuji's revulsion towards the desert. Recounting his first trip to Israel, Yamaori recalled, 'It was a shocking experience for me, because the entire landscape was desert'. Japan, in contrast, 'simply looked like heaven to someone who had come back from the desert.'[54] Watsuji's *Climate and Culture* is a literary and philosophical work that, despite the author's physical presence in the many of the places described, distances and divides the reader from those places. That process of distancing works in different ways for Japanese and non-Japanese readers. The former is encouraged to recognise her complete distance from the Other, the non-Japanese landscape. Watsuji's desert is, in particular, completely alien; he gives us all of the harshness of the desert but none of its beauty as described, for instance, by Mary Austin, Edward Abbey or Terry Tempest Williams.[55] The non-Japanese reader is constantly perplexed by Watsuji's quirky descriptions which seem deliberately formulated to be those of a complete outsider. There is a sense in which all views of landscape are distancing. Yet *Climate and Culture* displays a constant tension between *living in* Japan and simply *looking at* non-Japan. Watsuji was a highly reluctant traveller to Europe and 'Apart from his German tutor and his landlady, he spoke to hardly anyone, failed to attend classes, and eventually returned to Japan a nervous wreck six months sooner than planned.'[56] This experience may go some way to explain the striking

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[48] Morales-Muñiz and Roselló-Izquierdo, 'Twenty thousand years of fishing', p. 249. See also Horden and Purcell, *The Corrupting Sea*, pp. 190-197 and Marzano, *Harvesting the Sea*.

[49] Six or seven years ago, when still living in Japan, I was surprised to find endangered Mediterranean tuna on sale in my local supermarket in Saga. Food labels can, of course, be deceptive and the supermarket may have added 'Mediterranean' to make it sound more exotic. On organised crime in global fisheries, see Witbooi *et al*., 'Organized crime in the fisheries sector'.

[50] By the time Watsuji reached Britain, however, the Grim Reaper was back in his observation that 'England's gloom made it the land of the dead': Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 76.

[51] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p 71.

[52] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, pp. 70-72.

[53] Yasuda, 'Monsoon and religions', p. 320; cf. Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 44.

[54] Yamaori, 'A comparative view of the cult of Mt. Fuji', p. 69. See also, Yamaori, 'Two strategies'.

[55] Austin, *The Land of Little Rain*; Abbey, *Desert Solitaire*; Williams, *Red*.

[56] Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 272. According to Pauline Couteau, Watsuji had to return to Japan because of the death of his father. Couteau also notes, however, that Watsuji was influenced by the novelist Sōseki Natsume who is famous for his stressful experiences in Europe, admitting in his 1907 work *Bungakuron* that, 'The two years I spent in London were the most unpleasant years in my life. Among English gentlemen I lived in misery, like a poor dog that had strayed among a pack of wolves.' See Couteau, 'Watsuji Tetsuro's ethics of milieu', p. 271

omission from *Culture and Climate* of any mention of actual people inhabiting landscapes outside Japan. There is a great deal about 'Man' in general, and we are treated to a shocked account of German men sunbathing half-naked in Berlin parks, but the only individual who appears in the text as someone living outside Japan and with whom Watsuji had actually spoken is a Japanese man who 'had been made to suffer heaven knows how many dull and dreary days' in London.[57] There is no-one in the text to nuance, contradict or even explain the author's perspective. Watsuji's philosophical work is often discussed in terms of humanism, but from a landscape perspective the most striking thing is the *erasure* of people living and working in the landscape. Landscape can be seen as a 'veil' or 'curtain' hiding working people and the contradictions of social life in general.[58] Watsuji makes no pretence about drawing such a curtain over the stage he sets—he simply omits people from that stage at the outset. It goes without saying that Watsuji's landscapes lack any sense of *class*, or of different people experiencing the same landscape in different ways. Yet a long tradition of research in landscape geography has emphasised that, 'Spaces are not simply reproduced by cognitive and social structures [or by climate] but are also contested, refined, and reshaped by individuals through the practical experiences of living.'[59]

As noted, Watsuji's writings can be paced within a context of anti-Western imperialism. Yet his own approach to landscape mirrors the imperial landscape gaze, which 'projected out through the eyes of European explorers and scientists from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, is quite often a detached gaze, a controlling gaze, a gaze that somehow leeches the life out of the scene surveyed and replaces it with either a fabricated set of Eurocentric preconceptions or a tabula rosa, an emptiness, blank but measurable.'[60] Following Lacan, the landscape gaze of both Watsuji and Yasuda is also *narcissistic*, emphasising non-Japanese landscapes in terms of death or absence (of weeds, insects, etc).[61] In his analysis of Thomas Hardy's *The Woodlanders* (1887), Jonathan Bate notes that Grace Melbury, the primary female character in the novel, had 'developed the capacity to imagine herself in a place other than the one where she is.'[62] This alienation from her roots brings only trouble for Grace but the ability to imagine how human life connects to and impacts a broader environment represents a truly ecological viewpoint. Such a perspective is completely missing from Watsuji and the other eco-nationalist writers considered here.

Forest: Pure White Cloaks Dyed Red With Blood

Japanese eco-nationalism extolls the forest as the home of the primitive *Ur* culture of Japan in a way that recalls and mirrors numerous European writers from Ovid to Rousseau to Heidegger. Yet again there is a peculiar twist. For Enlightenment Europeans it was civilisation itself which had penetrated the forest and destroyed the native. In William Henry Hudson's *Green Mansions: A Romance of the Tropical Forest* (1904), the protagonist Abel journeys into the Guianan rainforest in search of authentic natives uncorrupted by the Europeans. He finds a being who is half-bird, half-girl and whose language is so natural that he cannot understand it. In the story, the love that develops between Abel and the bird-girl Rima brings into stark contrast the gap between the two as 'Abel's desire to return to nature has destroyed the very nature he desired.'[63] The impossibility of civilised man being able to experience the state of Nature provides the tragedy of *Green Mansions*; yet Japanese eco-nationalists such as Umehara and Yasuda write as if they themselves were the bird-girl and that the penetrating civilisation(s) are

[57] Watsuji, *Climate and Culture*, p. 110, 108.
[58] Berger, *Ways of Seeing*, p. 41; Mitchell, *The Lie of the Land*; Williams, *The Country and the City*.
[59] Thornton, *Being and Place*, p. 14.
[60] Wylie, *Landscape*, p. 127.
[61] Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. For a discussion of the application of Lacan's work to landscape, see Wylie, *Landscape*, pp. 89-91.
[62] Bate, *Song of the Earth*, p. 16.
[63] Bate, *Song of the Earth*, p. 62.

only those which are not native to Japan. In suggesting that authentic Japanese civilisation has no inequality or war, these writers go against all Nature writing since Rousseau. In making the forests of Japan the new firewall against the Anthropocene, a utopian 'forest civilisation' of Real Nature has been maintained against all odds. Outside of this Real Nature, the malware of Western and Chinese civilisations has destroyed the forests, leaving deserts in their place.[64]

The Japanese eco-nationalist view of the forest as the homeland of the original Japan involves the fundamental contradiction of the fact that forests have also played the same role in many European nationalisms. This is no coincidence—it is exactly the *Ur* landscape chosen by Romantic thinkers which was adopted by the Japanese.[65] Against the background of the growing industrialisation of the nineteenth century, it is no surprise that forests should have been a focus of critical ideas in many places. In Japan, parliamentarian Shōzō Tanaka (1841-1913), known for his vocal opposition to the pollution from the Ashio copper mine, described how Japan's forests had changed under the industrial economy of the Meiji era: 'No men love mountains and rivers now', he wrote. 'When trees are planted on the hillsides, it is not done from love, but from greed, for what the timber will fetch.'[66] Kunio Yanagita voiced his opposition to the Meiji government's policy of destroying sacred groves around Shinto shrines.[67] However, more disturbing views of mountains and forests can also be found in modern Japanese literature, most notably in Yanagita's *Legends of Tōno* (1910) and it was not until late in the post war Shōwa era that a re-evaluation of the forest was begun by Umehara and others.

Yasuda's 2001 edited volume *Forest and Civilisations* attempts to expand and support Umehara's vision of the forest as Japan's authentic landscape. The book opens with a photograph of Umehara looking out to sea with not a tree in sight; a dedication extolls him as 'one of the first who pointed out the importance of the forest culture philosophy for the past and the future world.' Yasuda's short introduction emphasises the need for narrative and in particular '*new* stories which take the position of the weakest subjects on earth.'[68] Yet it is quite striking to what extent the book reproduces so many *old* stories, many from the nineteenth century. A chapter on witchcraft bases its approach on the work of French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874).[69] A comparative mythology of the 'earth-mother cult' begins with the announcement that 'It is clear that the religion of *Homo sapiens* began with the adoration of the Earth-Mother.' The same author writes about Jōmon figurines, emphasising the 'threefold maternal functions' of 'breast feeding, pregnancy, and birth' and citing the *Kulturkreise* theories of Gudmund Hatt (1884-1960) and Adolf Jensen (1899-1965).[70]

Another chapter in the same book, by Hideo Tabata, discusses so-called *satoyama* woodlands. At the time of the publication of *Forest and Civilisations*, we had not yet been subjected to the subsequent flood of writings on *satoyama* and the chapter might be considered as an example of the new narratives desired by the editor. However, the whole discourse around these woodlands has today become so influenced by atavistic ideas that it is worth taking a moment to unpick the concept. *Satoyama* means 'village mountain' and refers to woodlands surrounding human settlements and used for firewood, charcoal, wild plants and mushrooms, green manure and hunting. Given the mountainous nature of the Japanese

64 Yasuda prevaricates between seeing Christianity and the 'Anglo-Saxons' as the main forest-destroyers in world history. In claiming that the 'Anglo-Saxons' have been responsible for a 'forest genocide', Yasuda uses the romanised word *jenosaido* to try to emphasise its non-Japanese nature: see Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei*, p. 100.

65 For an excellent overview of the forest in German nationalism, see Zechner, 'Politicized timber'.

66 Cited in Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan*, p. 55.

67 Hamashita, 'La forêt vue par Yanagita Kunio'.

68 Yasuda, 'Tales of the Forest', p. 9, emphasis added.

69 Walter, 'European forests'. Other chapters by well-known archaeologists such as Paul Bahn and Rosemary Joyce present scientific accounts which only indirectly engage with Yasuda's vision for the volume.

70 Yoshida, 'The origin of the earth-mother cult'.

archipelago, most rural settlements are found in close proximity to upland forests. The term *satoyama* was first recorded in 1759 but was revived in the 1960s.[71] Across the world, many premodern societies made similar use of such woodlands but two claims characterise the *satoyama* discourse. The first is that the *satoyama* are fundamentally different from non-Japanese forests. Tabata accepts a similarity with the *dongsan* of Korea but stresses the difference from the coppice woodlands of England.[72] The second claim—used to support the first—is that the Japanese exploited *satoyama* in a harmonious way, again disproving Rousseau. It is acknowledged that humans have impacted the *satoyama* forests to some extent, but their authenticity comes precisely from the claim that they were used by local (Japanese) villagers in an egalitarian and harmonious fashion. For Yasuda, by contrast, use of *non*-Japanese woodlands necessarily leads to damage and destruction. A somewhat more balanced comparison of woodlands in Japan and Scandinavia is provided by the work of Björn Berglund, though he also writes about the latter region as a 'wheat-meat-milk culture' citing personal communication from Yasuda.[73]

The most interesting new narratives in *Forest and Civilisations* are found in a chapter by Jacques-Louis de Beaulieu and colleagues on the *longue durée* of forest environments in France. Their chapter argues that, unlike the Romans who were more destructive of the natural environment, 'the Celtic and Gallic peoples belonged to a forest civilisation, even though they practiced farming.'[74] While this claim may also seem to contain a hint of eco-nationalism, the end of the western Roman empire did see a major regeneration of many forests.[75] Sicily, for example, had been largely deforested by the Romans but its forests recovered after the fifth century.[76] De Beaulieu and colleagues use palaeoenvironmental evidence to conclude that some forests in France have been preserved by 'rational management and exploitation, first by monks and then by the state' and that major changes in forest composition occurred even prior to human impacts. In a direct contradiction to Yasuda's view of a Christian 'civilisation of deforestation', the authors conclude that 'In south-western Europe today, the problem we have to face is not one of deforestation. Rather, it is the reduction in biodiversity that has resulted from a marked decline in traditional and extensive agriculture and the use of new heating methods.'[77] In other words, the problem is the *lack* of the (proper) use of forests. This conclusion has been supported by more recent research in France.[78] While both Umehara and Yasuda have contrasted Japan's 'forest civilisation' with a 'civilisation of deforestation' found in north China, the Middle East and Europe, forest use depended on a wide range of social and ecological factors and was not hard-wired into 'civilisational principles'.

The Gothic forest

The re-appropriation of the forest by Japanese eco-nationalism has been achieved through a deliberately constructed dualism between Japanese and European landscapes. The Japanese forest receives minimal description yet is assumed to be the pure, energising natural landscape of the Nation, including the harmoniously utilised woodlands of the *satoyama*. The European forest, by contrast, is constrained through Gothic tropes which link woods to a dark claustrophobia. Testuo Yamaori's description of his 1976 visit to Grande Chartreuse provides an excellent example:

[71] Knight, 'The discourse of "encultured nature" in Japan', p. 423.
[72] Tabata, 'The future role of *satoyama* woodlands', p. 155. No explanation is provided for the difference between *satoyama* and coppice woods.
[73] Berglund, 'Satoyama, traditional farming landscape'.
[74] de Beaulieu *et al*., 'Changes in the forest environment', p. 52.
[75] Meiggs, *Trees and Timber*, p. 383.
[76] McNeill, *Mountains of the Mediterranean World*, p. 86.
[77] J-L. de Beaulieu *et al*., 'Changes in the forest environment', p. 53.
[78] See, for example, Walsh *et al*., 'A historical ecology of the Ecrins'.

> I had not seen this kind of 'mountain' or 'forest' before. The view was not a gentle one with the gods of the mountains or ancestors within. *It is only with Japanese mountains that people can feel themselves and their dwellings embraced by the landscape*. The Chartreuse landscape was more suitable for a devil. The mountains there did not exist in harmony with forests and woods. Instead they had the overwhelming appearance of a chain of crags, resembling a grotesque figure howling like a beast.[79]

Although a poor translation of the original Japanese in this bilingual book, the sentence which I have emphasised here is nonetheless quite remarkable. The original text claims that the feelings of being 'embraced' by the landscape that are experienced by people in Japan are not applicable to Chartreuse. Essentially, all this means is that Japanese people *like* Japanese landscapes, or at least that those are the landscapes with which they are most familiar. The European forest, by contrast, is impossible to understand or appreciate; Yamaori's scare quotes lead the reader to question whether these are really 'mountains' or 'forests' at all. As with Watsuji, there is no irony here, no realisation that landscape always looks different depending on one's perspective.[80]

Yamaori's choice of Chartreuse cannot be seen as fortuitous. Not only had it been the topic of several famous literary accounts extolling the grandeur of its landscape and history, not least by Thomas Gray, Wordsworth and Matthew Arnold, but the very establishment of Chartreuse in the eleventh century was associated with monastic ideas about the forest as wilderness. Saint Bruno told monks to expect 'a forbidding place, the lair of wild beasts, of towering mountains, of vast forests, an intense and enduring cold, no fruits, no crops.'[81] Yamaori's description of the landscape around Chartreuse has certain similarities with any number of Romantic writings by English and other visitors. On a Grand Tour with Horace Walpole in 1739, Thomas Gray was especially impressed with Chartreuse, writing that 'You here meet all the beauties so savage & horrid a place can present you with.'[82] Yamaori's take on the landscape is, however, quite different; rather than the sublime—what Schama calls the 'awe-ful'—there is a *revulsion* akin to Watsuji's account of the desert. Rather than the monastic landscape bringing the pilgrim closer to God, the 'Chartreuse landscape was more suitable for a devil.'

This style of writing, what we might call 'Nichibunken Gothic', reaches its heights in Yasuda's writings on European forests. In a long chapter titled 'Eyes of the forest gods' in *Forest and Civilisations*, Yasuda attempts to show how an anthropocentric Christianity killed the spirits of the forest. Such 'spirits' include snakes:

> For Christianity, the snake is a devil to be scorned, and the Medusa, who had snakes for hair, is a symbol of heathenism. That is why Medusa was shut away in the deep subterranean darkness while Christianity spread its tentacles throughout the world. Medusa's pathetic voice, persecuted and killed by the armies of Christianity can still be heard welling up from the subterranean depths.[83]

This passage refers to the two Medusa carvings—one placed upside down, one in a sideways position—in the subterranean basilica cistern of the Yerebatan palace in Istanbul. For Yasuda, the placement

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[79] Yamaori, 'A comparative view', p. 69, emphasis added.

[80] This realisation is achieved in Lafcadio Hearn's account of climbing Mount Fuji: 'So one of the fairest, if not the fairest of earthly visions, resolves itself into a spectacle of horror and death. . . . But have not all human ideals of beauty, like the beauty of Fuji seen from afar, been created by forces of death and pain?—are not all, in their kind, but composites of death, beheld in retrospective through the magical haze of inherited memory?' Hearn, 'Fuji-no-yama'.

[81] Walter, 'European forests', p. 133, citing Bligny, *Saint Bruno*. Saint Bruno may, of course, have exaggerated the isolation of Chartreuse in order to attract followers.

[82] Cited in Schama, *Landscape and Memory*, p. 450.

[83] Yasuda, 'Eyes of the forest gods', p. 110 with figure caption omitted.

of these carvings symbolises the Christian emperor Justinian's persecution of other religions. Other interpretations are no doubt possible, but what I want to emphasise here is Yasuda's use of language to express the pathos of a destroyed Nature shut away by a triumphalist monotheism.[84] Persecuted by the Christians, Medusa and other forest gods were, according to Yasuda, forced into the dark forests of northern Europe. There, 'Within the gloom of these forests, the descendants of Medusa lived the remainder of their lives and were termed witches.'[85] Adopting this *problématique*, witchcraft has been a favourite topic for Yasuda. Once again, his approach is by no means original; he basically follows the lead of Jules Michelet who saw witchcraft as a pagan resistance to modernity.[86] In attempting to link witches to the spirits of the forest, Yasuda ignores an extensive body of recent historical research on this topic. The rise in witchcraft trials in Europe between 1560 and 1660 cannot be seen as a direct result of the Christian destruction of the forests, whatever that might mean. Yasuda argues that the parts of Europe with few such trials were those areas where forests still remained in the early modern era and thus where an animistic heritage was still strong.[87] Scandinavia is placed in this category but Sweden, for example, had a similar level of witchcraft persecutions to France or England.[88] Political and legal factors, such as the use of Roman law in Scotland, are a better predictor of persecution than forest cover.[89] Yet witches, like Medusa and Druids, have long remained a favourite trope in eco-nationalist claims over a Japanese 'forest civilisation', which is imagined almost entirely in terms of its contrast with the Christian 'mantra' that 'There is no civilisation in the forest'. As a result, 'The Druids, who fought desperately to save the great sacred oak, were driven out by the Christian missionaries screaming this mantra, and the pure white cloaks were dyed red with blood.'[90]

Gothic is the perfect form for writers such as Yamaori and Yasuda who wish to resist the classical or modern genres associated with 'European civilisation', and instead place themselves in a more 'primitive' Germanic or medieval tradition. Just as Bram Stoker's *Dracula* built on an irrational fear of the Orient, Yasuda tries to infect his writings with a new fear of the barbarian West.[91] However, Yasuda rarely ventures into the medieval or 'Germanic' world with any conviction; he prefers to write about the classical world, though purely from a critical standpoint.

Garden: Beauty Closely Associated with Keeping Neat and Clean

The view of the Japanese landscape as a garden has become particularly associated with Heita Kawakatsu. Japan's 1998 Fifth Comprehensive National Development Plan was titled *Grand Design for the 21st Century: Promotion of Regional Independence and Creation of Beautiful National Land*.[92] This plan was critical of previous policy which had emphasised *urban* development. According to Kawakatsu himself, it was he who suggested the concept of Japan as a 'Garden Island' to the committee.[93] The idea that a garden-like Nature could be used to build national identity represents a change from earlier Japanese understandings of landscape. In the late nineteenth century, Shigetaka Shiga worried that, for most Japanese, Nature was 'static and confined within their home boundaries, and not beyond their garden

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84 One alternative explanation might be that the carvings were used to protect the water in the cistern. James Bond fans may remember that the basilica cistern was used in the film of *From Russia With Love*.

85 Yasuda, 'Eyes of the forest gods', p. 111.

86 Michelet wrote about the folklore of the forest in terms of the 'long struggle between the Semitic and the Indo-Germanic worlds': Demoule, *Mais où sont passes les Indo-Européens?*, p. 106.

87 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, pp. 456-457.

88 Roberts, 'Witchcraft and magic', p. 205.

89 Cf. Roberts, 'Witchcraft and magic', p. 204.

90 Yasuda, 'Eyes of the forest gods', p. 113, citing his earlier work *Daichi boshin no jidai*.

91 See Gibson, *Dracula and the Eastern Question*.

92 An English translation of this plan can be downloaded from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport at: http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/zs5-e/cndp5.txt

93 Kawakatsu, *Bi no kuni*, p. 34.

gate'. Shiga's answer to this problem was to extend the 'home boundaries' of Japan to include the whole archipelago and even colonial outposts such as 'Shumushuru' in the Kurils, an island where 'the Onko trees (laurel trees) turn green and there are so many larks that the foxes dance in their shadows'.[94]

According to Kawakatsu, the garden-like landscape of Japan results from intensive use of the land, and especially from the 'closed country' (*sakoku*) period of seclusion in the early modern Tokugawa era:

> Seclusion meant that there had been no frontier to develop outside the country; natural resources were taken only from within Japan. These resources were not wasted, they were reused and recycled to sustain the economy. Nature was under the utmost care of the people, well kept and under control. Japan's view of nature was no longer one of wilderness, but of gardens.[95]

In Kawakatsu's reading of Japanese history, keeping Nature 'neat and clean' led naturally to a 'civilisation of beauty':

> As nature became carefully reserved and controlled, the common perception of nature that gradually prevailed among Japanese became understood as 'beauty'. The value of beauty was closely associated with the keen interest the Japanese had in keeping neat and clean.[96]

The 'theme of purity, of cleanliness, permeates Shigetaka Shiga's political thinking proper as well as his interpretation of the landscapes of his country.'[97] Kawakatsu argues that this concern with 'beauty' also worked to make Tokugawa Japan uniquely peaceful: 'Valuing beauty might have something to do with realizing peace for a society. Violence is ugly. The opposite of violence is beauty.'[98]

Historically-speaking, all of this represents an extremely whimsical reading of the Japanese past. Despite the relative seclusion of the Tokugawa age, Japan exploited neo-colonial peripheries in Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurils and the Ryukyus and raw materials from those regions were of considerable importance in sustaining Japan's early modern economy.[99] Kawakatsu himself accepts a link between ideas about 'cleanliness' and elite cultures of Zen Buddhism and the samurai. Zen, he notes, was associated with gardens, the tea ceremony and flower arrangement, all of which 'helped to develop gardening'.[100] Such cultures were hardly shared by the majority of premodern Japanese, yet Kawakatsu simply assumes that the 'value of beauty permeated through the Japanese people.'[101] For Japanese eco-nationalism, beauty is the fundamental sine qua non of Japan: 'There are forests, rice fields, and the sea. This beautiful scenery is safely protected by the circulation system of the forest. And it is this beautiful scenery which is in fact the point of origin of the soul of the Japanese people.'[102] Like a medieval enclosed garden (*hortus conclusus*), the scenery of Japan is *protected* from the outside. However, there is no appreciation or real description of this beauty, it is just a clinical checklist.

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94 Translated in Gavin, *Shiga Shigetaka*, pp. 28-29. It is unclear whether 'Shumushuru' here refers to Shumshu or Simushir islands.

95 Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization based on beauty', p. 86.

96 Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization', pp. 86-87.

97 Berque, *Japan*, p. 71.

98 Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization', p. 87.

99 See Howell, *Capitalism from Within*; Morris-Suzuki, 'Sustainability and ecological colonialism'; Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*.

100 Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization based on beauty', p. 87.

101 Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization', p. 87. On the samurai and the 'invention of tradition', see Vlastos, *Mirror of Modernity*.

102 Yasuda, 'Gyoshoku no bunmei', p. 517.

One of Kawakatsu's points of reference is the 'garden villages' of modern England. The 'garden village' was a policy developed from the end of the nineteenth century 'to create more attractive housing for the more well-to-do of society', the idea being 'to have reasonably large houses, well designed and situated in garden plots with the whole area around them designed on a garden village principle.'[103] According to Kawakatsu, it was only in the industrial nineteenth century that European cities began to include green spaces as part of their urban development.[104] From this relatively benign point of departure, Kawakatsu and colleagues advance more reactionary links between keeping both Nature *and* society 'neat', 'clean' and 'under control'. Yasuda has proposed creating a group of 'environmental rangers' who could protect Nature in Japan, a job description which would include 'cracking down on such things as the illegal development carried out by foreigners.'[105] In Yasuda's vision these rangers could also be sent overseas to 'beautify the earth'.[106]

If such comments seem radical, even more extreme claims about cleanliness can be found elsewhere in Yasuda's writings. Dirt, he claims, is linked to race, religion and the destruction of the environment.

> I feel that being dirty is somehow closely connected to environmental destruction and to the spread of pestilence.
>
> This makes me think of the filthy public toilets in China at the moment. The Han Chinese don't like taking baths. I remember my feeling of dismay when people who can talk and laugh together while defecating invited me to enter a hot spa with them; I rejected their offer.[107]

For Yasuda, this explains why the Chinese are one of the nations of the world who are most destructive of Nature. Contemporary China is, he writes, a society where people try to make money by deceiving others: 'if you can't believe in and protect human beings, how can you believe in and protect nature?' According to Yasuda, the type of society found in China today also characterised England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the Renaissance economy was based on the intense destruction of forests and formed a 'world of extreme uncleanliness and full of the foul odours of faeces and dirt.' This world, Yasuda suggests, can be imagined by reading the works of Shakespeare whose 'deep human insights into betrayal and murder can be said to derive from this background of suspicion born from the terrible destruction of the environment—above all the destruction of forests, the outbreaks of plague and unclean living.'[108] The Japanese, by contrast, have since antiquity 'been a people who like cleanliness and for that reason they have maintained a rich environment. Being clean is what makes the Japanese Japanese and has protected the landscape [*fūdo*] of Japan.'[109] The rice-farming/fishing people of the same period, living as they did in clean and beautiful Japan, could never possibly have written something as dirty and suspicious of human nature as *Hamlet*.[110]

In his writings about cleanliness, Yasuda makes use of the Japanese translation of Katherine Ashenburg's entertaining yet anecdotal book *The Dirt on Clean*. Ashenburg emphasises the contextual nature of historical attitudes to dirt. At the beginning of her book, she notes that 'It follows that hygiene has

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103 Bailey, 'Two garden suburbs'.

104 Kawakatsu, *Bi no kuni*, p. 30.

105 See Hirano and Yasuda, *Ubawareru Nihon no mori* and Yasuda, 'Proposed solution rooted in Japanese civilization'. The quotation was translated by Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history', p. 9.

106 Translation by Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history', p. 12

107 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 448.

108 The previous three quotes are from Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 449.

109 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 451.

110 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, pp. 449-450.

always been a convenient stick with which to beat other peoples, who never seem to get it right.'[111] Yasuda provides us with unambiguous examples of this problem, cherry-picking and in fact embellishing examples of Europeans being dirty. While Ashenberg, for instance, discusses historical variation in the washing of genitals, Yasuda brings in the example of Romeo and Juliet to stress that even these famous lovers must have been extremely smelly.[112] Ashenburg collects a range of mostly European historical texts relating to personal hygiene. While she accepts the importance of providing historical context for such texts, this is by its very nature a difficult task because of the 'convenient stick' problem. Ashenburg's point of reference for hygiene is the post war American middle class; she recognises the unusual obsession of that group with sanitised cleanliness but omits any mention of the current crisis of Americans unable even to access clean water.

For Yasuda, Christianity was the major cause behind the uncleanliness of Europe. Buddhism, by contrast, promoted bathing and hygiene. These claims are illustrated with a discussion of rats and plague. According to Yasuda, Europeans deserved the plague, not just because of their absence of personal hygiene but also because they destroyed forests and Nature. When Europeans started to wash and to re-plant forests in the eighteenth century, plague began to abate.[113] Part of this argument derives from ideas about the role of black versus brown rats in the spread of plague which have recently been critiqued and questioned in the literature.[114] Some research suggests that during the Second Pandemic plague was frequently re-introduced to Europe from Asia rather than being maintained in putative European rodent reservoirs.[115] More broadly, Yasuda's sweeping and provocative claims of links between uncleanliness, rats and plague recall anti-Semitic tropes such as those found in the Third Reich, most notoriously in the infamous propaganda film *Der Ewige Jude* ('The Eternal Jew'). A German army corporal in Poland in December 1939 wrote about Jews as 'unkempt figures wandering around, wrapped in tatters, filthy, greasy. These people seemed to us like a plague.'[116] The Japanese eco-nationalist view of Nature as a garden presupposes a living space of regulated purity with 'cleanliness' defined in a similar prescriptive way.

Kawakatsu's view of Japan as a garden landscape is also interesting in the context of debates over the Anthropocene. The idea that humans dominate what used to be called Nature is central to the whole concept of the Anthropocene. Kawakatsu makes ostensibly the same argument: Nature—in Japan, at least—has become so controlled by humans that it has become as artificial as a garden. Yet two aspects of Kawakatsu's argument differ from usual Anthropocene discourse. Firstly, the gardenisation of Nature applies *only* to Japan. Secondly, the eighteenth-century transformation of Japanese Nature was not caused by industry and industrialisation, rather by 'industriousness'. Here, Kawakatsu borrows the term 'industrious revolution' first coined by Akira Hayami.[117] At a time when other environments were becoming industrial wastelands, Japan was becoming a garden. The logic here is the connection between industriousness and the land. Yasuda helpfully explains that, 'The rice-cultivating fishing people find joy in transfusing the energy of their bodies into the steep barren wasteland, and transforming it into fertile terraced rice paddies.'[118]

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111 Ashenburg, *The Dirt on Clean*, p. 2.

112 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 446.

113 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 446.

114 See, for example, Hufthammer and Walløe, 'Rats cannot have been intermediate hosts for *Yersinia pestis*' and Dean *et al.*, 'Human ecoparasites and the spread of plague'.

115 Schmid *et al.*, 'Climate-driven introduction of the Black Death'.

116 Evans, *The Third Reich at War*, p. 52. As detailed by Evans, the violence of the German army against Jews and Poles made such impressions almost inevitable.

117 See Hayami, *Japan's Industrious Revolution* and De Vries, 'The industrial revolution and the industrious revolution'.

118 Yasuda, 'Sustainability as viewed from an ethos of rice cultivating and fishing'.

What sort of garden landscape is imagined by Kawakatsu? In the English essay cited above, he completely avoids this question, citing only a few haphazard impressions by European visitors:

> Quite a few Westerners visited Japan in this period – Kamphel and Seabold [sic] are two examples – and have left us their observations. They were all impressed by Japanese gardens. Many more Westerners visited Japan after it had opened its ports to the world; Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British Ambassador to Japan (appointed in 1905), said that the Japanese landscape was comparable to an English garden, which he boosted [sic] were the best in the world. Heinrich Schliemann, an archaeologist famous for having excavated Troy and Mycenae, came to Japan in the 1860s and declared that every Japanese house had a beautiful garden. A British botanist of the time observed that 'if love of flowers is taken as a yardstick to measure the level of cultural advancement, Japanese people are higher than the British'.[119]

'Kamphel' and 'Seabold' are presumably Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716) and Philipp Franz von Siebold (1796-1866). Since Rutherford Alcock died in 1897, he can hardly have been appointed ambassador in 1905; in fact, he served as British consul-general from 1858-64. This dating is important because by 1905 Japan was becoming much more industrialised than the country seen by the first European visitors. Even nineteenth-century Europeans and Americans were invariably impressed by the lush beauty of Japan's green landscapes. By the 1920s, the whole tone had changed. Aldous Huxley's account of his visit in 1926 provides a striking contrast with the Victorian accolades. Landing in Kobe to a pervasive smell of soot, Huxley took the train to Kyoto, describing how along the journey, 'Every few miles the sparse chimneys would thicken to a grove, with, round their feet—like toadstools about the roots of trees—a sprawling collection of wooden shanties: a Japanese town.' If Osaka was the 'largest of these fungus beds', Kyoto was like a mining camp in a Wild West movie.[120]

Table 1. *The garden as recovery of Eden. The first four columns are from Merchant, Reinventing Eden, p. 21.*

Christian	**Modern**	**Environmentalist**	**Feminist**	**Japanese eco-nationalism**
Eden	Golden Age	Pristine Wilderness	Matriarchy or Equality	Archaic (Jōmon & Yayoi) ecotopia
Fall	Dark Ages	Ecological Crisis	Patriarchy	Modernism; the West; Christianity
Birth of Christ	Renaissance	Environmental Movement	Feminist Movement	'Animism renaissance'; 'forest civilisation'
Heaven	Capitalism	Restored Earth	Emancipation, Equality	Japan as segregated 'Garden Island'

Kawakatsu's conceit of Japan as 'Garden Island' draws on the Western trope of the garden as a Recovery of Eden. The medieval enclosed garden symbolised 'the mysteries of womanhood, the sexual purity of the Virgin, and the association of virginity with the Garden of Eden.'[121] In the Garden, humans are at one with Mother and Child. Even in the Romantic era, the pre-civilisational idyll of integration with Nature was the 'childlike' age.[122] Environmental historian Carolyn Merchant has listed several changing features of the Recovery of Eden narrative (Table 1). These structural features have clear parallels in the Japanese writings analysed here.

[119] Kawakatsu, 'Towards a civilization based on beauty', pp. 88-89.
[120] See Leonard, 'Aldous Huxley's account of Japan'.
[121] Merchant, *Reinventing Eden*, p. 54.
[122] Bate, *Song of the Earth*, pp. 73-74.

Coda: Mount Fuji

Mount Fuji, inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2013, has become the last firewall landscape of Japanese eco-nationalism. The Fuji nomination was submitted by Yamanashi and Shizuoka prefectures, the two local governments within whose jurisdiction the mountain falls. Writing before the official inscription, Heita Kawakatsu in his role as governor of Shizuoka, claimed that Mount Fuji's acceptance as 'cultural heritage' would be an epoch-making event. 'In Europe', he argued, 'culture means the Notre-Dame de Paris, Cologne Cathedral, the Palace of Versailles and other man-made places. If Mount Fuji is recognised as "cultural heritage", that would mean that Japan's view of nature and culture would be acknowledged as having global significance.'[123] According to Kawakatsu, the idea that the Japanese view of Nature is integrated with a cultural worldview derives from the philosophy of his mentor Takeshi Umehara, although in this book we have already seen that such ideas have deeper roots in Japanese letters.

Figure 2. *Street art imitating Hokusai's Great Wave. La Croix-Rousse, Lyon. Photo by the author.*

Mount Fuji has been used as a symbol of Japan, especially in modern times. The problem is that what we understand by 'Japan' has changed, constantly shifting over time. Literary critic Hiroo Mita noted that the first ascent of Mont Blanc occurred in 1786 within a decade of the completion of Watt's steam engine.[124] Mita did not yet have the term 'Anthropocene', but the connection between industrial modernity and an interest in mountains and other Natures has been a widely noted element of Romantic thought. In her *Mountain Gloom, Mountain Glory*, Marjorie Nicolson analysed how views of mountains in European aesthetics changed dramatically from the late eighteenth century.[125] Those aesthetics were then brought to Japan. Whereas most sixteenth to eighteenth century Europeans had completely ignored Mount Fuji in their writings, from the moment Japan was re-opened by the steam-powered 'Black Ships' of the American Navy in 1854, Fuji became the subject of numerous outpourings of 'mountain glory'. Even the ability to climb Fuji was re-invented by Westerners such as British consul Rutherford Alcock as a test of the hegemonic bodyscape of disciplined modernity. Fuji became a hypervisible icon of identity and was adopted as a national symbol by both Japanese and non-Japanese alike. National symbols are by definition controversial because they assume acquiescence and discipline to the national project. Nevertheless, Mount Fuji has proven remarkably resilient as a symbol of Japan and, if anything, that role has become reinforced through the process of World Heritage inscription.

[123] Umehara and Kawakatsu, *Nihon shisō no kosō*, p. 15. Such comments show that Kawakatsu has no understanding of the concept of cultural landscapes central to UNESCO World Heritage.

[124] Mita, *Yama no shisōshi*.

[125] Nicolson, *Mountain Gloom, Mountain Glory*.

The conceit that all Japanese have a shared view of 'Japanese Nature' can be traced back to early twentieth century writers such as Tetsurō Watsuji and the 1937 propaganda pamphlet *Kokutai no hongi*.[126] Although, as noted by Thomas, this view of Nature was *modern* in that it brought Nature directly into the history of the nation-state, the concept of the Anthropocene profoundly changes the way we can perceive the relationship between Nature and the nation. Seeing Mount Fuji as a symbol of 'Japanese Nature' requires it to remain a discrete object 'out there'—what Tim Morton calls 'regular flavor Nature'.[127] Such views of Nature have been widely deconstructed within Anthropocene Studies.[128] Although the Anthropocene means there is no longer any regular flavour Japanese Nature, I suggest that Fuji can still serve as a prism to explore (environmental) history in Japan using what Morton calls *difference multiplication*.[129] In addition to *mountain history*, this would include: *urban history* (Hokusai and all those city-based artists and poets, as well as the urban *Fuji-kō* pilgrim associations); *coastal and marine history* (both geological/ecological and cultural links between Fuji and the ocean), *industrial history* (paper and textile factories in Fuji and Fujinomiya cities which use water from Mount Fuji), and *cultural history* (Fuji as a global art icon). In fact, it turns out that almost every type of history is connected to Mount Fuji. Of course, the same argument could be developed for many other places and anyway Mount Fuji has never been just one place. If Fuji is the 'spiritual home of the Japanese', then that home is a multinational chain store, more Starbucks than Heidegger's Black Forest hut. Although there are more days in the year when Fuji is hidden behind clouds than when it is visible, we see *representations* of Fuji more than we see the mountain itself. Mount Fuji is not just in Shizuoka/Yamanashi Prefectures but also in Tokugawa prints of Nihonbashi bridge, in 'Père' Tanguy's paint shop in Paris, on the walls of former weaving houses in la Croix-Rousse, Lyon (Figure 2). This virus-like existence means that Fuji is a wonderfully appropriate *metaphor* for Nature in the Anthropocene and a way to think about shared not exclusive histories.

126 Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*.
127 Morton, 'Here comes everything', p. 163.
128 Morton, *Ecology Without Nature*.
129 The term 'difference multiplication' is from Morton, 'Queer ecology'.

Chapter 3. Deep Japan: the spectre of strata

This book has discussed how Japanese writers and critics since the early twentieth century have faced the twin spectres of modernity and the West. I have examined some of the ways in which landscape and the archaic have been used to shrink-wrap Japanese culture and seal off the archipelago. Attempts to valorise the deepest, prehistoric stratum of Japaneseness and to deny other histories have been a persistent element in Japanese letters. But these claims involve a basic contradiction: if 'tradition' is the response to 'modernity', then this presupposes the co-existence of two historical facets of the Japanese experience. As we have seen, writers such as Watsuji, Umehara and Yasuda have insisted on a spatial and climatic distinction between the 'modern' West (with its deserts and meadows) and the 'traditional' East and its monsoon landscapes. Other Japanese critics, however, have noted and explicitly debated the co-existence of both modernity and tradition within the same physical and historical space of Japan. In fact, Watsuji himself spoke of the 'double life' (*nijū seikatsu*) of Japan, pointing to 'the jarring coexistence of several pasts and the present in the now of everydayness, often in a relationship of unevenness.'[1] As Japan developed its colonial empire from the late nineteenth century, this 'double life' gradually shifted from the problem of Japan's relationship with the West to a broader framework encompassing East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and China. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of historical 'layers' was one of the biggest questions facing social theory in Japan in the twentieth century. Those layers could provide stability: amongst late twentieth century scholars of Japan, it was widely argued that the nation's strong 'traditional life' had been a means to avoid the revolutionary upheaval which had occurred in China or Russia.[2] But how did those layers manage to retain their stability at a time of such violent change?

Abundant materials relevant to answering this problem seemed to be still available. Kunio Yanagita regarded Japan as a 'treasure house' of folklore research, claiming that 'Nowhere in the world is it possible to collect materials necessary for historical reconstruction as easily and as perfectly as in Japan.'[3] Yanagita initially argued that an *Ur*-layer of 'mountain people' had been swept into the hills by incoming rice farmers. Later, he abandoned the idea of this Native mountain folk in favour of a homogenous peasantry which he termed the *jōmin*.[4] Yanagita also began to realise that the unevenness of cultural layers derived from the very logic of capitalism; unevenness was therefore 'not a temporary stage in an evolutionary narrative but a permanently entrenched condition that could be found throughout East Asia.'[5]

The relationship between different cultural or racial strata in ancient Japan was a key issue for early archaeologists, and in certain respects this question continues to influence archaeological debate. In 1869, the year following the Meiji Restoration, Japan began full-scale colonisation of the northern island whose name was changed from Ezochi ('land of the barbarians') to Hokkaido ('northern sea circuit'). Hakodate on the southern coast of Hokkaido had been opened as a treaty port in 1859 and quickly attracted various Western visitors. From the 1870s, the Meiji government employed European, American and Chinese experts to assist in the colonisation of Hokkaido. Many of these foreigners became intensely interested in the Ainu, the native inhabitants of Hokkaido. The Ainu had been known to Europeans since the sixteenth century.[6] But the new disciplines of archaeology and anthropology

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1 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. xvii.
2 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. xiv.
3 Cited in Kuwayama, *Native Anthropology*, p. 72.
4 Oguma, *Genealogy*, pp. 175-202.
5 Oguma, *Genealogy*, p. 31.
6 Kreiner, 'European images of the Ainu'.

made the Ainu even more fascinating in Western eyes. Racially—and here I use the term in common use at the time—the Ainu appeared to be rather special. Their pale skins, rugged faces, and facial and body hair seemed to link them with the Caucasoid rather than the Mongoloid race. For some Westerners of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the possibility that the modern Japanese had, at some time in the past, inter-mixed with a Caucasoid people suggested a convenient explanation for the fact that Japan was the first Asian nation to begin the process of industrialisation. The American W.E. Griffis wrote that, 'Ainu intelligence is limited, but it seems to be of the same kind as our own and not of the Asiatic order.'[7] With such ideas floating around, the antiquity and original area of settlement of the Ainu people became crucial questions.

The problem of cultural strata in early Japan relates to what Glyn Daniel called the 'idea of prehistory'.[8] In a world dominated by texts and textual chronologies, how are we to conceive of a deep prehistory stretching back thousands or even millions of years? In the seventeenth century, the Irish archbishop James Ussher used the Bible to calculate that the world had begun in 4004 BC. In Japan, 660 BC was said to be the ascension of the first emperor; a National Foundation Day holiday to mark this event was revived as recently as 1966. As in Europe, early Japanese archaeologists linked remains from excavations with peoples mentioned in ancient texts and it was only gradually that an idea of a prehistory separate from the texts became widely acknowledged.[9] Early chronicles such as the *Nihon shoki* (completed in AD 720) and a growing archaeological record supported the conclusion that Bronze Age Yayoi farmers had entered Kyushu and spread up the archipelago at the expense of the hunter-gatherer Jōmon people. Since the texts described wars between the Japanese and the barbarian Emishi in the northeast in the eighth century and later, it was assumed that these two 'layers' co-existed until the medieval era.

As the discipline of archaeology developed, more and more emphasis was given to the theory that the Yayoi culture with its rice agriculture formed the roots of Japanese civilisation. It therefore became important to show that the Yayoi began more or less simultaneously across Japan (excluding Hokkaido). In the background of this debate was the wish for Japan to be perceived as a modern nation which had adopted the new culture of the industrial era with little or no delay. After 1945, the whole idea of time lags in the history of Japan became increasingly taboo, implying as it did that different areas had 'become Japanese' at different times. This was especially perceived as an affront in the poor and under-developed Tōhoku region of northeast Honshu and numerous works of history attempted to explain or resist the peripheral status of the region.[10] Nobuo Itō (1908-1987), the so-called 'father of Tōhoku archaeology', spent much of his academic career searching for early rice in order to demonstrate that agriculture had begun in the northeast at around the same time as the southwest. More broadly, Makoto Sahara (1932-2002) developed the argument that once farming had reached Japan, the subsequent transition to state power was unusually fast. Writing in the early 1990s, Sahara noted that royal tombs had appeared in Japan some six or seven hundred years after the advent of rice farming. Today, new radiocarbon dates would double that chronology but the shift could still be considered rapid. Sahara coined the word 'ancientisation' (*kodaika*) to describe this process, insisting that 'Japan's rate of "ancientization" was just as remarkable as her rate of modernization.' Two main explanations were suggested by Sahara. First, 'the model and threat of the advanced cultures of China and the Korean peninsula were close at hand.' Second, the rich culture of the Jōmon provided an appropriate prelude to ancientisation, just as the affluence of the early modern Tokugawa had preceded Meiji modernisation.[11]

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7 Griffis, *The Japanese Nation in Evolution*, p. 10.

8 Daniel, *The Idea of Prehistory*.

9 For this process see Barnes, 'The "idea of prehistory" in Japan'.

10 Hopson, *Ennobling Japan's Savage Northeast*. Parts of the Tōhoku such as upland Iwate were frequently called by the derogatory name the 'Tibet of Japan': see Oka, *Miezaru mori no kurashi*.

11 Sahara, 'Rice cultivation and the Japanese', p. 52.

Watsuji and Landscape Layers

Japanese scholarship developed various ways to resolve or ignore the problem of 'stratigraphic layering' (*jūsōsei*). By this latter term, Watsuji meant that 'he wanted to reject ... a view of history that moves to the next stage and thus leaves behind what it has just passed over because it is less advanced.'[12] Today, the view of Japan as a place where the old meets the new—*geisha* talking on smartphones—has become a stereotype. A century ago, this vision was less common and an influential strand in Japanese society promoted the wholesale adoption of Western customs and the rejection of Japan's feudal past. After the Meiji Restoration, one Japanese man told German doctor and anthropologist Erwin von Baelz (Bälz), 'We have no history. Our history begins today.'[13] For Watsuji, however, 'Life in Japan was always a double-layered structure, not simply composed of what was most immediate and recent; it was also a mixing of the past in the present and the accumulation of different strata representing earlier moments of folk experience.'[14] In other words, and in contrast to Umehara, older layers did not coalesce to form a synthesis but were retained as folk elements. Watsuji used the example of clothing. In everyday 'double life', both Japanese and Western clothing could be worn depending on the circumstances yet neither dominated the other. The same was true of religion; Japan had somehow managed to retain 'archaic' Shinto and folk beliefs together with later religious forms such as Buddhism. Ultimately, however, Watsuji believed in the unity of Japanese culture and the Japanese spirit. This led him to accept or at least 'misrecognise' (Harootunian) Japan's colonial expansions. 'Since the manifestation of the Japanese spirit is nothing other than the expression of the folkic life of the Japanese', Watsuji wrote, 'the Shanghai Incident itself must be acknowledged, here, as one expression of this great, folk life.'[15] The Shanghai 'Incident' or War of 1932 was a conflict resulting from anti-Chinese provocations by Japanese soldiers and Buddhist monks. Lasting more than a month, the War included an early example of the aerial bombardment of a civilian population.[16]

Watsuji did not extend his concept of layering to landscape in a systematic way. He did note that the extremes of seasonal climate lead to different summer and winter landscapes in Japan: 'So the wide earth is covered in winter with wheat and winter grasses, and in summer with rice and summer grasses' (cf. Figure 3).[17] Many students of landscape, especially in archaeology, have compared it to a palimpsest wherein later human activity is written over earlier traces, sometimes erasing them, sometimes not. In England, two early proponents of landscape archaeology, W.G. Hoskins and O.G.S. Crawford, made frequent use of this analogy.[18] Given his interest in historical layering, Watsuji might have developed a similar perspective but instead chose to read landscape in a much more static way. In this sense, it is questionable whether we can even apply the word landscape to Watsuji concept of *fūdo*. A major difference is in the treatment of erasure. In 1953, Crawford wrote that,

> The surface of England is like a palimpsest, a document that has been written on and erased over and over again; ... The features [of the landscape are the] products of human labour; ... But it is not easy to read them because ... the land has been subjected to continual change throughout the ages.[19]

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12 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 253.
13 von Baelz, *Awakening Japan*, p. 17.
14 Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 255.
15 Cited in Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 259.
16 Selden, 'A forgotten holocaust'. See also, Barclay, 'Imperial Japan's forever war'.
17 Watsuji's *Fūdo*, translated by Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, p. 58.
18 Johnson, *Ideas of Landscape*, p. 57.
19 Crawford, *Archaeology in the Field*, pp. 51-52.

Figure 3. *Barley fields near the Yoshinogari site, Kanzaki, Saga prefecture. Harvested in the early summer, the same fields are then used for wet rice which is harvested in the autumn. Photo by the author.*

Watsuji and his later followers have paid little attention to even the possibility of erasure. Once the landscape of rice fields was formed in the Bronze Age, it is assumed that it remained essentially unchanged thereafter, at least until the industrial era. In Britain, various landscape changes over time have been discussed, for instance the end of the Roman empire and the start of Anglo-Saxon settlement, the rise of towns, the effects of the Black Death, Henry VIII's destruction of the monasteries, enclosure movements, and so on. In Japan, historical geographers have analysed comparable transitions.[20] Yet the eco-nationalist writers examined here have ignored such historical trends in favour of a warm and imagined land of no change. This also indicates a lack of interest in conditions on the ground on the part of writers such as Watsuji and Yasuda. In the English landscape tradition, by contrast, empathy with the details of a familiar land has been key. Matthew Johnson wryly notes that such empathy is the only way to explain why the agropastoral landscapes of the Midlands and eastern England—an area less than 300 km wide and no more than 200 km above sea level—have been described as displaying 'a bewildering variety'.[21]

[20] For some examples, see Kawasumi, 'Settlement patterns and environment of Heijō-kyō' and Fujita, 'Geography in history and history in geography'.

[21] Johnson, *Ideas of Landscape*, p. 65. John Lubbock's comment that 'Scarcely any part of the world affords so great a variety in so small an area as our own island [of Britain]' had been quoted in Shiga's *Nihon fūkeiron*. Shiga insisted that Japan was even more diverse and beautiful than Britain because it has volcanoes like Mount Fuji. See Lubbock, *The Beauties of Nature*, p. 12 and Gavin, *Shiga Shigetaka*, pp. 31-33.

Faking Layers: The Palaeolithic Hoax

For early archaeologists in Japan the number of prehistoric strata which had (co-)existed was limited. There was the Stone Age Jōmon, the people of which may or may not have been the same as the Ainu. There was also the Bronze Age Yayoi which shifted more or less smoothly into the protohistoric Kofun or Tomb Age. Ryūzō Torii (1870-1953) designated the people of the Yayoi as the 'Japanese proper' (*koyū Nihonjin*). A few scholars also raised the possibility of a pre-Ainu/Jōmon population. The main suggestion in this respect was the *Korpokunkur*, a dwarf-like race found in Ainu legends. The *Korpokunkur* theory had been supported by John Milne (1850-1913) and Shōgorō Tsuboi (1863-1913) but was more or less laid to rest with the latter's death.[22] Until the first Jōmon radiocarbon dates were published, Japanese archaeologists worked with a very short chronology for the start of the Jōmon—although the end of the period was assigned much later dates, especially in eastern Japan. In the 1930s it was still widely agreed that the Stone Age had continued until the fourteenth century in northeast Honshu.[23] The so-called 'father of Jōmon studies', Sugao Yamanouchi (1902-1970), continued to support a short chronology for the onset of the Jōmon and to reject radiocarbon dating until his death.

Thus, while the reality of stratigraphic layering in the Japanese past was acknowledged, there was at first little acceptance of a deep history for the Stone Age. French historian Arnaud Nanta reminds us that, 'In the 1930s, even the idea of a Palaeolithic era ... was rejected by academics.'[24] It was only after 1945 that the possibility of a pre-Jōmon settlement began to be entertained and the first Palaeolithic site was discovered at Iwajuku (Gunma) in 1948. This background is important in attempting to understand the most extreme example of the Japanese desire to avoid any evolutionary lag with the rest of Eurasia—the Palaeolithic hoax perpetrated by amateur archaeologist Shinichi Fujimura (b. 1950) from the 1970s until his activities were discovered in 2000. Fujimura planted artefacts at over 180 'sites', leading to wide acceptance of a Palaeolithic occupation of Japan beginning as early as half a million years ago.[25] Most archaeologists accepted Fujimura's finds of ever-earlier Palaeolithic artefacts.[26] Sites of a similar antiquity were known in China and there was no apparent reason why archaic humans should not have also reached Japan. In reality, the archipelago does not seem to have been settled by humans until much later, probably around 40,000 years ago.[27]

Physical Anthropology and the Dual Structure Hypothesis

While archaeologists and historians dealt with what were regarded as clear social and economic differences between cultures found in Japan and elsewhere, the human skeleton proved itself more open to alternative interpretations. Since the late nineteenth century, physical anthropologists had developed various theories about Japanese origins.[28] Replacement theories, whereby the original inhabitants of the archipelago were *replaced* by the historic Japanese, were the first to be suggested. By the mid-twentieth century, however, a quite different approach was being discussed. Notwithstanding major differences in material culture—for example between Jōmon and Yayoi—physical anthropologists were suddenly able to argue for *continuity* in skeletal morphology. In 1949, Kotondo Hasebe (1882-1969) announced that,

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22 Hudson, *Ruins of Identity*, pp. 36-37.

23 Barnes, 'The "idea of prehistory" in Japan', p. 937.

24 Nanta, 'Physical anthropology', p. 31.

25 For an overview of this hoax, see Hudson, 'For the people, by the people'.

26 One critique was published by Oda and Keally, 'A critical look at the Palaeolithic'.

27 For a recent discussion of some problems surrounding this settlement, see my chapter 'Slouching toward the Neolithic'.

28 For historical overviews of these theories, see Hudson, *Ruins of Identity*, pp. 23-55; Mizoguchi, 'Contributions of prehistoric Far East populations'; and Nanta, 'Physical anthropology'.

> What makes cord-marked [Jōmon] culture seem different from Japanese culture is the absence of metallic tools in the former, as well as the remarkable disparity in the degree of technological development. Essentially, however, it is obvious that these cultures belong to the same lineage.[29]

The 'transformation' theory of the *in situ* 'micro-evolution' of the Japanese was especially expounded by Hasebe's former student Hisashi Suzuki (1912-2004) and became the anthropological orthodoxy of the 1960s to 1970s.[30] In this theory, skeletal differences between Jōmon and Yayoi were explained through 'lifestyle' changes such as the adoption of agriculture. Suzuki accepted some immigration had occurred but emphasised that 'the number of migrants was probably so small that they had almost nothing to do with the genetic structure of the subsequent Japanese population.'[31]

These ideas in physical anthropology had a broad impact on Japanese history and archaeology. Suzuki's work influenced archaeologist Takeru Akazawa well into the 1980s.[32] The Marxist historian Kiyoshi Inoue used anthropological research to conclude that while 'At times, some mixing did occur with other races ... there was never substitution of race as a result of conquest or mixing on a large scale. [The] Japanese ceaselessly developed their society and their civilisation, from primitive barbarity to the present-day first-rank civilisation.' For Inoue, this lack of ethnic mixing was the 'characteristic feature of Japanese history.'[33] Writing in 1969, cultural anthropologist Yoshio Masuda explained that the Japanese 'cooked' foreign elements of culture in their own distinctive way, making an end result which is 'curiously uniform and definite'. 'Seen in this perspective,' he concluded, 'Japanese culture is far from being "hybrid"; it is essentially "pure", with its basic patterns unchanging and consistent.'[34]

By using the apparently scientific claims of physical anthropologists, Japanese scholars could conveniently ignore the problem of uneven strata. While *culturally* there were clearly different strata, which were 'uneven', *biologically* there was just one Japanese 'race'. In this context, the idea of ethnic similarity between Okinawans and Ainu appears strange because the two groups had such different histories. Both were seen as 'backward' vis-à-vis 'central' Japan, but the conceit was that 'they had *always been* Japanese, but had been marooned in some earlier phase of national history.'[35] From the mid-1980s, a new approach began to develop within Japanese physical anthropology under the influence of Kazurō Hanihara (1927-2004). Hanihara's 'dual structure hypothesis' was first discussed in Japanese as early as 1984 and then published in English in a much-cited article in 1991.[36] Over the past three decades, the dual structure theory has remained the dominant model of the population history of the Japanese Islands (Figure 4). Hanihara's dual structure hypothesis is a hybridisation model with a new name. In Japanese the theory is known as the *nijū kōzōron*, the term *nijū* ('two layers') recalling Watsuji. At the time of its publication, the dual structure model could be seen as a critique of theories of Japanese racial homogeneity. Yet in retaining the concept of 'stratigraphic' layering, Hanihara's work was open to reactionary re-interpretation, a course quickly chosen by Takeshi Umehara.

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29 Translation by Nanta, 'Physical anthropology', p. 33.
30 See Suzuki, 'Racial history of the Japanese'.
31 Cited in Hanihara, 'Dual structure model', p. 4.
32 See Akazawa, 'Cultural change in prehistoric Japan' and 'Hunter-gatherer adaptations'.
33 Translations from Nanta, 'Physical anthropology', p. 41.
34 Cited in Wagatsuma, 'Problems of cultural identity', p. 329.
35 Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing*, p. 31, original emphasis.
36 Hanihara, 'Dual structure model'. According to Google Scholar, this article had been cited 455 times by September 2021. For a discussion of early Japanese versions of the theory, see Nanta, 'Physical anthropology', p. 42. This section builds on Hudson *et al.*, 'The evolving Japanese'.



Figure 4. *The 'dual structure' model of Japanese population history. Redrawn by the author, with modifications, from Hanihara, 'Dual structure model'.*

Umehara's basic idea—that Jōmon and Yayoi became integrated into a harmonious whole—was not original but he developed the ecopoetics of this claim in a radical way, defining Japanese culture as an integrated 'oval culture comprised of the harmonious opposition of two focal points, the forest culture that is Jomon and the paddy field culture that is Yayoi'. This conceptualisation built on Nietzsche's opposition of Apollonian and Dionysian elements in Greek culture. In the case of Japan, Umehara explained that 'The principle behind the integration and homogenization of the Japanese people was harmony [*wa*]'.[37] This emphasis on *wa* derives from the 1937 propaganda document the *Kokutai no hongi*. Umehara's portrayal of the harmonious relationship between Jōmon and Yayoi also recalls Sakuma Shōzan's (1811-1865) well-known motto *wakon yōsai* ('Japanese spirit, Western technique'). Nineteenth-century intellectuals such as Tenshin Okakura (1863-1913) can be further said to have influenced Umehara with respect to ideas about Asia as a land of 'organic solidarity'. Through Umehara's projection of the dual structure hypothesis, the default assumption became that Jōmon and Yayoi elements had contributed *in more or less equal measure* to the modern Japanese, making the latter a unique and special Nation. Umehara even extended this argument to psychology in a co-authored work titled 'Are You a Yayoi or a Jōmon Person?'[38] In that book the biological and cultural strata of Jōmon and Yayoi are represented by psychological characteristics.

Anthropologists and archaeologists did little to nuance these ideas. There was minimal debate over how the admixture between Jōmon and Yayoi actually occurred. As we have seen, archaeologists remained reluctant to accept a step-like transition to the Yayoi whereby the northeast was slower to adopt the new culture.[39] Notwithstanding the new studies by Hanihara and other physical anthropologists,

[37] Umehara, 'Nihon to wa nan na no ka'.
[38] Umehara and Nakagami, *Kimi wa Yayoijin ka, Jōmonjin ka*.
[39] For an especially polemical essay, see Okamoto, 'Sugihara Sōsuke to Yamanouchi Sugao'.

many archaeologists continued to deny or play down the role of immigration in the Yayoi. Especially influential in this respect was Yoshiyuki Tanaka, professor of archaeology at Kyushu University until his death in 2015 and president of the Japanese Archaeological Association from 2012-2014. A key text to understand Tanaka's ideas is a 2014 book edited by the Paleographic Association of Japan under the direction of Nobuyuki Shimojō and titled 'Who Introduced the Earliest Rice Cultivation in the Archipelago?' In his introductory chapter in this volume, Tanaka correctly pointed out several gaps and assumptions in the work by physical anthropologists. The poor understanding of the population history of the Korean peninsula, for example, is only recently being transformed by genomic research.[40] Tanaka emphasised archaeological evidence for the continuation of Jōmon ceramic and other traits into the Yayoi period and noted, again quite correctly, that there are few models to understand this process of social admixture. Tanaka's answer here was to propose a simple explanation whereby small groups of both women and men immigrated first to north Kyushu. If these groups were of primarily younger adults and around twenty in number, he suggests they could have easily married *into* existing Jōmon settlements. Since older people were not part of this immigration, Jōmon traditions initially remained strong under the direction of Jōmon elders. Over time, however, inter-breeding expanded and the society became increasingly mixed in both a genetic and cultural sense.[41] Thus, the immigrants did not form 'colonies' but were smoothly integrated into Jōmon society. Tanaka attempted to test his model using tooth crown measurements and cranial nonmetrics, concluding that Jōmon villages had a bilocal post-marital residence system which facilitated the acceptance of outsiders into the community.[42] Lest it be thought that the introduction of a new subsistence economy complicated this integration, Tanaka stressed that rice farming was also accepted in a frictionless manner. As the number of immigrants grew, 'the stability and superiority of agricultural crops centred on rice would have been realised and Jōmon-type subsistence would have gradually changed to one based primarily on the rice cultivation brought by the immigrants'.[43]

These opinions by Tanaka and other archaeologists have been completely transformed by recent work on ancient DNA which shows that Yayoi farmers, Kofun elites and the modern Japanese can be modelled as having only around 10% Jōmon ancestry. Such results confirm massive migrations into the archipelago in the Yayoi and Kofun periods.[44] In that sense, one basic premise of the dual structure hypothesis finds new support. Yet new complexities are also shown by the genomic analyses so far published and it seems likely that the dual structure model will need to be revised for the genomic age. One group of geneticists has recently proposed what they call an 'inner dual-structure model'—in my view retaining a terminological rigidity inappropriate to the available evidence. This model classifies Japanese populations into a 'central axis area' and a 'peripheral area', a division apparently reflecting little more than recent political control of the western archipelago. Instead of Hanihara's two layers of immigration, a third layer is proposed to have occurred in the Late to Final Jōmon phases, ca. 2500-1000 BC. Evidence advanced for what is described as a 'somewhat mysterious "sea people"' is twofold.[45] First is the presence of some Jōmon ancestry in the DNA of individuals at the Changhang site on Gadŏkto island, Pusan, southern Korea. However, the burials from Changhang date to the fifth millennium BC and cannot be directly linked to migrations in the third millennium BC. The second piece of 'evidence' is a recent book which stresses the importance of fishing in modern human dispersals.[46] Neither of these points supports the 'inner dual-structure model' of Jinam and colleagues. Archaeological and

40 See Robbeets *et al.*, 'Triangulation'.

41 Tanaka, 'Iwayuru toraisetsu'.

42 Tanaka, 'Reconstructing Final Jomon post-marital residential patterns'.

43 Tanaka, 'Iwayuru toraisetsu', p. 33. Tanaka's ideas remain influential amongst his former students and colleagues. See, for example, several chapters in Matsumoto *et al.*, *Coexistence and Cultural Transmission* and Mizoguchi, *The Archaeology of Japan.*

44 Wang *et al.*, 'Genomic insights'; Cooke *et al.*, 'Ancient genomics reveals tripartite origins'; Robbeets *et al.*, 'Triangulation'.

45 Jinam *et al.*, 'Modern human DNA analyses'.

46 The work cited is Shima, *Gyoshoku no jinruishi.*

linguistic evidence demonstrates increased interaction between Japan and the mainland in the Late to Final Jōmon.[47] The extent to which that resulted in gene flow from the continent is, however, presently unclear.

In an article published as this book was going to press, Cooke and colleagues also argue for a 'tripartite' or three layer model, but conclude the third layer arrived in the Kofun period not the Late-Final Jōmon.[48] This new study claims that its findings provide 'genetic evidence that the agricultural transition in prehistoric Japan involved the process of assimilation, rather than replacement, with almost equal genetic contributions from the indigenous Jomon and new immigrants at the Kyushu site', the latter referring to the Yayoi-period Shimomotoyama site in Nagasaki. Cooke *et al.* contrast this with Europe where 'only minimal contributions from hunter-gatherer populations [are] observed in many regions.'[49] Shimomotoyama is not, however, a typical Yayoi farming population: it is an upland cave site in a region where Jōmon traditions remained strong long after the arrival of the Yayoi.[50] The fact that the two sampled Shimomotoyama individuals nevertheless have substantial non-Jōmon genetic ancestry demonstrates just how rapidly the immigrant gene pool was spreading. Furthermore, the ca. 10% Jōmon (hunter-gatherer) genetic ancestry found in most post-Yayoi populations in Japan is equal to or even lower than hunter-gatherer ancestry found in many European populations.[51] The exciting new genomic research being conducted in Japan and neighbouring regions suggests the need to re-think a much more flexible approach to Japanese origins than has previously been common. However, the history of research on the topic discussed in this chapter suggests such a re-thinking will be challenging.

47 Hudson *et al.*, 'Bronze Age globalisation' and Hudson, *Bronze Age Maritime and Warrior Dynamics*.
48 Cooke *et al.*, 'Ancient genomics reveals tripartite origins'.
49 Cooke *et al.*, 'Ancient genomics reveals tripartite origins', p. 10.
50 See Hoover and Hudson, 'Resilience in prehistoric persistent hunter-gatherers'.
51 Cf. Haak *et al.*, 'Massive migration from the steppe'.

Chapter 4. Romantic nationalism and the new Jōmonology

This book has examined how ideas of the archaic—comprising not just prehistory but also folklore, tradition and 'natural' landscapes—have been used in the writings of a number of influential scholars in Japan from the 1930s. Since the 1980s, those scholars have included one archaeologist, Yoshinori Yasuda, but mainstream Japanese archaeology has been highly critical of the work of Yasuda and Umehara—although it would be more accurate to say that, in print at least, their work has been ignored rather than critiqued. Several historical and archaeological associations opposed the establishment of Umehara's International Research Center for Japanese Studies (the *Nichibunken*). At its 32nd general meeting on April 20, 1986, the *Kōkogaku Kenkyūkai* (Society for Archaeological Studies) passed a resolution against plans for the research centre, 'which has the danger of being used by reactionary ideology.'[1] A decade later, Gavan McCormack reflected that, 'The more bizarre [Nichibunken] claims—of a deep-structured Jōmon-rooted Japanese distinctiveness—were not pressed, but neither was there any such process of criticism, negation and transcendence as would inspire confidence that they had been rejected.'[2] Even today, there remain few critical evaluations of the role and influence of eco-nationalism within Japanese archaeology. In this chapter, I want to explore the relationship between eco-nationalism and more mainstream approaches to archaeology in Japan. I suggest that while explicit support for Umehara and the Alt-Nichibunken has been rare, Japanese archaeology has nevertheless incorporated several broader aspects of their approach, reflecting shared influences from Romantic thought. This trend has been particularly strong within Jōmon studies.

The use of archaeology to bolster claims of nationalism is by no means unique to Japan. In a much-cited essay, Bruce Trigger described 'nationalist', 'colonialist' and 'imperialist' archaeologies, noting that 'Most archaeological traditions are probably nationalistic in orientation.'[3] From the late nineteenth century, Japanese archaeology became increasingly involved in a 'colonialist' paradigm through research within its new empire, which included Taiwan, Sakhalin, Korea, Manchuria and the 'South Seas'.[4] After 1945, archaeology began to contribute to a new interest in national identity. This differed from wartime nationalism in its explicit avowal of Marxist and other critiques of the emperor system and the politics of fascism. In this context, archaeology was especially well-positioned to study the everyday lives of the common people.[5] *National* anthropology in post war Japan was not necessarily *nationalistic*; as discussed earlier in this book, however, from the 1980s certain elements of Japanese academia began to move quite explicitly towards positions which can without question be termed nationalistic.[6]

As Japan's economy recovered after the war, Japanese archaeologists also began to excavate overseas in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central America and later, and to a lesser extent, in China. While working in Japan, I participated in a Japanese archaeological project in Syria for three seasons between 1999 and 2003, excavating the Neolithic mega-settlement at Tel Ain el-Kerkh. In Syria, I visited two other Japanese excavations, at Palmyra and the Neanderthal cave of Dederiyeh. Post war Japanese archaeological missions overseas can certainly be counted as attempts to exercise 'soft power' and might be argued to share certain similarities with Trigger's concept of 'imperialist archaeology', although,

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1 Niiro, 'Kokusai Nihon Bunka Kenkyū Sentā', p. 19.

2 McCormack, 'Kokusaika', p. 278.

3 Trigger, 'Alternative archaeologies'.

4 There is a large literature on Japanese colonial archaeology and anthropology. See, for example, Pai, *Constructing 'Korean' Origins* and Shimizu and van Bremen, *Wartime Japanese Anthropology*.

5 An illuminating paper in this respect is Edwards, 'Buried discourse'.

6 For further background on *national* archaeology and anthropology in post war Japan, see Ryang, *Japan and National Anthropology* and Nanta, 'Physical anthropology'.

in my experience at least, the Japanese scholars involved in this work have been respectful of local customs and traditions.[7]

Bruce Trigger and others have noted that the use of archaeology in nationalist imaginings can be linked to Romanticism. The Romantic movement is notoriously difficult to define yet several key points resonate with aspects of Japanese archaeology and Jōmon studies in particular. Romanticism involves imagination, Nature and myth, all elements which have come to play a key role in writings about the Jōmon.[8] In the Romantic tradition, imagination is higher than reason, solace can be found in the natural world, and the divine is inherent in Nature. Kristian Kristiansen has proposed a shifting cycle in archaeological theory between 'Romanticism' and 'Rationalism'. Here, Romanticism refers to theoretical approaches which are individualising as opposed to generalising and whose interpretations are anchored in a 'humanistic discourse of the particular'.[9] This cycle mirrors previous discussions about 'historical' *versus* 'anthropological' traditions in Japanese archaeology. From the perspective of North American anthropological archaeology, the tendency of Japanese archaeology to focus on narrow 'culture history' has long been posited—sometimes implicitly—as a problematic or negative trait. In an important essay published in 1982, Fumiko Ikawa-Smith spoke of 'co-traditions' in Japanese archaeology, examining the ways in which humanistic and scientific approaches have interacted over the history of the discipline. She reminds us that, 'When Japanese archaeologists speak of archaeology as history, the term "history" is not used in the derogatory sense that some American archaeologists used it in the 1960s. To present a historical interpretation also implies the strength of conviction to defy the political pressures that have driven most Japanese archaeologists into a devotion to details of types and styles and away from the discussion of human behaviour and societal relations.'[10]

How does Romanticism as a broader movement relate to historical or particularistic traditions in archaeology? To my knowledge, Kristiansen has not developed a detailed discussion of this issue. However, in my view the Jōmon case study examined in this chapter clearly shows links between particularistic discourse, nationalism and Romantic ideas.

Affluent Foragers: The Americanisation of Prehistoric Japan

A key 'particularistic' argument regarding the Jōmon in recent decades is reflected in the growing lack of interest in understanding Jōmon cultures in the framework of the Eurasian Neolithic; instead, the Jōmon has come to be largely understood through ethnographic parallels with North America. This may at first seem to be a highly unusual trend, not least with respect to the broader discourse of nationalism, and the underlying reasons require some unpacking.

Notwithstanding the decline of Marxism in Japanese historical research after the 1970s, a Vampire-like ghost of static evolutionary stages still colours and constrains understandings of the Jōmon period. If human history is seen as a trajectory through progressive stages of development, then Japan apparently became stuck in a Jōmon loop for more than ten thousand years. An increase in ritual artefacts in the latter half of the Jōmon period is widely interpreted as 'indications of a stagnant society concerned with magic.'[11] This understanding of the period is succinctly summarised by Simon Kaner: since 'Jomon societies were unable to progress beyond the hunting and gathering mode of production (...) they

[7] An exception is provided by the claims that Chinese civilisation was 'discovered' by Umehara and Yasuda mentioned above. For an analysis of Chinese archaeology as international soft power, see Storozum and Li, 'Chinese archaeology goes abroad'.

[8] The following definitions are discussed in Ferber, *Romanticism*, pp. 7-13.

[9] Kristiansen, 'The nature of archaeological knowledge' and *Europe Before History*, p. 37.

[10] Ikawa-Smith, 'Co-traditions in Japanese archaeology', p. 302.

[11] Okamura, 'The Sannai-Maruyama settlement', p. 97.

became "trapped" in a cycle of stagnation, expressed through increasingly useless rituals.'[12] In short, many Japanese archaeologists have come to believe that, compared with the rest of the world, 'not much was happening in the Japanese archipelago' during the Jōmon period.[13] Without questioning the conclusion that, by the third millennium BC, Jōmon culture had 'stagnated'—only to be reluctantly thrust back into world history by the arrival of farming from the Asian continent after 1000 BC—recent archaeologists have turned this argument on its head by proposing that the Jōmon was nevertheless *affluent*. The organic, native and thus 'authentic' existence of the Jōmon has been emphasised while historical links with Eurasia have been denied.

Symbolic of this approach is the reluctance of Japanese archaeologists to use the term 'Neolithic' to explain the Jōmon in world historical terms. This reluctance contrasts with recent research which has emphasised the diversity of Holocene cultural expressions across Eurasia. It is now clear that there was no single 'Neolithic revolution'; instead, different Neolithic elements such as pottery, sedentism and agriculture developed at different time-scales in different places. The term 'Neolithicities' has been coined to capture this diversity.[14] In Japan, however, the trend has been to stress the uniqueness of the Jōmon with ever-growing confidence. The increased use of 'Jōmon', 'Yayoi' and other periodisations specific to Japan can be seen as an attempt to reclaim Japanese identity within the rapidly changing political contexts of the post war era.[15] The English literature has followed the Japanese in this respect: earlier uses of 'Neolithic' and 'Bronze-Iron Age' were increasingly replaced by 'Jōmon' and 'Yayoi' from the 1960s.

Since the 1980s, the 'uniqueness' of the Jōmon has been perceived through three main frames or types of discourse: affluent foraging, isolation and Nature. Already from the 1960s, hunter-gatherer society in general had been positively re-evaluated in the light of new ethnographic research.[16] Within archaeology, it was realised that maritime hunter-gatherers had often been especially affluent, and Japan seemed to have one of the richest records of such societies from anywhere in the world.[17] A view of the Jōmon as 'affluent hunter-gatherers' became common and Jōmon studies have frequently used ethnographic comparisons—primarily with western North America—to explore that 'affluence'. A seminal publication in this respect was Shuzo Koyama and David Hurst Thomas' 1981 edited volume *Affluent Foragers: Pacific Coasts East and West*. Another influential scholar was Hitoshi Watanabe (1919-1998) who compared the Jōmon to the Ainu and other northern hunter-gatherers. Junko Habu's book *Ancient Jomon of Japan* analyses Jōmon society with frequent reference to ethnographic examples from North America (Alaska, California and the Northwest Coast), as well as southern Africa. Other leading Jōmon scholars have explored comparisons with Aboriginal Australia and New Guinea.[18]

From the outset, the affluent hunter-gatherer paradigm for the Jōmon was concerned with subsistence diversity across the archipelago. The idea that regional Jōmon societies developed precise adaptations

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12 Kaner, 'The archaeology of religion and ritual', p. 460.

13 Kobayashi, *Jomon Reflections*, p. 1.

14 For good overviews of Neolithic diversity, see Gibbs and Jordan, 'A comparative perspective on the "western" and "eastern" Neolithics of Eurasia' and Kuzmin, 'Two trajectories in the Neolithization of Eurasia'. On 'Neolithicities', see Fuller and Carretero, 'The archaeology of Neolithic cooking traditions'.

15 Yamada, *Tsukurareta Jōmon*, p. 58. Although the economic influence of Japan grew dramatically from the 1950s to the 1980s, in many ways the political status of the country has remained unchanged as a 'client state' of the United States: see McCormack, *Client State*.

16 Lee and DeVore's edited volume *Man the Hunter* was influential here and included a chapter on the Hokkaido Ainu by Hitoshi Watanabe. Another key text was Sahlin's *Stone Age Economics*.

17 See, for example, Yesner, 'Maritime hunter-gatherers' and Rowley-Conwy, 'Postglacial foraging'.

18 Koyama and Thomas, *Affluent Foragers*; Watanabe, *Jōmonshiki kaisōka shakai* and 'Occupational differentiation and social stratification'; Habu, *Ancient Jomon of Japan*. On Australia, see Koyama, *Jōmongaku e no michi*; for New Guinea, see Takahashi, *Jōmon bunka kenkyū no saizensen*.

to different environmental conditions came to be widely accepted.[19] This 'adaptationist' approach made the assumption that Jōmon people rarely moved around. This was stated most explicitly by the physical anthropologist Hisashi Suzuki in his so-called 'transformation theory' discussed in the previous chapter. Central to this theory was Suzuki's idea that human populations in Japan have historically had very low levels of mobility. Thus, with respect to the Jōmon, he explained that 'Since ancient societies were always founded on the clan system, the Jomon period societies which depended on hunting and gathering were most likely to be consanguineous, and generally stationary in comparatively small areas.'[20]

There is no question that hunting, gathering and fishing all made important contributions to the Jōmon economy. Neither is there much doubt that many Jōmon groups could be considered as 'affluent' hunter-gatherers, however that is defined. It also cannot be denied that ethnography—especially that of the North Pacific—can inform us about the Jōmon. Given that acorns and salmon were important food resources in both Jōmon Japan and Native California, for example, research which attempts to understand the different collection, storage and processing requirements of these foods is of unquestioned significance in understanding prehistoric Japan.[21] Despite these caveats, however, what is striking about Jōmon archaeology is that such comparisons have come to be conducted with almost total disregard for historical connections with Neolithic and Bronze Age Eurasia.

The main critic of the 'affluent forager' model of Jōmon society has been Canadian archaeologist Gary Crawford who decries the 'trend in the Western literature to remove the Jomon from agriculture discourse'. Rather than analysing the Jōmon in terms of the Eurasian Neolithic, Crawford takes a quite different perspective which is worth discussing in some detail. Crawford's 2008 paper 'The Jomon in early agriculture discourse' is a fascinating and wide-ranging exploration of its topic. While I disagree with some of his conclusions, the issues discussed in Crawford's essay are key to the analysis attempted in this chapter. Writing about the Jōmon economy, Crawford claims that the 'English-language rhetoric (with a few exceptions) shifted in the 1990s to one almost exclusively of hunting and gathering.'[22] This is surprising because there had been a long tradition of debate on the 'Jōmon farming hypothesis' and archaeobotanical flotation had begun in parts of Japan as early as the 1970s.[23] Despite Crawford's use of the term 'rhetoric', there was a broader shift to a focus on Jōmon hunter-gathering by the 1990s. This was by no means limited to the English literature; in fact, it originated in Japanese research concerns. Crawford is exactly right that the Japanese archaeological literature has been dominated by a compulsion to classify the Jōmon as *either* hunter-gatherer *or* agricultural. This compulsion can be understood as reflecting both Romantic and Rationalist concerns in Japanese archaeology. In terms of the particular history of the nation, the transition from foraging to farming is thought to mark one important achievement in Japan's historical progress. From a more generalising or evolutionary perspective, and especially in terms of Marxist theory, the transition to food production is also a key social transformation. Thus, for many Japanese archaeologists the view that the Jōmon should *not* be agricultural is perfectly understandable.

[19] A key figure here was Takeru Akazawa who wrote many papers in English on the Jōmon economy. The adaptationist approach remains influential in the English literature on the Jōmon: see, for example, Temple, 'Persistence of time'.

[20] Suzuki, 'Racial history of the Japanese', p. 21. According to Suzuki, in the Yayoi and Kofun periods, new territorial connections with land used for farming further reduced mobility: 'this social system, coupled with the difficulty of overland journey, did not encourage the free migration of people, particularly those of lower castes.' Under the medieval *shōen* manor system, tenant farmers 'had little freedom of changing their job or of migration.' In the early modern Tokugawa era, farmers were 'practically bound to the land they were cultivating, having been deprived of freedom of migration through a rigid family register system.'

[21] Tushingham and Bettinger, 'Why foragers choose acorns before salmon'.

[22] Crawford, 'The Jomon in early agriculture discourse', p. 448.

[23] For reviews of this earlier literature, see Pearson and Pearson, 'Some problems in the study of Jomon subsistence'.

Building on Crawford's own earlier work, new research over the past decade or so has shown that many Jōmon societies were engaged in the cultivation of several plants, in particular soybean, adzuki bean and barnyard grass (barnyard millet). Little of the new work on Jōmon agriculture has so far been published in English. Even in the Japanese literature, while there is growing acceptance that Jōmon cultivation was widespread, the 'affluent foragers' paradigm remains dominant. Crawford discusses three explanatory factors behind this dominance. The first is the assumption of the 'centrality of south-western Japan'. Rice farming arrived first in Kyushu and spread east, but until modern times rice farming remained more productive in the warmer, western parts of the archipelago. Crawford argues that the history of agriculture in Japan is usually incorporated into the national history of the Japanese people and state. Since that national history has marginalised the cultures of the north and south (the Ainu and Okinawans), so has Japanese agricultural history dismissed the economies of those regions prior to their incorporation into a single nationwide farming culture.

A second point discussed by Crawford is the view of the Jōmon as *affluent*. Here, Crawford stresses the importance of the international 'Affluent Foragers' conference in Osaka in generating this paradigm. As mentioned above, I agree with this assessment. Nevertheless, it is still an open question why this particular conference had such an impact. The Japanese organiser of the meeting, Shūzō Koyama (b. 1939), had studied archaeology under J. Edward Kidder (1922-2014) at the International Christian University in Tokyo before receiving a PhD at the University of California Davis in 1976. Returning to Japan and a job at the National Museum of Ethnology, Koyama came under pressure from museum director Tadao Umesao to move beyond the culture historical approach of mainstream Japanese archaeology.[24] The 1979 *Affluent Foragers* conference fitted this requirement in terms of its strong emphasis on the comparative ethnology of hunter-gatherers, especially those from North America. Crawford notes that the conference papers paid little attention to issues of habitat management and cultivation in aboriginal North America, focusing instead on foraging behaviours.

Finally, Crawford critiques the use of simplistic analogies with the Ainu in Jōmon studies. While I also agree with this assessment, I would go much further in emphasising the differences between Jōmon and Ainu cultures. Crawford notes the importance of acknowledging the history of the Ainu, yet his work includes only a limited perspective on their extremely dynamic history.[25]

While I support many of the conclusions of Crawford's 2008 essay, my views differ in several respects. First, I agree that a strict dichotomy between hunter-gathering and agriculture is unhelpful. Hunter-gatherer *theory* can be extremely useful in modelling Jōmon and Ainu societies and several of my earlier publications have looked at those societies from this perspective. Much more than even a decade ago, however, it is clear that the cultivation of domesticated plants was common in the Jōmon period and we need new analyses of how that cultivation formed part of the broader economy. The model of social affluence currently chosen by most Japanese scholars to explain the Jōmon is that of 'affluent foragers' or 'complex hunter-gatherers'; Crawford proposes 'agricultural origins theory' as an alternative and discusses parallels between the Jōmon and Precontact North America. For me, however, the most appropriate model for the Jōmon is the Eurasian Neolithic, or more precisely the diverse 'Neolithicities' present during that epoch. This model provides a framework not just for understanding Jōmon subsistence diversity, but also for considering the historical question of why the Jōmon did not adopt millet agriculture from the Eurasian continent for some three thousand years after it had reached the Korean peninsula, only 200 km from Kyushu across the Tsushima Straits. Crawford wants to argue that the Jōmon was at least on the road to agriculture, a status which he implies would make them less

[24] S. Koyama, personal communication.

[25] Several of my own recent studies deal with Ainu history: see 'Okhotsk and Sushen', 'The historical ecology of colonialism and violence' and 'The Okhotsk culture and the formation of the medieval Ainu diaspora'.

primitive. From the perspective of the Eurasian Neolithic, however, we have to assume that all societies, including the Jōmon, *knew about* farming; the question is to what degree they adopted that farming or not. The Jōmon example makes it especially clear that this choice was continually reproduced in the context of frequent interaction with other farming societies.[26]

Another issue where my interpretation differs from Crawford's is in the role of the *Affluent Foragers* conference and volume in promoting a new view of the Jōmon. With hindsight, *Affluent Foragers* certainly appears symbolic of a new trend in Jōmon studies. The actual impact this conference had on the field is, however, a moot question. Published in English exactly at the time when the split between academic and rescue archaeology in Japan was becoming unreconcilable, it is hard to evaluate the impact of *Affluent Foragers* on the broader discipline. While almost all Japanese archaeologists have used his population estimates for the Jōmon period, for many years Koyama was regarded as a marginal figure by those same researchers because of his use of anthropological rather than historical methods. In my view, while *Affluent Foragers* may have provided hunter-gatherer affluence icing on the cake, the propensity of Jōmon studies to frame the period as non-agricultural has deeper roots. The affluent forager paradigm enables Japanese scholars to eat their Romantic cake as well as the icing: the Jōmon remains as an appropriately 'primitive' stage in the national story, yet the added value of 'affluence' enables a new pride in that period.

Comparisons with North America also avoid the contested issue of ancient Japan's historical relations with the continent, a question discussed further in the next section. In that respect, the affluent forager paradigm sits comfortably with eco-nationalist writings. The presence of (cereal) agriculture would imply that Jōmon groups had intimate relations with the continent. A hunter-gatherer economy, by contrast, could have evolved in the Islands with minimal outside disturbance. If—despite its aboriginal isolation—Japan had still managed to generate one of the most affluent foraging cultures known in prehistory, then that only proved the native authenticity of the Jōmon forest civilisation. Crawford notes that the prehistoric Jōmon and North Americans were both regarded as being ecologically passive and that the 'the Affluent Foragers conference reinforced the view that the Jomon *safely* resided in the realm of hunters and gatherers'.[27] From the Romantic or eco-nationalist standpoint, it is important that the landscape of Japan remains eternal and not subject to anthropogenic degradation, at least before the arrival of negative social and environmental impacts from China and the West.

Amongst participants, the *Affluent Foragers* conference was nicknamed the 'acorn symposium'.[28] In his 2008 essay Gary Crawford writes against the forest, emphasising that grasses and small-seeded plants were major foods for many Californian groups. Fire—burning the forest—was an important aid to this economy. Crawford is uncomfortable with Aikens' argument in *Affluent Foragers* that the forest adaptation by both the Jōmon and Late Archaic/Early Woodland peoples was responsible for their wealth and complexity. This represents a rather selective reading of Aikens' chapter in which he discusses the use of sunflower seeds, marsh elder and Chenopodium in eastern North America, concluding that prehistoric societies in both Japan and North America which adopted outside cultigens 'were clearly preadapted to make use of them by long histories of quasi-agricultural or even incipiently agricultural existence'.[29] These are minor points of textual exegesis; what is important for the present volume is that many Japanese scholars were predetermined to see the Jōmon through a forest lens.

[26] See Hudson *et al*., 'Bronze Age globalisation'.
[27] Crawford, 'The Jomon in early agriculture discourse', p. 453, emphasis added.
[28] Koyama and Thomas, 'Preface'.
[29] Aikens, 'The last 10,000 years in Japan and eastern North America', p. 270.

Isolation and Asia

The second dominant discourse which has been used to emphasise the particularity of Jōmon Japan has been *isolation*, especially isolation from Eurasia. Japanese archaeology has always had a contested relationship with both Asia and Europe. In 1932, Sugao Yamanouchi had defined the Jōmon as a culture which—in contrast to the following Yayoi—lacked significant contacts with the Eurasian continent, despite the fact that he later cross-dated Jōmon pottery with the Neolithic and Bronze Age cultures of Lake Baikal.[30] In their overview of Japanese research, Takahashi and colleagues note that the Jōmon has been conceived 'as an autonomous entity insulated from the mainland Asia.'[31] Western archaeologists and historians have, in large part, followed their Japanese counterparts in emphasising the particular features of the historical sequence of the archipelago rather than trying to place Japan in a broader Eurasian chronology.[32] Even Chester Chard, with his deep understanding of the prehistory of both northern Eurasia and North America, stressed the uniqueness and isolation of Japan:

> The Jomon nuclear area [Honshu] was marginal to any influences from outside of Japan which might occasionally affect more accessible regions such as Hokkaido or Kyushu. This maximum isolation evidently fostered conservatism and stability in cultural life. ...
>
> ... the Jomon tradition ... shows only very rare and trifling instances of seemingly alien elements suggesting possible outside influence or borrowing. ... Jomon Japan provides an ideal laboratory case study for the anthropologist of cultural development in a 'closed system'—a 'test tube' situation which it would be hard to duplicate elsewhere.[33]

In order to understand Japanese archaeology's contested relationship with Eurasia it is useful to borrow Kōji Mizoguchi's concept of 'safe' and 'dangerous' domains within that discipline. Mizoguchi argues that the 'dangerous' domain is that potentially related to the imperial family. More precisely, it is archaeology which might cast doubt on the 'authenticity and genealogical continuity of the Imperial family.'[34] The Yayoi and Kofun periods were clearly connected to the rise of imperial power and also to cultures on the Asian mainland. The Jōmon, by contrast, was 'safe' because it preceded the imperial family and historical relations with Asia. Japan's colonial dreams of a 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' led to the archaeology and ancient history of Japan becoming intimately connected to those of Northeast Asia.[35] Japan's colonial empire gave Japanese scholars a chance to conduct anthropological fieldwork in Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan and other places. After 1945, therefore, this background meant that Eurasia came to be seen as a 'dangerous' space, whereas North America and the Pacific Rim were perceived as 'safe'.

This formulation developed in the post war era. At the height of nationalist ideology in the 1930s, many writers denied *any* role for China and other countries in Japan's national story. Such countries were not ethnic nations like Japan. China, it was argued, was not even a proper country, just a region which various foreign dynasties had conquered and ruled. Chinese history, suggested the philologist Yoshio Yamada (1875-1958), was 'as if a burglar or a thief had broken into somebody's house, killed the master of the house, occupied the house, and then had written a history of the house and the generations of its occupants from the viewpoint of a criminal.'[36] Japan was the only country with a true national/ethnic coherence and unity.

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30 Yamanouchi, 'Nihon enko no bunka 2'.
31 Takahashi *et al.*, 'Archaeological studies of Japan', p. 69.
32 One exception is Aikens *et al.*, 'Environment, ecology, and interaction'.
33 Chard, *Northeast Asia in Prehistory*, pp. 117-118.
34 Mizoguchi, *Archaeology, Society and Identity*, p. 65.
35 See Oguma, *Genealogy* and Pai, *Constructing 'Korean' Origins*.
36 Skya, *Japan's Holy War*, p. 304.

Post war Japanese eco-nationalism has adopted a more ambiguous position with respect to Asia. On the one hand, Umehara and Yasuda have emphasised links between prehistoric Japan and the rice farming cultures of southern China and Southeast Asia. Yasuda has written openly about migrations from these latter regions to Japan. On the other hand, the eco-nationalist project has continued to stress the inherent superiority of Japanese culture. Early pottery provides one example. Recent research from China suggests that ceramics may have been developed there before Japan. Yasuda appears to accept this chronology while noting that the pottery from Yuchanyang (Hunan province), dated to around 17,000 years ago, is three times thicker than the oldest pottery in Japan at around 16,000 BP. 'This is proof', Yasuda comments, 'of the advanced and outstanding technology possessed by Japan in the Jōmon period.'[37] As Mizoguchi has written, such narratives imply 'the erroneous sense of uninterrupted continuity and innate uniqueness in diligence and industriousness of the "Japanese"'.[38]

Nature and History

From the 1990s, the Jōmon has increasingly become associated with nostalgia for an 'authentic' Japanese past, a culture somehow embodied within the Nature of Japan. Mizoguchi notes a trend by which the Jōmon has been de-historicised and synchronised into a timeless past, in contrast to the Yayoi and later periods which remain within a historical frame.[39] Against this background, Japanese eco-nationalism has attempted to de-historicise *all* Japanese history in the same way, eliding the boundaries between Jōmon and Yayoi which have been so important to archaeological research. Japanese eco-nationalism has positioned itself against Marx; yet its view of prehistory recalls Marxist narratives of the early post war era in its emphasis on the Jōmon as a '*changeless*, hence *historyless* period'.[40]

Table 2. *Some dichotomies in post war Japanese archaeology contrasted with claims made in eco-nationalist writings. The first two columns are from Mizoguchi, An Archaeological History of Japan, with the exception of the last four rows.*

Jōmon	**Yayoi**	**Japanese eco-nationalism**
eastern Japan	western Japan	all of Japan
(female) body	(male) mind	female body idealised
idyllic	evil	idyllic until industrialisation from the West
nostalgia	despair	search for nostalgia remains unrealised due to despair at the Other
nature	culture	nature = culture
domestic	political	the political as a response to the threat of wheat farming peoples
Other	same	same
pre-history of the Japanese	history of the Japanese	deep history of the Japanese
remedy to modernity	ills of modernity	remedy to modernity
peaceful	violent	peaceful
forest	rice paddy	forest = rice paddy
childhood	adult	childhood
prior to the emperor	emperor achieves control	deep communal solidarity with the emperor

[37] Yasuda, *Seimei bunmei*, p. 66. Dates of around 18,000 BP for the earliest pottery at Yuchanyang have been published by Boaretto *et al*., 'Radiocarbon dating'.

[38] Mizoguchi, 'The reproduction of archaeological discourse', p. 158.

[39] Mizoguchi, *An Archaeological History of Japan*, p. 31.

[40] Mizoguchi, *Archaeology, Society and Identity*, p. 77.

Mizoguchi has proposed that the series of oppositions shown in the first two columns of Table 2 have become widely accepted in both academic and popular discourse in Japan. In many cases, the eco-nationalist position simply rejects the Yayoi dichotomy, producing a deep continuity between the Jōmon and the contemporary nation. Thus, both the Jōmon and modern Japan are characterised as female, idyllic, domestic, peaceful, as a remedy to modernity and are symbolised by childhood. These claims frequently ignore the evidence of the archaeological record. For example, while it may be possible to make an argument that the Jōmon was less violent than many hunter-gatherer societies, for the Yayoi such a claim clearly contradicts the archaeological record of extensive warfare and conflict. Yet Yasuda writes that the rice farming which began in the Yayoi period led to 'Japanese civilisation' becoming based on principles of coexistence and peace because 'To survive in such a [rice farming] society, one had to keep a check on one's own desires and refrain from taking all and to consider the well-being of others in the society as well as the well-being of non-human living things.'[41] In several cases, the division between Jōmon and Yayoi is seen as artificial and is elided into one; instead of eastern *versus* western Japan, Nature *versus* culture or forest *versus* rice paddy, eco-nationalism assumes a single geographic nation and that Nature = culture and thus forest = paddy. The major differences are in the way eco-nationalist writings propose a deep history—which is not a history at all—and support the emperor as a deep, natural feature of a communal Japanese society.

Cultivating the Romantic in Jōmon Studies

In the last part of this chapter, I should like to discuss a quite remarkable recent book by Tatsuo Kobayashi (b. 1937), perhaps the leading contemporary scholar of the Jōmon. Over his long career, Kobayashi has written on a range of topics including lithic technology and salvage archaeology.[42] He has also played an important role in introducing a landscape perspective to Jōmon studies. For Kobayashi, identity—or 'sublimation to feelings of belonging to "my country"'—stems from landscape, a link which began with the sedentary settlements of the Jōmon period:

> ... villages became the starting point for the consciousness of new behaviour. And people always returned to their villages. On long journeys, the inability of people to cut themselves off from feelings of homesickness stems from the reassurance of willingly entrusting one's body to the landscape of the home village. Although the natural landscape encountered on journeys also has many attractions, it is not one's own landscape and has no more than a transient meaning.[43]

As with Watsuji and Yamaori, alienation or 'homesickness'—being away from home—is key to identity, to feeling Japanese.

The book discussed here is titled 'Jōmon culture can open up the future of the Japanese', the word 'open up' (*hiraku*) also meaning to clear land for cultivation.[44] A slim volume, the text is written for the general public but incorporates ideas previously explored by Kobayashi in more academic writings. To explain world history, Kobayashi proposes two stages. In the first, humans live a nomadic existence 'like animals as part of nature', while in the second they settle down in permanent villages. On the Eurasian continent, the start of farming marks the transition to Stage 2, but in Japan sedentism developed *without* agriculture. In the rest of the world, Stage 2 is termed 'Neolithic' but, because 'Jōmon culture had no

[41] Yasuda, 'Shift of the lifestyle', p. 80. For the archaeology of Jōmon and Yayoi violence, see Sahara, 'Rice cultivation and the Japanese' and Hudson *et al.*, 'The origins of violence and warfare'.

[42] See, for example, Kobayashi, 'Microblade industries in the Japanese archipelago' and 'Trends in administrative salvage archaeology'.

[43] Kobayashi, 'The memes of the Jomon people'.

[44] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai o hiraku*.

connection with agriculture', there was no Neolithic revolution in Japan, rather there was a 'Jōmon revolution'.[45] Compared to the Eurasian continent, which possessed an 'authentic Neolithic', the Jōmon has, according to Kobayashi, been regarded as 'imperfect' or 'inferior', in short as a 'sham Neolithic'.[46] Kobayashi's response here, which goes back to Marx and ultimately Aristotle, is to argue that sedentism led to a true human social life distinct from that of animals. Living in villages (what Kobayashi calls 'culture centres') meant more opportunities for older people to stay at home and look after children. 'From discipline to cultural information', Jōmon elders 'could now teach a variety of knowledge to their grandchildren.'[47]

Another key aspect of Kobayashi's Stage 2 concerns Jōmon humans' cosy relations with the natural environment, in contrast to Neolithic populations on the Eurasian continent who developed agriculture and 'did not coexist with nature [but] came to subjugate nature'.[48] This argument that, despite sedentism, Jōmon culture 'coexisted' with Nature over more than 10,000 years is widely repeated in Japanese archaeology. Okamura proposes that the Jōmon was a stable 'utopia' during which the 'basis of the soul and technology of the Japanese people' was formed.[49] In a statement that could have been written by Umehara himself, Kobayashi concludes that, 'Japanese ideas and Japanese attitudes have an original base which differs from that of other countries. I apologise to Westerners but they are also different from European attitudes and ways of thinking, and of course originally different from those of the Chinese continent.'[50]

Kobayashi's book is highly unusual within Jōmon studies for including a whole chapter on language. This chapter contains no analysis based on either comparative historical linguistics or archaeolinguistics and only makes sense when read against a background of Romantic nationalism. In fact, Kobayashi presents us with a quite remarkable Herderian account of language in prehistoric Japan. The chapter is theatrically titled 'The Jōmon Yamato *kotoba* breathing in the heart of the Japanese people'. Yamato *kotoba* or 'Yamato language'—Yamato referring to the Nara region, the home of the early state—is a term which can be traced back to the eighteenth-century Nativist scholar Moto'ori Norinaga and has the meaning of the original elements of Japanese language which were prior to Chinese or other outside influence. Norinaga's philological study of the *Kojiki* assumed that this text 'read "correctly" as Yamato kotoba, revealed a mode of consciousness that allowed Japan to take form as a "natural" community, ... Thus community became something not produced from "outside" its members or by them but rather constituted from within them.'[51] Kobayashi's claim, therefore, is that the language of the Jōmon period can be considered as the original Japanese, enabling an extension of the 'natural community' back more than 15,000 years before the time of the *Kojiki*.

Kobayashi makes use of several linguistic titbits to bolster this claim, but begins by dismissing the expertise of Japanese linguists who, 'until very recently' have been 'especially behind the times.'[52] According to Kobayashi, Noam Chomsky's theory that language is innate means that 'all human groups possess language'; though not made explicit, the text hints at the implication that the Jōmon people

[45] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 18.

[46] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 20.

[47] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 30. Though incidental to the main focus of this chapter, Kobayashi's comments here reflect a mischaracterisation of hunter-gatherer life history. Social learning has been central to human adaptations long before sedentism: see Boyd *et al.*, 'The cultural niche'. A large literature on the 'Grandmother Hypothesis' argues that post-menopausal longevity evolved early in human history to support cross-generational learning and provisioning: see Hawkes *et al.*, 'Grandmothering'. It cannot be assumed that grandmothers (or fathers) stayed at home, 'disciplining' their children.

[48] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 3.

[49] Okamura, *Jōmon no rettō bunka*, p. 1.

[50] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 33.

[51] Burns, *Before the Nation*, p. 69.

[52] Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 130.

had their own 'natural language', a sentiment with which Herder would no doubt have approved.[53] Kobayashi writes that most Japanese linguists think that 'Japanese only began around the time of the Yayoi period'. More seriously, 'they believe that languages come from another place. It is stressed that Japanese is a branch of the Ural-Altaic languages and so on.' With a brief apology to Susumu Ōno (1919-2008), one of Japan's best-known historical linguists, Kobayashi begs to differ: 'Japanese is not something that came from some other, distant region. Japanese was born on the stage of the Japanese archipelago. The Jōmon Yamato *kotoba* was already in existence in the Jōmon period and has been nurtured [here] for more than ten thousand years.'[54]

Onomatopoeia are proposed as a piece of linguistic 'evidence' to support Kobayashi's Jōmon 'native language'. According to Kobayashi, onomatopoeia are more developed in Japanese than in any other language in the world.[55] However, these words are *not* human representations of the sounds of Nature; rather they are voices from Nature itself. In other words, writes Kobayashi, 'As well as the linguistic activity performed amongst themselves, Jōmon people faced nature on the same or a similar level, and actively developed linguistic activity with that nature.'[56] Again, this quite remarkable claim has echoes of Herder who wrote that, since the oldest languages were 'formed immediately according to living nature', they were capable 'of raging with the sea, of roaring with the river, of cracking with the collapsing rock, and of speaking with the animals.'[57] As Coleridge wrote in *Frost at Midnight* (1798), 'so shalt thou see and hear / The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible / Of that eternal language, which thy God / Utters'. This relationship with Nature is not an ecological one of 'co-existence and symbiosis'; rather, Kobayashi sees it as one of 'empathy and resonance'.

Language is also important to Kobayashi in marking the boundaries of the Jōmon. He argues that although Jōmon groups used Tsushima island as a base, they did not travel from there to Korea: 'There is no Jōmon pottery on the Korean peninsula, and no jades.' Starting a new paragraph for dramatic effect, Kobayashi goes on to explain that, 'Strictly speaking, it is not the case that they never went at all. But, for example, a large shell mound site over there might have two sherds of Jōmon pottery.' According to Kobayashi, the reason why there was not a greater exchange of ceramics between Japan and Korea is that because of linguistic differences 'the meaning of Jōmon pottery was not understood.'[58] 'The languages spoken in northern Kyushu and southern Korea may indeed have been different. The hypothesised arrival of proto-Koreanic on the peninsula around 3500 BC corresponds with a period of reduced cultural exchange with Kyushu ca. 3700-2600 BC.[59] But Kobayashi overreads the link between Jōmon pottery and (ethnic) identity. There is no reason to assume that Jōmon individuals who crossed to Korea did not simply use whatever pottery was being made locally. Kobayashi's investment in seeing Jōmon pots as an icon of identity prevents him from considering this possibility. The broader implication is

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53 Herder wrote that 'nature obliges us to learn only our native tongue, which is the most appropriate to our character, and which is most commensurate with our way of thought.' Cited in Wilson, 'Herder, folklore and Romantic nationalism', p. 827. Kobayashi could have made the same argument using critiques of Chomskyan Universal Grammar which emphasise language diversity. See, for example, Evans and Levinson, 'The myth of language universals'.

54 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 132. Kobayashi and several other archaeologists had previously published a book with Ōno which had considered the latter's theory of a link between Japanese and Tamil: see Ōno and Kanaseki, *Kōkogaku, jinruigaku, gengogaku to no taiwa*. In his 2018 book Kobayashi makes no mention of this Tamil theory. For archaeological critiques of this theory, see Hudson, 'Tamil and Japanese' and 'Ono's Tamil-Yayoi theory again'.

55 Needless to say, no evidence is provided to support this claim. While ideophones may be rare in Indo-European languages, they are common in many other languages around the world: see Evans and Levinson, 'The myth of language universals', p. 435.

56 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 134.

57 Johann Gottfried von Herder, 'Fragments on recent German literature', in Forster, *Herder*, p. 61.

58 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 98.

59 For the dispersal of Koreanic, see Hudson and Robbeets, 'Archaeolinguistic evidence'. For exchange with Kyushu, see Bausch, 'Prehistoric networks across the Korea strait'.

that 'foreigners' cannot understand Jōmon (and thus, by extension, Japanese) culture, an interpretation supported by Kobayashi's claim that Yayoi pottery (linked with farming and immigration) 'contains no world view and is just containers'.[60] Since 'As long as there is the Japanese language, Japanese culture will remain', then an essential continuity of artistic and linguistic expression can be assumed. As well as Jōmon pots in Korea, another example given by Kobayashi is *ikebana*. In claiming that 'the world of Japan's flower arrangement is Jōmon like', Kobayashi tries to suggest a very long-term continuity between language, culture and Japanese identity.[61]

One aspect of Kobayashi's approach to language differs from Romantic nationalism and especially from Herder. Kobayashi sees the sensibility of *haiku* poetry as deriving from the Jōmon because such a sensibility is *only* found in Japan and Japanese. As an example, he uses the *kigo* (season words) of 'sleeping mountain' and 'laughing mountain', claiming 'We can't find such a scene description anywhere in any other languages in the world.'[62] And yet this particular example was borrowed into Japanese from the eleventh century Chinese landscape painter Guo Xi.[63] Unlike Herder, who praised Shakespeare's ability to promote the poetry of the English vernacular, Kobayashi denies the viability of poetry in languages other than Japanese.

Kobayashi's book fits within the frame of Romanticism because it privileges the search for identity and the human relationship with Nature, because it sees human development in terms of making and consuming lifeworlds, and because it situates these goals as part of a struggle of emotion over reason. Japanese eco-nationalism shares this frame but goes beyond the Romantic into a darker territory which has clear similarities with what Umberto Eco calls Ur-fascism. Like most Japanese archaeologists, Kobayashi is probably critical of the writings of Umehara and Yasuda, though as far as I am aware he has never mentioned their work in print. Yet the common underlying framework of all these Japanese writings undeniably owes much to Romanticism.

60 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 99.
61 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, p. 101.
62 Kobayashi, *Jōmon bunka ga Nihonjin no mirai*, pp. 134-135.
63 Guo Xi wrote: 'The mountains in spring are light and seductive as if smiling ... the mountains in winter are sad and tranquil as if sleeping': see Grousset, *The Rise and Splendour*, p. 195.

Chapter 5. Conclusions: the violence of Japanese world-shaping

Japanese eco-nationalism has attempted to re-centre Nature in the Japanese story to provide an organic identity. This move shares a deep similarity with the nativist National Learning (*Kokugaku*) of the Tokugawa era, but now the archaic is incorporated though archaeology rather than through textual criticism. Over a period of almost a century, a series of eco-nationalist writers has valorised the climate and culture of Japan. These writers have gone far beyond a love of the pastoral or the local, generating a genre which defines itself *against* the Other—the Christian West, the Jews, Han China, and the world of Islam. Like Maximilien Aue in *The Kindly Ones*, Japanese eco-nationalism adopts a pathological insistence on the purity of its roots, a position associated with the thinly-veiled menace of the need to regulate or rectify the non-Japanese.

For Tetsurō Watsuji, writing in the 1920s and '30s, landscape resulted from cultural practices generated by climate. Landscapes outside Japan were marked by various shades of revulsion. Since landscape was connected to culture, Watsuji could not hide his contempt for the people inhabiting those inferior landscapes. The Jews invited their own persecution because of their desert psychology carried into Europe; Italians were 'lazy idlers' due to the 'lightness of their farming tasks'; the psychological passivity of India 'prompts in us and draws out from us all our own aggressive and masterful characteristics.' Watsuji justified the aggressive and masterful characteristics of the Japanese against Indians and other Asians because their 'resignation' was induced by their climate. For Watsuji, the monsoon climate is naturally violent and too strong for resistance, leading to resignation by monsoon peoples. Desert and meadow climates, in contrast, are respectively harsh and benign, encouraging violence by the peoples of those lands. Watsuji's comments were made at a time when the 'systemic violence' (Žižek) of Western colonialism was very real. Nevertheless, he left no doubt that his ideas about climate and culture supported Japan's own violence against non-Japanese peoples in an attempt to restore the Asian greatness that had once been held by classical China.[1]

The post war generation of eco-nationalists began from a slightly different point of departure. Stimulated by Toynbee, Umesao launched an interest in the ecological history of 'civilisations'. In the 1980s, Umehara's claims that Jōmon environmentalism (aka his 'forest civilisation') might provide a solution to the crisis of modernity appeared initially as a mild philosophical reproach. Before long the mantra changed to one of 'Japanese values' *replacing* those of 'the West'. This mantra mirrored the political Zeitgeist of 1980s Japan, the time of best-sellers such as *The Japan That Can Say No*.[2] The argument was taken to its extreme in the writings of environmental archaeologist Yoshinori Yasuda. Yet no eco-nationalist writers have discussed the fundamental contradiction in their landscape approach: if the monsoon climate or *fūdo* supports Japanese culture and its environmentalism, how can those values be transferred to other cultures which are more or less determined by their own quite different climates? Umehara and Yasuda have been silent on how this great replacement might occur, except through Yasuda's 'Shangri La' proposal that the Japanese use international marriages to expand the nation's cultural values, an idea which goes back to nineteenth century writers such as Ukichi Taguchi. Yasuda has authored diatribes against the dangers of 'foreign capital' controlling Japan.[3] In these works the 'foreign capital' is mainly Chinese but the discourse reflects familiar anti-Semitic tropes about global capital. Yasuda has also proposed sending Japanese 'eco-rangers' overseas: 'Dispatch this team to clean out toilets, particularly in China. This is the only way to change the spirit (*kokoro*) of the Chinese

[1] Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity*, p. 281.
[2] Ishihara and Morita, *NO to ieru Nihon*.
[3] Hirano and Yasuda, *Ubawareru Nihon no mori*.

people'.[4] Compared to Watsuji's support for colonial aggression against Asia, this represents an example of history appearing first as tragedy, then as farce.

Japanese eco-nationalists follow Watsuji and wartime propaganda such as the *Kokutai no hongi* in assuming that a fatalistic attitude to Nature is intrinsic to the Japanese national character. According to Yasuda, whereas in Christianity there is only one God who is responsible for everything, Japan has an animistic and polytheistic heritage. Typhoons, for example, were considered by the Japanese to be the work of dragons; since people had no control over dragons, they had to resign themselves to natural disasters. By contrast, 'in the Christian society of Europe, the dragon would be assiduously killed.'[5] As we saw in Chapter 2, for Yasuda the burning of witches is typical of this Christian scapegoating. Such comments conveniently ignore similar cases in Japanese history. After the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923, for example, thousands of Koreans were tortured, mutilated and murdered in the streets.[6] Yasuda understands the psychology of scapegoating but lacks the empathy to apply that understanding to his own country's history.

Archaeology can provide very long-term records of human-environment interactions which are crucial to building sustainability and resilience. However, linking archaeological research with environmental policy is difficult and, as noted already, the discourse on Japanese environmental exceptionalism discussed here has produced little in the way of policy recommendations.[7] Umehara and his followers have instead proposed a reductionist return to, or a revival of, prehistoric cultural assemblages centred on the Jōmon and Yayoi periods, reducing cultural variation to 'civilisational' packages which remain fixed and unchanging over millennia. Japanese eco-nationalism is an example of what Morton calls a *record store approach* to ecology wherein pre-printed labels such as 'Western civilisation', 'animism' and 'monotheism' are simply attached to ideas without critical reflection. This is dangerous because 'the categories get circulated, and become more legitimate. Then it becomes difficult to think outside the boxes of the categories we are retweeting.'[8]

Japanese eco-nationalism adopts a superficially comparativist approach to the world. These comparisons are made primarily between Japan and western Europe and, in Umehara's early works in particular, any contribution from the third world was denied.[9] More recently, Yasuda has tried to incorporate so-called 'Pan-Pacific civilisations' in his neo-colonialist vision but that approach remains unconvincing in its ability to go beyond a binary logic of Japan *versus* Europe. The argument that the solution to today's problems is to be found only in Japan is profoundly racist and reactionary. More than thirty years ago, archaeologist Izumi Niiro's insightful critique of Umehara's work noted that all peoples in the world have the potential to contribute solutions to global problems; in fact, those peoples and classes who suffer the most under global modernity could be said to have a privileged position in that respect.[10]

The ostensibly comparative approach of Japanese eco-nationalism is also contradicted by the way it views Japan as a place where life is lived within a closed 'box'. Anthropologist Tim Ingold has criticised the notion of place as bounded space. Ingold's 'contention is that lives are led not inside places but through, around, to and from them, from and to places elsewhere.' Ingold links place with movement, which he terms *wayfaring.* Thus, places 'are delineated by movement, not by the outer limits to

4 Translation by Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history', p. 12
5 Yasuda, *Kankyō bunmeiron*, p. 456.
6 See Ryang, 'The Great Kanto Earthquake and the massacre of Koreans'.
7 For a discussion of the relationship between archaeology and environmental policy, see Hudson, 'Navigating disciplinary challenges'.
8 Morton, *Being Ecological*, p. 192.
9 Niiro, 'Umehara Nihongaku', p. 21.
10 Niiro, 'Umehara Nihongaku', p. 21.

movement.'[11] Japanese eco-nationalism sees islands like Japan as more sustainable since people living there realise their limits more easily. This is a nice idea but there is no empirical evidence it is true. The opposite could equally be the case: living on an island makes it easier to pretend that an ecological 'over there' really exists. Morton quips that 'One doesn't throw a candy wrapper away—one drops it on Mount Everest.'[12] While Japan seems like a place which it is easy to draw lines around, such lines are never natural.

The question of boundaries brings up the violence at the heart of Japanese eco-nationalism. Morton explains that

> If there is no inside-outside boundary, social space must already include nonhumans, albeit unconsciously. Thus, its contradictions must be structural: they transcend empirical differences. It's not the case that there are 'real' or 'more real' beings toward the center of a mandala of concentric circles. It's that differences are always arbitrarily produced by acts of violence (social, psychic and philosophical) on beings that cannot in any sense be arbitrarily divided in such ways (hence the violence).[13]

Inside-outside boundaries are the bright lodestar of Japanese eco-nationalism. As Morton perceptively notes, such arbitrary boundaries require violence for their reproduction. The arbitrariness begins innocently enough, as when Tatsuo Kobayashi writes about Jōmon sedentism. The creation of an 'artificial space within the natural environment' and thus 'a clear statement of an intention to branch away from the natural world of all animals and plants of which humans had previously been one element', sedentism led to an 'objectification of nature' wherein 'the village (*mura*) and surrounding nature (*hara* or 'plain') became clearly opposed.'[14] So far so classic agrilogistics, but Kobayashi then proceeds to claim that

> Although village and plain were clearly opposed, ... this was in no way a hostile relationship, nor did it share the same objectification of the conquest of nature found in modern Western rationalism. In contrast, from the perspective of the Jomon people, they were taking one step back in opposition to the natural environment and in fact advanced towards the construction of a new, unwavering relationship with nature.[15]

Kobayashi frequently stresses the ways in which humans, in contrast to other animals, shape their world, a distinction which mirrors Heidegger's characterisation of humans being 'world-shaping' (*weltbildend*) versus animals which are 'world poor' (*weltarm*). Sedentism for Kobayashi led to a type of human niche but this was not 'a hostile relationship' involving the 'conquest of nature'. It was 'world-shaping' but only in a benign Japanese way. Like Heidegger, Kobayashi uses the metaphor of a bounded 'clearing' in the forest; the space of Jōmon (and by extension Japanese) dwelling is thus bounded and controlled.

Perhaps more than in other countries, the sudden transition from feudal to industrial modes of production forced the Japanese to confront the problem of how tradition interacted with modernity. In response, many Japanese writers have taken a winding, stony path between acceptance of various historical layers and the wish to imagine a single, authentic Nation. Japanese eco-nationalism mirrors European Romantic thought in its emphasis on nation and identity, on primitive and *Ur* landscapes, and on passion and instinct. In certain respects, the project of Romantic nationalism has been realised

[11] Ingold, *Being Alive*, pp. 148-149.
[12] Morton, *Humankind*, p. 6.
[13] Morton, *Humankind*, p. 24.
[14] Kobayashi, 'The memes of the Jomon people'.
[15] Kobayashi, 'The memes of the Jomon people'.

more perfectly in Japan than anywhere else. A series of writers examined here has offered a redemptive Nature for Japan, yet has successfully limited the authentic landscape to the Japanese nation. Landscape effectively becomes a 'smokescreen' from any material realities.[16] As Reitan argues, 'reactionary ecology in Japan reflects a desire for ethnic community' and can be understood as 'a fascist desire to create or rely upon a nationalistic narrative of Japanese cultural uniqueness that conceals the excesses of capitalism and operates to sustain the socio-economic order that is today generating ecological catastrophe.'[17] It is for this reason that the writings on landscape and the archaic considered in this book retain their relevancy in an inter-connected world in ever-growing ecological crisis.

[16] Cf. Daniels, 'Marxism, culture and the duplicity of landscape'.
[17] Reitan, 'Ecology and Japanese history'.

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